TULLY's Morals.

BRITISH MUSEUM

(Cicero (M. T.)

R

Hugh. W. Diamond

TULLY's OFFICES,

In English.

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Revised and Corrected.

By Mr. THO. COCKMAN.

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PREFACE.

THE Author of this Book is so well known, that it would be altogether needless to give any Account of him in this Place. As for the Book it self, it has always been looked upon as one of the perfectest Pieces of his Writings, and one of the noblest Systems of Moral Precepts, that have ever been left us by the ancient Heathens; and not without Reason: There appears all along in it so great a Love and Concern for Virtue, which he recommends to his Son with all imaginable Earnestness; so deep a Sense of the Obligations to Honesty, and Aversion for every thing that is contrary to it; such an admirable Inclination for the Virtues of Plainness, Truth, and Sincerity; and such a generous Contempt of all shuffling, mean, and under-hand Dealings; such Piety towards his native Country, and hearty Concern for the Calamities it groaned under, and withal, so much Hatred and Detestation for those Men, who had been the Causes of its Misfortunes; and, in a Word, so many excellent Rules of Life, with reference to our Duty either to God or Men, and to these in their several Capacities and Relations, whether of Kindred, Friends, or Benefactors, as have justly recommended it to the Esteem of all the World, and given it the first Place among the eminent and most celebrated Writings of this Kind. The Scope and Design

of it, in his own Words, is, To lay down ſome Directions and Precepts of good Living, according to which, upon all Occaſions, Men ought to govern their Lives and Actions; ſo that whatever State of Life a Man is in, whether Publick or Private, of Governour or Governed, of Proſperity or Adverſity, of old Age or Youth, he will here find Rules how he ought to demean himſelf in any of thoſe Capacities; and will be told what that is, which the Dignity and Excellence of his own Nature requires in regard to himſelf, and what the ſeveral ſorts of Alliance or Society among Men demand, in relation to other People: So that while other Parts of Learning and Knowledge are moſt times confined either to certain Ages, certain Times, or certain Places, this is of general and univerſal uſe; it is (as our Author ſays upon another Subject) neceſſary for Youth as well as old Age; it directs in Proſperity as well as in Adverſity; it is a Delight to us at home, and a Companion for us abroad; Pernoctat nobiſcum, peregrinatur, ruſticatur.

IT was principally deſigned for the uſe of his own Son, whom he had ſent to Athens *for the Benefit of Study, while all things were in Diſorder and Confuſion at* Rome, *after* Pompey's *Defeat in the* Pharſalian *Field; but he tells us he has purpoſely framed it in ſuch a Manner, as that it might be equally ſerviceable to all other People. The Time of its writing was after* Cæsar *was killed, when* Mark Anthony *and his Adherents had got the Power into their Hands, and* Cicero (*as he complains at the Beginning of the third Book*) *was by wicked Arms driven away from the City, and forced to betake himſelf to his private Retirements. At this Time he thought to have gone to* Athens *to his Son, and was accordingly on his Journey, when he*

he was called back again by the loud Cries of his Country, as he intimates in the Concluſion of this Diſcourſe, and explains more at large in the Beginning of his firſt Philippick. *He returned to* Rome *upon this Recall, but found things very different from what he expected when he came thither: Hereupon he withdrew himſelf to his Houſes in the Country, reſolving to wait for ſome fitter Opportunity of being ſerviceable to the Republick. From this Retirement he ſent theſe Precepts in writing to his Son, which he deſigned to have given him by Word of Mouth, had he arrived at* Athens. *The Method he proceeds in, is this which follows: After a ſhort Diſcourſe by way of Preface to his Son, and fixing the right Notion of the Subject he is to treat about, he endeavours to beget in him a Love of* Honeſty, *by repreſenting it as amiable and commendable in it ſelf, and agreeable to the Nature and Reaſon of Mankind. He divides it into four Parts, or general Heads,* Prudence, Juſtice, Fortitude, *and* Temperance, *which are uſually called the four* Cardinal Virtues; *and diſcourſes in order upon every one of them, with all their ſeveral Species or Branches, and the Vices that ſtand in oppoſition to them. And this he does, not in a dry and ſcholaſtical Manner, by enquiring nicely wherein the ſtrict Nature of the ſeveral Virtues conſiſts, and which of their oppoſite Vices they are neareſt to, (which my Lord* Bacon *ſomewhere very ingeniouſly obſerves, is like a Maſter's ſetting a Boy a Copy to write after, without ever ſhewing him how he ſhould make his Letters) but by laying down ſuch Rules under each of theſe Heads, as may direct Men in the Practice of the Duties required of them. Afterwards he compares* them *with one another, and ſhews in what Order they are to be performed by*

us; *as* Juſtice, *for Example*, *before* Knowledge, Fortitude, &c. *All theſe Virtues, when taken together, make up the general Notion of* Honeſtum; *and when taken ſeparately, are ſo many Branches or diſtinct Members of it.*

BUT ſeeing ſomething elſe beſide Virtue *or* Honeſty *is neceſſarily requiſite, or at leaſt uſeful and convenient, for our well-being here*; *ſuch as are the* Comforts *and* Conveniencies *of Life*, viz. *Riches, Glory, Honours, Succeſs in Buſineſs*, &c. *which are all comprehended under the Notion of the Word* Profit; *therefore in the ſecond Book he endeavours to ſhew how theſe are to be obtained: And having made it appear, That all the* Advantages *Men enjoy, and the* Evils *they endure, are principally owing to Men themſelves, from thence he infers, That the way whereby we may obtain the* former, *and avoid the* latter, *is to procure the Endeavours of* Men *on our Side, ſo as to have* them *ready to aſſiſt us upon Occaſion. This he ſhews can be done no other way, than by performing thoſe Duties which* Honeſty *requires of us*; viz. *by* Prudence *and* Wiſdom, *by* Juſtice *and* Integrity *in our Words and Actions, whereby Men are drawn to place their Truſt and Confidence in us*; (*where alſo he particularly ſhews, that Pretending and Hypocriſy can never get a Man any laſting Honour*) *by* Kindneſs *and* Beneficence, Courteſy *and* Affability, *which beget in Men a Love and Affection toward us*; *and laſtly, by* Fortitude, Contempt of Money, &c. *which are Virtues that draw Men to Wonder and Admiration, and make them think us Perſons that really deſerve to be promoted.*

BUT becauſe Riches, Honours, Power, and the like, which ſeem *to be a Profit and Advantage to us, may often interfere with Virtue and Duty,*

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which really *are such*; *therefore in the third Book he endeavours to shew, How a good Man ought to carry himself in such a Case*; *and makes it appear, that Riches, Honours, Kingdoms, and Empires are far from being truly an Advantage to any Man, whenever they are gotten by unlawful Means*; *and that no honest Man would do any thing that is contrary to Conscience or Honesty, tho' sure to obtain even the whole World by it. All which he builds upon this Foundation,* That the Goods of the Soul, *viz.* Virtue and Honesty, are, if not the *only*, yet infinitely the *greatest* Goods; (*which is a Principle allowed of by all the wiser Philosophers:*) *From whence it must follow, that whoever parts with* these *upon the Account of any Riches, or other seeming Advantage, be it never so great, must needs be a Loser*; *for he forfeits a* greater *for the sake of a* less *Good, and in hopes of getting a* seeming, *deprives himself of a* real Interest. *Here he goes over each of the Virtues mentioned in the first Book, and proves that nothing can be a Man's true Profit, tho' it should bring him all the appearing Advantages in the World, and tho' he were sure to keep it secret from the Eyes of all Men, and even of the Gods themselves, that is contrary to the Duties of Prudence and Justice, of Fortitude and Moderation. In a Word, here are Rules for the Government of our Lives in relation to* God, *our* Neighbours, *and* Ourselves, *such as are deservedly admired in a Heathen, and might have well become even a Christian Writer. He tells us, that to procure the Favour of the* Former, *we must live a religious and holy Life: That, as to the* Second, *there is an Alliance or Society between all Mankind, whereby each Particular is obliged to do his best, toward promoting the Happiness and Welfare of*

the whole Body, and rather to die than do another any Injury: That, as to Ourſelves, *we ſhould always conſider the Dignity and Excellence of our reaſonable Nature, and take Care that we never be guilty of any Action, that may any wiſe ſtain or unbecome its Honour: This, as he goes on, will quickly teach us, how baſe a thing it is to diſſolve in Luxury, Softneſs,* &c. —— *Thus have I endeavoured to preſent the Reader with a general View of this incomparable Treatiſe: Should I proceed to tell him, that ſome of the moſt eminent Writers in the World have owed great Part of their Credit to it; that the* Sanderſons, Grotiuses, Pufendorfs, &c. *are particularly obliged to it for their Skill in determining moral Caſes, perhaps he might think me rather zealous, than impartial, in my Account of it; tho' I can aſſure him it is no more than what is ſtrictly true. The firſt of thoſe great Perſons (as the Writer of his Life tells us) had it all by Heart; and how much uſe the two latter have made of it, I leave thoſe to judge who have been converſant with their Writings.* —— *But the Book can much better recommend it ſelf by its own true Value, than I can do by any thing I am able to ſay of it; thither therefore I ſhall refer the Reader for his further Satisfaction, after I have told him, in a few Words, what has been attempted in this new Tranſlation.*

I have endeavoured to expreſs what I conceived to be the Senſe and Meaning of the Author, in as full and comprehenſive Words as I was able, attending all along to the principal Scope and Deſign of his Diſcourſe, rather than to the particular Words and Expreſſions. I have taken Care however to let none of his Words eſcape, without giving the Senſe of them in our own Language; ſo far from

that, as that I rather expect to be condemned, on the other Hand, for explaining some of them a great deal too much, and spending a Line perhaps, or more, in that, which the Author expressed in but one single Word: But whoever considers the Nature of the Latin *Tongue, and our Author's way of writing, especially in this Book, will easily perceive that it was necessary for me to do so, otherwise the* English *would have been almost as hard to be understood as the* Latin: *For the Truth of which I refer the Reader to Chap.* 35, 36, 37. *Book* 1. *not to name innumerable other Places. I have had a peculiar Eye all along to the Method of the Discourse, and the Connexion or Dependance of one Part of it upon another; which because it is oftentimes very obscure, I have generally added the distinguishing Terms of* first, second, &c. *and where that could not be done, have sometimes added a Line perhaps, to shew how he passes from one thing to another: But this I have generally told the Reader of, or else have printed what is so added in a different Letter; as may be seen at the Beginning of Chap.* 6. *and the End of Chap.* 7. *Book* 1. *As to some things, that are of little or no Consequence toward understanding the Author, as if I have translated* Cæna *Dinner;* Hominis honorati & principis, *a Gentleman, or a Person of Honour;* Convivium, *sitting at a Table, and over a Glass of Wine,* &c. *or if in a philosophical Discourse as this is, I have sometimes made use of an unusual Word, I suppose they will be counted not unwarrantable Liberties, but such as are commonly taken by Translators. If in the Main I have hit upon the true Sense and Meaning of my Author, and expressed it in such clear and intelligible Terms, as may make the Reader see what is the Force of his*

Arguments, the Reasonableness of his Precepts, the Fitness of his several Illustrations and Examples, with those other Virtues which have rendred this Book so deservedly famous, I have obtained what I principally designed by this Attempt.

I have gone according to that Division of Chapters which is usually received, because the Book has been quoted according to it, and to have made any Alteration would but have bred Confusion. I have put before each Chapter a Summary of what is contained in it; and to the Whole have subjoined an Index, referring to the principal Matters that are mentioned in the Book. The Notes which went along with the former Impressions, are here purposely omitted; that those, who do not need them, may have TULLY's OFFICES *pure and entire, in a small Volume; but are intended to be printed again in due time, for the Benefit of others. I have made some use of Sir* R. L'ESTRANGE's *English, and especially Mr.* DU B.'s *French Translation; which I gratefully acknowledge. In fine, I am sure my Design was commendable; the Success of it I must leave to the Reader's Judgment: I shall only say, That as I look for no Honour from any thing I can do, more especially of this Nature; so I hope that however I may expect a Pardon.*

TULLY's

TULLY'S OFFICES.

The FIRST BOOK.

CHAP. I.

Cicero *exhorts his Son, a young Student at* Athens, *not to forget his* Latin, *tho' he was in a* Greek *Univerſity; but to mix the Studies of both theſe Languages, and alſo learn to write both as a Philoſopher and an Orator. To this Purpoſe he adviſes him to read his Works, as having equally written in each of thoſe Kinds, which none of the* Grecians *had ever done. But he modeſtly adds, That he thinks they could have done if, but that they applied themſelves wholly to one of them.*

Dear Son MARCUS.

THO' after a Year's Study under CRATIPPUS, and that at ſuch a Place as *Athens*, you cannot but have abundantly furniſhed your ſelf with Knowledge in the Doctrines and Rules of Philoſophy; having had the Advantage of ſo eminent a Maſter

Maſter to ſupply you with Learning, and a City that affords you ſuch excellent Examples: Yet I ſhould think it convenient for you (which is a Method I took for my own Improvement) always to mingle ſome *Latin* with your *Greek*, in the Study of Eloquence as well as Philoſophy; that you may be equally perfect in both thoſe Ways of Writing, and make your ſelf Maſter of either Language. For the Furtherance of which, I am apt to imagine, I have done no inconſiderable Service to our Country-men; ſo that not only thoſe who do not underſtand *Greek*, but even thoſe that *do*, will be ready to acknowledge, that my Works have been ſome Advantage and Help to them both in ſpeaking and judging. Wherefore I am willing, it is true, you ſhould learn of your preſent Maſter, the greateſt Philoſopher of this Age, and *learn* of him too as long as you deſire it; and ſo long I think it is your Duty to *deſire* it, as you find your ſelf ſufficiently benefited by it: But withal, I would have you to read my Writings, which very little differ from thoſe of the Peripateticks; for both we and they profeſs our ſelves Followers, not of SOCRATES only, but of PLATO likewiſe. As for the Matters contained in them, uſe your own Judgment with Freedom and Impartiality; for I lay no Manner of Reſtraint upon you: Your Improvement in the *Latin* is what I chiefly aim at, which I am confident muſt follow from a careful Peruſal of them. Nor let any one think that I am Vain or Pretending when I ſpeak thus: For, allowing ſome others the Precedence in Philoſophy, ſhould I aſſume to my ſelf what is the Part of an Orator, *viz.* to ſpeak ſuitably, methodically and handſomely upon any Subject, ſeeing I have ſpent my whole Life in that Study, I think it is no more than what I

might

might reaſonably and fairly lay Claim to. I cannot but very earneſtly deſire you therefore, my dear CICERO, to read my Writings with Care and Diligence; not my *Orations* only, but theſe Pieces alſo that concern *Philoſophy*, which are now of a Bulk almoſt equal to them: For tho' in the former there is more of the Force and Power of Eloquence, yet is the ſmooth and even Stile of the latter by no Means to be neglected. And of all the *Grecians* I find not one, that has employed his Pen in both theſe Kinds; and been at once ſucceſsful in the Language of the Bar, and this other more gentle and eaſie Stile of Philoſophical Diſcourſes: Unleſs DEMETRIUS PHALEREUS may be reckoned for one, who is ſubtle enough in his Diſputes of Philoſophy, but methinks in his Oratory wants that Spirit and Vehemence that is requiſite; however has ſuch a Vein of Sweetneſs in him, that one might know he had been THEOPHRASTUS's Scholar. Whether I have had any better Succeſs in both theſe Ways, muſt be left to the Judgment of others to determine: I can only ſay that I have attempted them both. And it is my Opinion, That if ever PLATO had undertaken to plead, he would have been a moſt copious and powerful Orator; and if DEMOSTHENES had ſtudied and diſcourſed of thoſe things, which he learnt of PLATO, he would have done it with a great deal of Ornament and Majeſty. The ſame I think true of ISOCRATES and ARISTOTLE; each of which, pleaſed with his own Way of Writing, neglected to cultivate and improve the other.

CHAP.

Chap. II.

The Reaſons why he writes upon this Subject. The general Uſe and Importance of it. All Philoſophers have handled it; tho' ſome, by their falſe Notions of Happineſs and Miſery, utterly pervert it. What Sects they are, that have a Right to lay down any Rules or Precepts concerning it. He deſigns in this Work to follow the Stoicks principally. The Subject of a Diſcourſe ought firſt to be defined, before we begin to ſay any thing upon it.

BUT having reſolved to write ſome thing at preſent, and a great many others hereafter to you, I thought I could begin upon no better Argument, than that which is fitteſt for your Age, and moſt becoming my Authority as a Father; For, of all thoſe uſeful and important Subjects, which Philoſophers have handled ſo largely and accurately, the Precepts they have delivered about *Offices* or *Duties*, appear of the largeſt Extent and Comprehenſion; for they take in every Part of our Lives, ſo that whatever we go about, whether of publick or private Affairs, whether at home or abroad, whether conſidered barely by our ſelves, or as we ſtand in relation to other People, we lie conſtantly under an *Obligation* to ſome Duties; and, as all the Virtue and Credit of our Lives proceeds from the due Diſcharge of *This*, ſo all the Baſeneſs and Turpitude of them reſults from the Non-obſervance of *It*. Now, tho' this be a Subject which all Philoſophers have buſied themſelves about, (for who ever dared to aſſume that Name, without laying down ſome Inſtructions about Duty?) yet

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have ſome Sects of them given ſuch Accounts of Man's Happineſs and Miſery, as deſtroy the very Being of Virtue and Honeſty. For he that makes any thing his chiefeſt Good, wherein Juſtice or Virtue does not bear a Part, and ſets up Profit, not Honeſty, for the Meaſure of his Happineſs; as long as he acts in conformity with his own Principles, and is not over-ruled by the meer Dictates of Reaſon and Humanity, can never do the Offices of Friendſhip, Juſtice, or Liberality: Nor can he be ever a Man of Courage, who thinks that Pain is the greateſt Evil; or he of Temperance, who imagines Pleaſure to be the ſovereign Good. Which things are all ſo obvious and plain, that one would think they could never ſtand in need of a Diſpute; however, I have largely diſcourſed upon them in another Work. Theſe Sects therefore, unleſs they are reſolved to be inconſiſtent with themſelves, ought wholly to abſtain from ſpeaking any thing about Duties. Nor indeed can any conſtant, unalterable, rational Rules of them at all be given, unleſs it be by thoſe who go upon this Principle, *That it is Virtue alone*, or at leaſt that *chiefly, which ought to be deſired for its own ſake*: So that only the Stoicks, Academicks, and Peripateticks have a Right to lay down any Rules upon this Subject; for as to the Opinion of ARISTO, PYRRHO, and HERILLUS, that has been exploded a good while ago; who might have claimed a Privilege to treat about Duties, *as well as the former three*, had they but left a Poſſibility of Chuſing, and allowed of at leaſt ſo much Difference between things, as to put us into a Capacity of finding out our Duty, and diſtinguiſhing it from that which is not ſo. I ſhall follow therefore at this Time, and on this Subject more eſpecially, the Stoicks; not as a bare

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Tranſlator of them, but (according to my uſual Cuſtom) ſhall take out of their Stores ſo much, and after ſuch a Manner, as in my own Judgment I ſhall think moſt convenient. Seeing then the Whole of our following Diſcourſe is deſigned to be about *Offices* or *Duties*, I think it will be neceſſary for me, in the firſt Place, to determine and fix the Signification of the Word *Office*; which I cannot but admire to find omitted by PANÆTIUS; for every clear and rational Diſcourſe upon any Subject, ought firſt to begin with an Explication of that Subject, that ſo we may have a diſtinct Conception of what we are afterwards to diſcourſe about.

CHAP. III.

The whole Subject of Duties conſiſts of two Parts. Ordinary and perfect Duties, and what they are. Panætius *made but three general Heads of Deliberation, to which* Cicero *adds two more. The general Method he deſigns to take in the whole Work.*

THE whole Subject of Duties then, in its greateſt Latitude, comprehends under it theſe two Parts: The firſt is taken up in explaining what is *Good*, and what our *greateſt Good*; the ſecond in certain Directions and Precepts, according to which, upon all Occaſions, it is our Duty to govern our Lives and Actions. To the firſt Part belong ſuch Queſtions as theſe, *Whether all Duties are perfect, or not?* and, *Whether one can be greater or leſs than another?* with ſeveral others to the ſame

ſame Purpoſe: Not but that the Duties of this ſecond Part, which conſiſts in the laying down of Rules and Precepts, have ſome Tendency and Relation to our chiefeſt Good; but only it does not ſo plainly appear, becauſe they ſeem to relate more immediately to the Government of our Lives, and Regulation of our Manners: And theſe are they I deſign to explain in the following Treatiſe. There is alſo another Diſtribution of Duties, ſome of them being called *Middle* or Ordinary, and others *Perfect* or Compleat. To the latter, I think, we may give the Name of *Right* or *Strait*; which ſort by the *Greeks* is call'd Κατόρθωμα, as the former *ordinary one* Καθῆκον. By that which we have called *Right* or *Strait*, as they explain it, is meant a Virtue *that is wholly compleat in all its Parts, without any manner of Flaw or Imperfection*; and by that which we have call'd *Ordinary*, ſuch a one as *a fair and reaſonable Account may be given for the doing of it*. Now theſe *fair and reaſonable Accounts* are all to be drawn from ſeveral Heads, which are by PANÆTIUS reduced to three, and may be called general Heads of Deliberating or Doubting concerning any Action, whether it ſhould, or ſhould not be done. The firſt is, when it is conſulted or doubted, Whether the Action, that is under Conſideration, be honeſt or diſhoneſt; in which Enquiry Men are often divided between ſeveral Opinions. The ſecond is, when it is enquired and conſulted, Whether the Action, that is under Deliberation, will ſupply us with the Pleaſures and Conveniencies of Life, furniſh us with Plenty of outward things, ſuch as Riches, Honours, Power, *&c.* which may put us into a Capacity of doing good to our ſelves, and to all thoſe for whom we are more nearly concerned; all which Enquiry comes under the general

neral Head of *Profit*. The third Ground or Reason of Doubting is, When that thing, which seems to be profitable for us, comes into Competition with that which is honest; for then our Interest drawing us one way, and Honesty pulling us back another, the wavering Mind is as it were torn in sunder between the two, and is racked with doubting and anxious Thoughts. There is no greater Fault in any Division, than not to take in all the several Parts of the Matter to be divided; and yet two are omitted in the now mentioned one of PANÆTIUS: For Men not only consult and deliberate, whether such an Action be honest or dishonest; but also, of two Honests that are both proposed to them, which is the most so; and, in like Manner, of two Profitables, which is the most profitable. From whence it appears, that what he thought was contained in three, ought rather to be divided into five Heads. We must then, in the first Place, discourse about *Honesty*; and this we shall do under these two Enquiries, *Whether the thing proposed be honest or dishonest?* and, *Of two that are honest, which is the most so?* which will make up the Subject of our First Book. We shall treat in our Second of *Profit* or *Interest* under the same Heads: And lastly, in our Third, we shall endeavour to shew, *When a seeming Advantage and Honesty come into Competition, how a good Man should determine his Judgment.*

CHAP.

Chap. IV.

The Excellence of the Nature of Man above that of Brutes. How the ſeveral Virtues, Prudence, Juſtice, &c. *are agreeable to its Dictates, and reſult from them. Wherein* Honeſtum *in general conſiſts.*

THE firſt thing then to be taken Notice of is this, That every Creature doth by Nature endeavour to preſerve its own ſelf, its Life, and Body, and to ſhun and avoid thoſe things which appear prejudicial and hurtful to it; but to ſeek and procure whatever is neceſſary for the Support of its Being, and Advancement of its Happineſs, ſuch as Food, Shelter, and the like. There is likewiſe common to all ſorts of Animals a Deſire of Copulation, for the Continuance and Propagation of their ſeveral Species; together with a Love and Concern for their young ones. Now there is this ſpecial Difference between Men and Brutes, that the *latter* are governed by nothing elſe but Senſe, never look any farther than juſt to what ſtrikes and affects them at preſent, and have a very little, if any Concern at all, for what is paſt or to come: But the *former* are Creatures endowed with Reaſon, which gives them a Power to carry their Thoughts to the Conſequences of things; to diſcover Cauſes before they have yet produced their Effects; to ſee the whole Progreſs, and even the firſt Seeds (as it were) and Appearances of them; to compare like Occurrences with like, and by joyning what is paſt and what is to come together, to make a juſt Eſtimate of the one from the other; whereby they are able at once to take a View of their

their whole Lives, and accordingly make Proviſion for the Neceſſities of them. And the ſame Force of Reaſon makes all Men by Nature to love one another, and deſire an Entercourſe of Words and Actions. It begets in them likewiſe a ſomewhat extraordinary Love and Affection for their own Children, and ſtrongly enclines them to frequent publick Meetings, and keep up Societies one amongſt another. For the ſame Reaſon alſo they are very induſtrious to provide for the Neceſſaries and Conveniencies of Life, and that not only for themſelves in particular, but for their Wives, their Children, and others whom they have a Kindneſs for, and are obliged to take care of; which Concern is very proper to rouſe up the Spirits, and make them more vigorous and active in Buſineſs. But of all the Properties and Inclinations of Men, there is none more natural and peculiar to them, than an earneſt Deſire and Search after Truth. Hence it is our Minds are no ſooner free from the Thoughts and Engagements of neceſſary Buſineſs, but we preſently long to be either ſeeing, or hearing, or learning of ſomething; and eſteem the Knowledge of things ſecret and wonderful, as a neceſſary Ingredient of a happy Life. From whence it appears, That nothing is more agreeable and ſuited to the Nature and Minds of Men, than undiſguiſed Openneſs, Truth, and Sincerity. Next to this Love and Affection for Truth, there follows in the Soul an impatient Deſire and Inclination to Superiority; ſo that whoever has the genuine Nature of a Man in him, will never endure to be ſubject to another, unleſs he be one that inſtructs, or adviſes, or is inveſted with a juſt and lawful Authority for the Benefit of the Publick. From whence there ariſes a Greatneſs of Soul, which ſets it above all the

the petty Concerns and trifling Enjoyments of this preſent World. It is another, and that too no mean Prerogative of our reaſonable Nature, that Man alone can diſcern all the Beauties of Order and Decency, and knows how to govern his Words and Actions in conformity to them. It is he alone, that of all the Creatures obſerves and is pleaſed with the Beauty, Gracefulneſs, and Symmetry of Parts in the *Objects of Senſe*; which Nature and Reaſon obſerving in them, from thence take Occaſion to apply the ſame alſo to *thoſe of the Mind*; and conclude that Beauty, Conſiſtency, and Regularity, ſhould be much more kept up in our Words and Actions; and therefore command us, that nothing be done that is effeminate or unbecoming; and that ſo ſtrict a Guard be kept over every Thought and Action, as that no Luſt or Filthineſs be either conceived or practiſed by us. From theſe Inclinations and Inſtincts of Nature, ariſes and reſults that *Honeſtum* we are ſeeking for; which however little valued and eſteemed it may be, is nevertheleſs virtuous and amiable in it ſelf; and which we juſtly affirm, tho' it were commended by no one, to be yet in its own Nature truly commendable.

CHAP. V.

The admirable Beauty of Honeſty. *Four general Heads of* it, *from which all the ſeveral Duties ariſe; and what the Object of each of them is, about which it is employed.*

THUS, Son MARCUS, have I given you a rough Draught, and juſt the Outlines, as it were,

were, of *Honesty*; which, could she be seen in her full Beauty with mortal Eye, would make the whole World (as PLATO has said) be in love with Wisdom. Now whatever is contained under the Notion of Honesty, arises from one of these four Heads; *First*, A sagacious Enquiry and Observation for the finding out of Truth; *which may be called by the general Name of Prudence. Secondly*, A Care to maintain that Society and mutual Entercourse which is between Men; to render to every Man what is his Due; and to stand to one's Words in all Promises and Bargains; *which we call Justice. Thirdly*, The Greatness and unshaken Resolution of a truly brave and invincible Mind; *which goes by the Name of Magnanimity or Fortitude.* And, *Lastly*, A keeping of our Words and Actions within the due Limits of Order and Decency; under which are comprehended *Temperance* and *Moderation.* Now every one of these several Heads, tho' they all have a mutual Connexion and Dependance upon one another, has yet its particular *Classis* (as it were) and respective Sett of Duties arising from it: From that, for Example, which is mentioned first, and under which *Prudence* and *Wisdom* are contained, arises the Duty of seeking, contemplating, and finding out of Truth, which is the proper and peculiar Business of those Virtues; for it is then, and then alone, that we justly esteem a Man prudent and wise, when we find that he is able to see and discover the Truth of things; and of an active, vigorous, and piercing Mind, to give an Account of the Reasons of them; so that it is *Truth* that is the proper Object of both these Virtues, and that about which they are only concerned. The other three Heads more peculiarly belong to the *active Life*, and their Business lies in procuring and

and keeping what is uſeful and neceſſary for the Preſervation of it; as in holding up mutual Love and Correſpondence among Mankind; in an elevated Greatneſs and Strength of Mind; which appears, as in getting things profitable and pleaſant for our ſelves and Dependants; ſo more eſpecially in deſpiſing and being above them. Then as for the laſt, *viz.* Order, Uniformity, Moderation, and the like, it is plain they belong not only to Contemplation, but have alſo a reſpect to our outward Actions; ſince from keeping of *theſe* within the Bounds and Limits of Order and Moderation, we are ſaid to obſerve what is virtuous and becoming.

CHAP. VI.

Prudence or Contemplation of Truth, the firſt of the general Virtues, is the neareſt allied to the Nature of Man. Two Cautions concerning it. It ought to give Place to the Duties of the active Life. What it ought eſpecially to be employed about.

HAVING thus explained how the whole Nature and Power of Honeſty, is deduced from ſome one of theſe four Parts, we are now to diſcourſe of them each in particular. And, firſt, of *Prudence*, which is wholly taken up in the Knowledge of Truth, and has the neareſt Affinity of any with the reaſonable Nature of Man: For how are we all of us drawn and enticed with the Deſire of Wiſdom? How noble and glorious a thing do we imagine it to excel in Knowledge? and how mean and reproachful do we count it, on the other Hand,

Hand, to ſlip, to be in an Error, to be ignorant, or to be impoſed upon? In gratifying this ſo natural and virtuous Inclination in the Mind of Man, there are two grand Faults to be carefully avoided: The *firſt* is an over-great Haſtineſs and Raſhneſs in giving up our Aſſent, preſuming that we know things before we really do ſo. Whoever deſires (as I am ſure all ought) to avoid this Error, muſt in all his Enquiries allow himſelf Time, and diligently conſider the Matter with himſelf, before he proceeds to paſs his Judgment upon it. The *ſecond* Fault is, that a great many Men beſtow abundance of Study, and a world of Pains, upon very difficult and obſcure Subjects, and ſuch as, perhaps, when they are found out, are of but very little, or no Concernment. Would Men but be careful to ſhun theſe two Miſtakes, whatſoever Study or Pains they might ſpend upon virtuous, worthy, or profitable Subjects, it would not without Reaſon be highly commended. Thus CAIUS SULPICIUS was heretofore praiſed for his Skill in Aſtronomy, SEXT. POMPEIUS, ſince my Memory, for his in Geometry: Many have been famous in the Study of Logick, and more in that of the Civil Laws; the more peculiar Buſineſs of all which Parts of Learning, is the finding out of Truth. No Man however ſhould be ſo taken up in the Search of Truth, as thereby to neglect the more neceſſary Duties of the active Life; for, after all is done, it is Action only that gives a true Value and Commendation to Virtue. Not that we are able to be always a doing without Intermiſſion, but often retire from Buſineſs to Study; beſide that the Mind, which is in perpetual Motion and Agitation, of it ſelf will ſupply us with Study and Thinking, whether we ſet our ſelves to it or not. In a Word, the general

Aim

Aim and Deſign of our Thought, and Application of Mind, is either the Attainment of ſuch things as are honeſt, and tend to a virtuous and happy Way of Life; or elſe the Improvement of our Reaſon and Underſtanding in Wiſdom and Knowledge. And this may ſuffice for the firſt of our general Heads of Duty.

CHAP. VII.

The ſecond general Virtue, which conſiſts in maintaining of Human Society. Two Parts of it, Juſtice *and* Liberality. *The firſt Duty of Juſtice. All things at firſt common. The Original of Property. Men are born for the Good,* &c. *of one another: Whence ariſes the ſecond Duty of Juſtice. Two ſorts of* Injuſtice, *the one of* Commiſſion; *the other of* Omiſſion. *The Cauſes of the firſt ſort of Injuſtice; Firſt,* Fear: *Secondly,* Deſire.

OF the other remaining three, that which conſiſts in upholding Society, and keeping up mutual Love and good Nature amongſt Mankind, ſeems of the largeſt and moſt diffuſive Extent. It comprehends under it theſe two Parts: Firſt, *Juſtice,* which is much the moſt glorious and ſplendid of all Virtues, and alone entitles us to the Name and Appellation of *Good* Men. And near of kin to this, Secondly, *Beneficence,* which may alſo be called either Bounty or Liberality. Now the firſt thing that Juſtice requires of us is this, *That no one ſhould do any Hurt to another, unleſs by way of reaſonable and juſt Retribution for ſome Injury received*

ceived from him: And whatever things belong either to all in common, or to particular Persons as their own Propriety, should not be altered, but made use of accordingly. Now no Man can say that he has any thing *his own* by a Right of Nature; but either by an ancient immemorial Seizure, as those who first planted uninhabited Countries: Or, secondly, by Conquest, as those who have got things by the Right of the Sword; or else by some Law, Compact, Agreement, or Lot. 'Tis by some of these Means, that the People inhabiting *Arpinum* and *Tusculum* came to have those Lands, which are now called theirs; and the same may be said as to private Mens Estates. However, since at present, *by some of these Ways*, each particular Man has his personal Possessions, out of that which by Nature was common to all, 'tis but Reason that each should hold what is now his own; which if any one endeavour to take away from him, he directly breaks in upon common Justice, and violates the Rights of Human Society. *But seeing* (as is excellently said by PLATO) *we are not born for our selves alone; but that our native Country, our Friends and Relations, have a just Claim and Title to some Part of us*; and seeing whatsoever is created on Earth, was meerly designed (as the Stoicks will have it) for the Service of Men; and Men themselves for the Service, Good and Assistance of one another: We certainly in this should be Followers of Nature, and second her Intentions; and by doing all that lies within the Reach of our Power for the general Interest, by mutually giving and receiving good Turns, by our Knowledge, Industry, Riches, or other Means, should endeavour to keep up that Love and Society, that should be amongst Men. Now the great Foundation of Justice

ſtice is *Faithfulneſs*, which conſiſts in being conſtantly firm to your Word, and a conſcientious Performance of all Compacts and Bargains; whereupon for this once, let us venture to follow the Opinion of the Stoicks, thoſe mighty Admirers of Derivations, and believe that *Fides* [Faithfulneſs] is ſo called, (tho' perhaps it may ſeem a little too far fetcht) *quia fiat quod dictum eſt*, becauſe what was promiſed is performed. The Vice that is oppoſite to Juſtice is Injuſtice, of which there are two ſorts; the *firſt* conſiſts in the actual doing an Injury to another; the *ſecond* in tamely looking on while he is Injured, and not helping and defending him, tho' we are able. For he that injuriouſly falls upon another, whether prompted by Rage or other violent Paſſion, does as 'twere leap at the Throat of his Companion; and he that refuſes to help him when Injured, and to ward off the Wrong, if it lies in his Power, is as plainly guilty of Baſeneſs and Injuſtice, as tho' he had deſerted his Father, his Friends, or his native Country. Now that former Injuſtice, which conſiſts in the *willful and actual wronging another*, has oftentimes no other Cauſe but *Fear*; when he, who deſignedly does a Man an Injury, is afraid leſt himſelf ſhould be forced to undergo one, if he does not ſecure himſelf by doing it before-hand. But generally ſpeaking, the great Source and Fountain of all ſuch Injuſtice, is the ſatisfying ſome irregular and exorbitant Appetite; and in a more eſpecial Manner, the Deſire of Riches: *Of which we ſhall therefore ſay ſomething in particular.*

CHAP. VIII.

The Desire of Riches, which is one Cause of Injustice, whence it proceeds. 'Tis allowable enough, so long as it does not draw Men to the injuring of others. The Desire of Honours, &c. another Cause of Injustice. It usually is found in Men of the greatest Minds. There's a Difference to be made between those Injuries, that are done hastily and in a Passion, and those that proceed from premeditated Malice.

RICHES then are most commonly desired, either to supply us with the Necessaries of Life, or furnish us with the Pleasures and Conveniences of it; or else, as it often is observed to happen in Persons of great and aspiring Minds, as a Means of obtaining *an Interest* in the Publick, and *a Power* of obliging and gratifying one's Friends: To which Purpose was that Saying of the late MARCUS CRASSUS, That whoever designed to be a leading Man in the Commonwealth, ought never to think he had Estate enough, till he could maintain an Army with its yearly Revenue. Others take Pleasure in Splendor and Magnificence; in a handsome, noble and plentiful way of living: All which things have begot an insatiable Greediness after Money, without which they can never be supported and maintained. Not but that a moderate Desire of Riches, and bettering a Man's Estate, so long as it abstains from oppressing of others, is allowable enough; but a very great Care ought always to be taken, that we be not drawn to any Injustice by it. There's another *Desire* that makes Men as apt to be forgetful of Justice, as that after Riches; the Thirst,

I mean, of Empire, Glory, Honours, *&c.* For that Saying of ENNIUS, *There's no inviolable Faith or Friendship in the Matter of a Kingdom*, tho' applied by him to that one Case only, is yet full out as true in a great many others; for wherever the Subject of Contention is such, as that only one Party can meet with Success, and the rest must fall short of what they desire; things are usually carried to so great a Height, as that 'tis very difficult not to break in upon Faith and Friendship. This hath appeared but too manifestly of late, in that rash and most impudent Attempt of CÆSAR's, who has broke through all those Ties and Obligations, that either by Gods or Men could be laid upon him, for the compassing and getting of that Empire to himself, which he vainly proposed in his depraved Imagination. But in this case 'tis one very great Unhappiness, that the Thirst after Honour, Empire, Power, *&c.* falls most upon Men of the greatest Souls, and most exalted Natures; wherefore the greater Care ought to be taken, that nothing of Offence be committed in this kind. Now it makes a great Difference in all Acts of Injustice, whether they proceed from some violent Passion, (which is for the most Part of short Continuance) or are done with Design and previous Deliberation: For those that are the Effects of a sudden Gust of Passion, ought not to be esteemed of so heinous a Nature, as those that proceed from premeditated Malice. And this may suffice for the first sort of Injustice, which consists in *The actual doing of Wrong*; and the Causes of it.

Chap. IX.

Injuſtice of Omiſſion, and the Cauſes of it. Thoſe are guilty of it, who ſpend their whole Lives in Study and Contemplation; as ſome Philoſophers have done. Juſtice ought to proceed from Choice. Thoſe who mind nothing but their own Buſineſs, are guilty of this Injuſtice. Self-love hinders Men from ſeeing their Duty. An excellent Rule for the avoiding of all Injuſtice.

AS for the ſecond, which only conſiſts *in ſeeing another injured, and being wanting to our Duty, by not defending him*; the Cauſes of *that* are wont to be ſeveral. For ſome are afraid of offending others, or of bringing a Trouble and Charge upon themſelves: Others are negligent, idle, or mean-ſpirited: And a third ſort there is, who are ſo taken up with their own Concerns, that they have no time left to regard the Oppreſſed, whom yet 'tis their Duty to ſave and protect. I am therefore of Opinion, that Plato's Conſequence will hardly hold good, where ſpeaking about the Philoſophers, he ſays, "They are wholly taken up in "the ſeeking out of Truth, and perfectly neglect "and make light of thoſe things which the reſt of "the World are ſo eager after, and ſo contend "about; and that *therefore* they are juſt. *This*, I ſay, *I am afraid is a bad Conſequence*; for tho', 'tis true, they keep the firſt ſort of Juſtice, inaſmuch as they *actually do* no Wrong; yet they run perfectly counter to the other: For being engaged in their Learning and Studies, they abandon their Friends to to be injured by others, whom in Juſtice they ought to have protected and defended. So that 'tis believed,

lieved, they would hardly ever trouble themſelves ſo far, as at all to intermeddle with the Buſineſs of the Publick, if it was not altogether, as it were, forced upon them. But it were a great deal better would they do it voluntarily; for an Action, tho' honeſt, is not therefore truly virtuous, unleſs it be done out of Choice, and with a Good-will. There are others yet, who out of a Deſire of improving their own Eſtates, or elſe a moroſe and unſociable ſort of Temper, cry, *They meddle with Nobody's Buſineſs but their own*, that ſo they may ſeem to be Men of ſtrict Honeſty, and to injure Nobody: And they do indeed avoid the one ſort of Injuſtice, but directly run themſelves into the other; for they deſert the common Good and Society of Mankind, while they beſtow neither Study, Pains, nor Money, toward the Preſervation of it. Thus have I laid down the two ſorts of Injuſtice, and pointed out to you the Cauſes of each; and have alſo endeavoured to explain the true Nature and Extent of Juſtice; from all which Account 'twill be eaſie to judge, unleſs we are extremely fond of our own Eaſe, what thoſe ſeveral Duties are, which at *ſeveral* Times are required of us. I ſay, *Unleſs we are fond of our own Eaſe*; for the Truth of it is, 'tis a troubleſome thing to be concerned in the Buſineſs of other People; however old CHREMES in TERENCE thinks, *That he ought to be concerned for the Good of all Men.* But be that as it will, foraſmuch as the Succeſs of our own Affairs, whether Good or Ill, more nearly concerns us, and makes us more ſenſible, than that of another's; (which appears to us ſmall, as a thing at a great Diſtance) therefore we paſs a quite different Judgment upon the one and the other. And, upon this Account, 'tis a very good Rule that is given by ſome Men,

That we ſhould never venture upon any Action, of which we doubt whether 'tis honeſt or diſhoneſt. For Honeſty quickly would ſhew it ſelf by its own native Brightneſs; and the doubting about it is a plain Intimation, that at leaſt we ſuſpected ſome Injuſtice when we did it.

Chap. X.

Juſtice is altered upon an Alteration of Circumſtances; and what was our Duty in one Caſe to do, in other Circumſtances 'tis our Duty to avoid. Promiſes are not to be ſtood to in ſeveral Caſes, as, If they are prejudicial: If made thro' Fear, &c. A cloſe adhering to the Words of a Law, or Bargain, is a Means of being unjuſt: Craft in ſuch Caſes to be diligently avoided.

BUT here 'tis obſervable, That the Limits of Juſtice are not ſo fixed, but that they may be altered upon an Alteration of the Circumſtances; ſo that what at one time appears to be the Duty of an honeſt and good Man, at another is altered and becomes the quite contrary: To deliver up a Truſt, for Example, or perform a Promiſe, and other things relating to Truth and Faithfulneſs, are Duties which Juſtice it ſelf will allow us, in ſeveral Caſes, to neglect or omit: For Reſpect muſt be had to thoſe general Rules we before laid down, as the Ground and Foundation of all Juſtice. *Firſt*, That no Injury be done to any other: And, *Secondly*, That we make it our earneſt Endeavour to promote the Good and Intereſt of all Mankind: So that our Duty is not always the ſame, but various according to the

the Variety of Circumſtances. There may be a Contract or Promiſe, for Inſtance, the Performance of which would bring very great Damage, either to the Perſon himſelf that made it, or the other Party whom it was made to. Thus, had NEPTUNE not granted what he promiſed to THESEUS, THESEUS had not ſuffered the Loſs of his Son HIPPOLYTUS. For (as the Story goes) NEPTUNE having granted him any three Wiſhes, for the third, he once in a very great Paſſion, deſired the Death of his own Son; by obtaining of which, he was afterwards brought into the greateſt Afflictions. Such Promiſes therefore are not to be kept, as will but bring a Miſchief on him they were made to; no more are thoſe, which tend to the Damage of the Promiſer himſelf, more than to the Profit of him they were promiſed to. Again, even Juſtice it ſelf requires us to perform a greater before a leſſer Duty: You promiſe, for Example, a Friend of yours, to aſſiſt him in a Cauſe that he has depending, but your Son grows dangerouſly ſick in the mean time; here it would be no Breach of Duty in you, if you ſhould not make good what you promiſed to your Friend; and he himſelf rather would be much to blame, ſhould he complain of being diſappointed by you. Further, 'tis plain to any one's Senſe, that ſuch ſort of Promiſes can never be binding, as are made by People over-awed by Fear, or over-reached by Deceit; moſt of which are void by the Prætor's Edicts, and ſome of them even by the Laws themſelves. But another great Spring from which Injuries ariſe, is ſome Quirk or Cavil, and an over-ſubtle and malicious Interpretation of the Laws; from whence that Saying, *Summum jus ſumma Injuria, The Height of Juſtice is the Height of Roguery,* is now become a daily and common Proverb among us. There

are frequent Examples of this to be met with in our Publick Tranſactions; as that of him, for Example, who concluding a Truce with the Enemy for thirty Days, made continual Incurſions into their Territory by Night; becauſe, forſooth, the Truce was not made for ſo many Nights, but only ſo many Days. Juſt ſuch a crafty and pitiful Trick (if the Story be true) was that notable Cunning of QUINTUS FABIUS LABEO's; or whoever the Man was, for I have it only by hear-ſay) who being by the Senate appointed Arbitrator, in a Difference between thoſe of *Nola* and *Naples* about their Bounds; when he came to the Place that was appointed for the Treaty, took aſide the Commiſſioners of either Party, and exhorted them privately, not to be too eager and greedy in their Demands, but rather to take up and content themſelves with leſs, than pretend to any more than what was honeſtly their Due. Both Parties did ſo according to his Deſire, ſo that a good Quantity of Ground was left between them: This he e'en goes and adjudges to the *Romans*, leaving that to each Party which they themſelves had demanded. And is not this now to decieve and cheat, rather than to judge? In all Caſes therefore ſuch ſubtle kind of Tricks ſhould be diligently avoided.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Juſtice to be kept towards all ſorts of Men. Bounds to be obſerved in puniſhing thoſe that have injured us. Laws of War to be ſtrictly obſerved. Two ſorts of Diſputing, by Reaſon *and* by the Sword: *The latter is allowable, when we cannot obtain what's our Right by the former. What ought to be the End of making War. How it ſhould be carried on. The Strictneſs of the old* Romans *in obſerving the Laws of War. A Story of the elder* Cato *to that Purpoſe.*

THERE are certain Duties or Offices alſo, to be ſtrictly obſerved, even towards thoſe that have injured us; for we ought not to go beyond ſuch and ſuch Bounds, in exacting Revenge and Puniſhment of another: In which Particular it may perhaps be enough, to make him that has wronged us repent of the Wrong done; ſo that both he himſelf may abſtain from the like, and others may be diſcouraged from injuring us for the future. There are certain peculiar Laws of War alſo, which are of all things moſt ſtrictly to be obſerved in the Common-wealth: For there being two ſorts of diſputing in the World, the one by Reaſon, and the other by open Force; and the former of theſe being that which is agreeable to the Nature of Man, and the latter to that of Brutes; when we cannot obtain what is our Right by the one, we muſt e'en of Neceſſity have Recourſe to the other. 'Tis allowable therefore to undertake Wars, but it muſt always be with Deſign of obtaining a ſecure Peace. And when we have gotten the better of our Enemies, we ſhould reſt

reſt content with the Victory alone, and ſhew our ſelves merciful and kind to them afterwards; unleſs they are ſuch as have been very cruel, and committed inhumane Barbarities in the War. Thus our Foreſathers took into their City the *Æquians*, *Volſcians*, *Sabines*, and others whom they had ſubdued; whereas *Carthage* and *Numantia* they entirely deſtroyed. I could wiſh I might not add *Corinth* too; but I believe they had ſomething in their Eye when they did it, and that more eſpecially the Situation of the Place; which being ſo very convenient as it was, they were afraid leſt it might be, at one Time or other, an Encouragement to a Revolt. In my Opinion 'tis always our Duty to do what we can for a fair and ſafe Peace; in which thing, if People would have hearkned to me, we might at this Time have ſeen the Republick, tho', 'tis true, I cannot ſay in a flouriſhing Condition, yet certainly not, as at preſent we percieve it, entirely ſubverted and fallen into Ruines. And as we are bound to be merciful to thoſe we have actually conquered, ſo ſhould thoſe alſo be received into Favour, who have laid down their Arms, and thrown themſelves wholly upon the General's Mercy, and *that* even tho' the Breach be made in their City Walls. Our good Fore-fathers were moſt ſtrictly juſt as to this Particular; the Cuſtom of thoſe Times making him the Patron of a conquered City or People, who firſt received them into the Faith and Allegiance of the People of *Rome*. In ſhort, the whole Right, and all the Duties of War, are moſt religiouſly ſet down in the Fecial Laws; out of which it is manifeſt, that never any War can be juſtly undertaken, unleſs Satisfaction have been firſt demanded, and Proclamation of it made publickly before-hand. POPPILLIUS was Commander

mander in one of the Provinces, and CATO's Son a young Soldier under him; and POPPILLIUS thinking fit to disband one of his Legions, it happened to be the same in which the young Man was, who therefore was dismissed among the rest of the Soldiers; but having a Mind to see more of the War, he notwithstanding this continued still in the Army. Hereupon old CATO writes a Letter to POPPILLIUS, and therein desires him, *that if he suffered his Son to remain in the Army, he would give him his Military Oath again; forasmuch as the former being void by his disbanding, he could not any longer fight lawfully with an Enemy:* So religiously careful they were in those Days, of doing nothing that is contrary to the Laws of War. There is extant still an Epistle of CATO the Father to his Son, in which he tells him, *That he had heard of his being disbanded by the Consul, when he was a Soldier in* Macedonia, *in the War with* PERSEUS; *and therefore he advises him not by any Means to intermeddle in a Battle, because,* says he, *'tis unlawful for one, that is no longer a Soldier, to engage with the Enemy.*

CHAP. XII.

The Civility of the old Romans *towards their Enemies, in giving them the mildest Names. Some Wars are only for Empire, others for Safety: Difference of Conduct to be observed in each. A noble and generous Saying of King* PYRRHUS.

AND here I cannot but observe moreover, that he who is properly called *Perduellis* [*a stub-*

ſtubborn Enemy] had by our Anceſtors the Name of *Hoſtis* given him; the Gentleneſs of the Word ſomewhat leſſening the Foulneſs and Odium of the Thing: For *Hoſtis* [*an Enemy*] among them, ſignified the ſame thing that *Peregrinus* [*a Stranger*] does now amongſt us; as appears from the Laws of the XII Tables, and therein ſuch ſort of Expreſſions as theſe, *Status dies cum hoſte*, and *Adverſus hoſtem æterna auctoritas*. What greater Courteſy could be ſhewn than this, to call even an Enemy by only the ſofteſt and moſt obliging Names? Tho' the Word is now altered, I confeſs, from that mild to an harſher Senſe, Cuſtom having changed it from what it firſt properly ſignified, *a Stranger*, to denote ſuch a one as *bears Arms againſt us*. We have told you already what previous Cauſes and Conditions there ſhould be, before any War can be lawful and juſt; the ſame are required even in thoſe Wars alſo, which are undertaken meerly for Glory and Empire: But then all Conteſts of this latter ſort ſhould be carried on with leſs Heat and Animoſities: For as in the Differences that happen among Citizens, we make a Diſtinction between a violent Enemy and a generous Rival; (in one Caſe nothing but a Title of Honour, in the other our Lives and Reputations being concerned) ſo did our Anceſtors do in their Wars. That which they waged with the *Cimbers* and *Celtibers*, was managed as with hateful and implacable Enemies, the Queſtion then being, not whether of the two ſhould remain a Conqueror, but whether ſhould remain a People at all: Whereas thoſe with the *Latins*, *Carthaginians*, PYRRHUS, *&c.* were only Quarrels about Honour and Dominion. The *Carthaginians* were perfidious and treacherous, HANNIBAL their great Commander

der cruel; but all the reſt more faithful and merciful. That Speech of PYRRHUS is indeed very extraordinary upon reſtoring the Captives, when he ſays,

I neither Gold of you nor Price demand,
Nor will I chaffer, *but* fight *out the War;*
Let Steel, *not* Gold, *to each their Fate decide.*
Whether to you *or* me *Dame Fortune will*
The Victory grant; or what the Chance of War,
Shall Courage try. And this I add withal,
That freely I their Liberties reſtore
To theſe brave Men, whoſe Lives the War has ſpared.
Freely I give, do you as freely take,
In the Name of the mighty Gods.

A truly royal and princely Saying, and worthy of the glorious Family of the ÆACIDÆ.

CHAP. XIII.

Particular Perſons bound in Juſtice to keep the Promiſes made to an Enemy. The Example of REGULUS. *The Story of ten who did the contrary: How puniſhed by the* Romans; *particularly one, who thought to have eſcaped by a Quirk. A noble Inſtance of the* Roman *Juſtice to King* PYRRHUS. *Juſtice to be kept towards the meaneſt Slaves. Two ways whereby Injuries are done,* Fraud *and* Force. Fraud *the more odious. To be a Rogue under the Mask of Honeſty, the greateſt of Villanies.*

'TIS alſo the Duty of particular Perſons, if at any Time, forced by the Neceſſity of their

their Circumſtances, they have made any Promiſe or Oath to an Enemy, afterwards to ſee that they perform it faithfully. Thus REGULUS was taken in the firſt *Punick* War by the *Carthaginians*, and ſent by them to *Rome* about an Exchange of Priſoners, upon ſolemn Oath given that he would return to them again. Firſt then, as ſoon as he was come to *Rome*, he adviſed the Senate againſt making ſuch a Change; and when he had done ſo, (tho' begged on to ſtay by his Friends and Relations) rather returned to a certain Puniſhment, than his Oath ſhould be broken, tho' made to an Enemy. But HANNIBAL in the ſecond *Carthaginian* War, after our fatal Defeat at *Cannæ*, ſent ten to *Rome* under the ſame Obligation of returning again, unleſs by their Intereſt they could prevail with the Senate to redeem their Priſoners, who were all by the Cenſors deprived of their Privileges as Freemen, and tied to pay ſuch and ſuch Duties to the Publick as long as they lived, for not being true to their Oaths and Obligations. There was one of them thought by a Trick to have eluded the Force of his Oath, but was nevertheleſs puniſhed for all that: His Shift was this: HANNIBAL had let them depart his Camp upon the Condition afore-mentioned; when therefore they had gotten a little way out of it, what does he do but come back to it again, under Colour of having forgot to take ſomething (I know not what) with him; and then away he goes out again, diſcharged (as he thought) from his Obligation of returning. And ſo, 'tis very true, he was in Word, but not in Reality; for in all ſuch Oaths we are not to attend to the meer Form of Words, but the true Deſign and Intention of them. But the greateſt Example of Juſtice to an Enemy, was ſhewn by our Anceſtors

ſtors towards King PYRRHUS: There came a Deſerter out of PYRRHUS's Camp, and offered the Senate to diſpatch him with Poyſon; which they and FABRICIUS were ſo far from accepting of, that they gave him up again as a Traitor to his Maſter. Thus we may ſee, that they would not allow of any unjuſt way of dealing, tho' for the Death of a powerful and invading Adverſary: And ſo much for the Duties required in War. There is one Part of Juſtice remaining behind, and which ought by no Means to be forgotten by us; I mean that towards the loweſt and meaneſt ſort of People: And theſe are more eſpecially thoſe we call our Slaves; in relation to whom, 'tis a very good Rule that is given by ſome Men, that we ſhould uſe them no otherwiſe than we do our Day-labourers, *Make them firſt do their Work, and then pay them honeſtly what they have earned.* In fine, to cloſe up this Diſcourſe of Juſtice, there are two Ways or Methods, whereby one Man may injure or oppreſs another; the one is *Fraud* and Subtlety, the other open *Force* and Violence; the former of which is held the Part of a Fox, and the latter of a Lion; both of them certainly very unworthy of a reaſonable Creature, tho' Fraud, I think, is the more odious of the two. But of all Injuſtice, theirs is certainly of the deepeſt Dye, who make it their Buſineſs to appear honeſt Men, even whilſt they are practiſing the greateſt of Villanies.

CHAP.

Chap. XIV.

Of Liberality, the second Part of general Justice. Three Cautions to be observed concerning it. 'Tis not Liberality, to bestow upon one what is wrongfully taken from another; nor what ought to have rather been given to our Relations; nor to give out of Vain-glory. Bounty should be proportioned to the Merit of the Receiver, which is of several sorts.

WE have now gone through with the Subject of Justice, it remains in the next Place (to go on according to our Method proposed) that we say something likewise of Bounty and Liberality, than which there is nothing more nearly allied to the Nature of Man. But then we must observe these following Cautions; *First*, That we take Care in all Acts of Bounty, that they be not prejudicial to those we would oblige by them, nor to any other Body. *Secondly*, That we do not in our Bounty and Liberality go beyond our Estates. And, *Thirdly*, That we duely proportion our Kindness, according to every Man's Merit and Deserts. And first of the former, which is grounded upon the great and fundamental Principle of all Justice, to which this Duty in all its particular Instances should be referred. For he who pretending to do one a Kindness, does that which is really a Prejudice to him, is indeed so far from being kind and obliging, as that he ought to be counted a most pernicious Flatterer; and to do any Manner of Injury to one, that you may shew your Generosity and Bounty to another, is just one and the same sort of Roguery and Injustice, as to enrich your self by the Spoils of

of your Neighbour. Yes this is the Fault of a great many People, and especially those who are desirous of Glory, to take away from some that which justly belongs to them, that so they may have to bestow upon others; and they are apt to think themselves extreamly bountiful, if they enrich their Adherents by any Manner of Means. But this is so far from being a Duty of Liberality, that nothing in the World can be more contrary to it. It ought to be therefore our first Care in giving, that what we bestow be a real Advantage and Kindness to our Friend, and no ways an Injury to any third Person. That Action therefore of CÆSAR and SYLLA's, in taking away Estates from the rightful Proprietors, and giving them to others who had nothing to do with them, ought by no Means to be accounted liberal; for nothing can ever be truly such, that is not at the same time just and honest. A *second* Caution to be observed was this, *That our Bounty be not suffered to exceed our Abilities*; for they who give more than their Estates will allow of, are, in the first Place, injurious to their own Relations, by spending that Wealth upon other People, which should rather have been given or left to them. Beside that this over-great Bounty in giving, is usually accompanied with an answerable Desire and Greediness of getting, which often proceeds even to down-right Oppression, that so Men may have wherewithal to supply this extravagant Humour. One may also observe in a great many People, that they take a sort of Pride in being counted magnificent, and give very plentifully, not from any generous Principle in their Natures, but only to appear great in the Eye of the World; so that all their Bounty is resolved into nothing but meer Outside and Pretence, and is nearer of kin

to

to Vanity and Folly, than 'tis to either Liberality or Honesty. The *third* Caution was, *That our Bounty should be proportioned to the Merits of the Receiver*: In judging of which, we are first to consider the Man's Honesty or *Manners*; secondly, the *Good-will* he bears towards us; thirdly, the *Nearness of Relation*, or Society that is between us; and, lastly, the *Benefits* we have formerly received from him. 'Tis desirable that all these Inducements might concur in the same Person; but when they do not, we should bestow our Kindness more especially on him, in whom we find the most and weightiest of them.

Chap. XV.

Honesty, the first sort of Merit. We are not to expect we shall find perfectly good Men. Modesty, Temperance, &c. more especially to be regarded. How we should judge of Men's Good-will towards us. Gratitude a most necessary Duty: We should imitate fruitful Fields, by returning more than we have received. How to judge of the Value of any Kindness: Those to be least esteemed that are done rashly and inconsiderately. We should do most for those that stand in greatest Need, if they are otherwise deserving.

NOW seeing we do not live amongst such as are perfectly and fully wise, but such as are thought to have done very well, if they are but, as it were, the rough Draughts of Virtue; we ought to consider, I think, in the first Place, that no one should wholly be neglected in this Case, in whom

whom there appears any Shadow or Reſemblance of real Honeſty; but that thoſe Men ought to be principally regarded, who excel in the quiet and more peaceable Virtues of Modeſty, Temperance, and eſpecially this Juſtice, of which I have now been diſcourſing a great while: For moſt times Greatneſs of Spirit and Courage, unleſs it be in thoſe who are *perfectly* wiſe and virtuous, is ſomething too hot and apt to boil over; the others are the Virtues which ſeem more peculiarly to conſtitute a good Man. And ſo much for the firſt ſort of Merit to be conſidered, *viz.* The Manners or Honeſty of the Perſon we would be kind to. The *ſecond* was, *The Good-will which he bears towards us*; as to which it ſhould always be our principal Care, to do moſt for him by whom we are moſt beloved. Now in judging of the Good-will that any one bears us, we are not to conſider (like Boys and Children) any ſudden Flaſhes and Heats of Paſſion, but rather a conſtant and well-ſettled Affection. But if a Man, *in the next Place*, has done us any real Service, ſo that our Part is to make a Requital, and not firſt to lay an Obligation upon him, 'tis then our Duty to take ſome greater Care; for of all the Virtues, there is none we are more neceſſarily obliged to than *Gratitude*. If then, according to HESIOD's Rule, even that which was no more than barely lent us, is, if poſſible, to be returned back with Intereſt again, what abundant Returns ſhould we make to thoſe, by whom we have been freely and generouſly obliged? What leſs can we do than be like fruitful Fields, which produce beyond Compariſon more than was thrown into them? And if we do Services even to thoſe Men from whom we hope afterwards to receive any Favours, ought we not much more to do the ſame

ſame to thoſe, from whoſe forward Kindneſs we have already received them? For the Virtue of Liberality containing under it theſe two Parts, in the *firſt* Place, The doing a Kindneſs to any one; and, *ſecondly*, The requiting it when done to us; whether we will perform the former or not, is altogether left to our own Choice; but every good Man is obliged to the latter, whenever he can do it without Injuſtice. But then we are to make a Diſtinction between Benefits, and are *there* bound to make the moſt ample Returns, *where* the Obligations we have received are the greateſt. And to judge of the Merits of any Kindneſs, we are chiefly to conſider in what Manner it was done, as whether freely, conſiderately, and from a Principle of Good-nature: For ſeveral People do many things raſhly, and with a blind ſort of Impulſe, throwing away their Favours upon all without Diſtinction, being hurried about, as it were with a Tempeſt, by every mad and frolickſome Humour, and every ſudden or impetuous Paſſion. A Benefit therefore, when received from ſuch a one, is not to be eſteemed of an equal Value, with thoſe that proceed from a ſettled Judgment and due Conſideration. But our principal Duty both in doing of Kindneſſes and making Requitals, is to do moſt for thoſe that ſtand in greateſt need of it, ſuppoſing all Circumſtances elſe to be equal: The contrary to which appears plainly in the Practice of the Generality of Mankind; for People chooſe to beſtow their Favours upon thoſe, from whom they expect to receive the moſt Benefits, tho' the Perſons perhaps do not at all ſtand in need of them.

CHAP.

Chap. XVI.

We ſhould be moſt ready to give to thoſe, who are moſt nearly allied to us. The firſt ſort of Alliance is that between all Men in general. The Bond of it, and Duties reſulting from it. We are bound to do for any Man what will be a Kindneſs to him, and no Prejudice to our ſelves; but with this Caution, That we do not thereby make our ſelves unable to aſſiſt thoſe who are more nearly allied to us.

THE fourth Inducement remaining to be ſpoke to, is, *The Nearneſs of Relation,* or Society that is amongſt Men; for the Maintenance of which, we cannot do better, than to give moſt to thoſe that ſtand neareſt related to us. But that we may conſider with greater Diſtinctneſs the natural Principles of humane Society, we ſhall here trace it down from the Fountain Head. The firſt thing then to be taken Notice of is this, *That there is ſuch a thing as a Fellowſhip or Society between all Men in general:* The Bond or Cement that holds this together is Reaſon and Diſcourſe, which by teaching, learning, communicating one with another, *&c.* eaſily make Men agree together, and unite them all in one natural ſort of Conjunction and Community. Nor does any thing ſet us at a greater Diſtance from the Nature of Beaſts; for we *oftentimes* talk of the Courage of *them,* ſuch as Lions and Horſes, but *never* a Word of their Equity, Juſtice, or Goodneſs; and why is this, but becauſe they are deſtitute of Reaſon and Diſcourſe? This is then the largeſt and moſt comprehenſive of all Societies, being made up of Men conſidered barely

barely as ſuch, and ſo taking in even the whole Race and Kind of them one with another: The Duties of which are, To let every one have a Share in thoſe things, which by Nature were produced for the common Advantage and Benefit of all; To let what is already determined by Laws and Civil Conſtitutions remain as it is, without breaking in upon any Man's Right: As to which things however we ſhould remember a Rule, which is now among the *Greeks* become an uſual Proverb, *All things in common amongſt Friends.* But perhaps you may ask, what kind of things we ſuppoſe them to be, which ought to be common to all Mankind: ENNIUS has given us one Inſtance of them, which may eaſily be applied to a great many others;

He who directs the wandering Traveller,
Doth, as 'twere, light another's Torch by his own;
Which gives him ne'er the leſs of Light, for that
It gave another.

By this one Caſe he ſufficiently teaches us, That whatever Kindneſs can be done for another, without any Damage or Loſs to our ſelves, it is our Duty to do it, tho' to never ſo much a Stranger. From hence have ariſen thoſe general Maxims and Principles of Humanity, *Not to deny one a little running Water*; or, *The lighting his Fire by ours, if he has Occaſion: To give the beſt Counſel we are able to one who is in Doubt or Diſtreſs*; which are things that do Good to the Perſon that receives them, and are no Loſs or Trouble to him that confers them. Such things therefore, being by *Nature common*, ſhould accordingly be kept open for the free uſe of all Men: And of thoſe which are

our own we ſhould always be giving ſomething, that may contribute to the Benefit and Welfare of the Whole. But becauſe the Revenues of Particulars are ſmall, and there are infinite Numbers of thoſe that want, therefore is this univerſal Bounty to be kept within the Limits preſcribed by ENNIUS, *It gives him ne'er the leſs of Light*; that ſo we may have it ſtill within our Power to be liberal to thoſe who are more nearly allied to us.

CHAP. XVII.

Several other Degrees of Relation, leſs extenſive than that mentioned in the former Chapter. That of Friendſhip the moſt cloſely knit. The Ground and Foundation of true Friendſhip. The Relation ariſing from doing Kindneſſes to one another. The Love a Man has for his native Country ſwallows up all other Loves whatever. Which of the ſeveral Relatives we ought to prefer, in our Liberality and doing Kindneſſes. A Deſcription of Friendſhip; and of all Friendſhips which is moſt pleaſant.

BUT there are ſeveral Degrees of Society and Fellowſhip amongſt Mankind; for to take now our Leave of that general and univerſal one already mentioned, there is a nearer among thoſe who are all of the ſame Country, Nation, or Language, than which nothing more knits and unites Men to one another. There is a cloſer yet among thoſe who are all of the ſame City; for a great many things are in common to Fellow-Citizens, ſuch as Markets, Temples, Walks, Ways, Laws,

Privileges, Courts of Juſtice, Freedom of Votes, beſides common Meetings and Familiarities, and abundance of Buſineſs and Entercourſe with one another. But there is a ſtricter Bond of Alliance ſtill between thoſe who belong to the ſame Family, as taking into it but a very ſmall Part of that vaſt and immenſe one of all Mankind: For there being by Nature implanted in all things a certain Deſire of begetting their Like, the cloſeſt and neareſt of all Societies is between Man and Wife; then follows that between *them* and their Children, and afterwards *that* of the whole Family, who inhabit together, and have all things in common; which is, as it were, the firſt Beginning of a City, and Ground or Seed-plot of a whole Common-wealth. Next to this comes the Bond of Relation between Brothers, as alſo between firſt and ſecond Couſins; who growing too numerous to live in the ſame Houſe, are ſent out to others, as it were into new Colonies. Next after this follow Marriages and Alliances, and ſo a new Stock of Relations that way; from whence comes a new Propagation and Offſpring, which ſerves to give Riſe, as was ſaid, to Common-wealths. Now that Nearneſs of Blood, and the natural Love which ariſes from it, cannot but endear Men to one another, is paſt all Doubt; it is a very great Matter to have the ſame Relicks and Monuments of our Anceſtors, to make uſe of the ſame religious Ceremonies, and be laid after Death in the ſame Place of Burial. But of all the Societies and Unions amongſt Men, there is none more excellent, or more cloſely knit, than when ſuch as are Men of real Virtue and Honeſty, from a certain Agreement and Likeneſs of their Manners, contract a Familiarity and Friendſhip with one another. For Virtue and Goodneſs

(as

(as we often observe) of Necessity moves us wherever we see it, and makes us all have a Love and Respect for that Person in whom we discover it. And as every Virtue thus wins upon our Hearts, and even forces us to love those we take to possess it, so more especially do Justice and Beneficence. But when several Persons are all like one another in Honesty and good Manners, then no Society can ever be more loving, or more closely united: For where there are many of the same Humour, and same Inclinations, every one sees, in some Measure, his own self, and is accordingly delighted in the Person of another; and that is brought about, which PYTHAGORAS thought the Perfection of all Friendship, *That a great many Severals are made into One.* There is another remarkable Fellowship or Community, arising from an Entercourse of doing and receiving Benefits; which, while it is kept up by a mutual Gratitude and Kindness of all the Parties, cannot but occasion a firm and very lasting Agreement between them. But when we have gone over all the Relations that are in the World, and throughly considered the Nature of each, we shall find that there is no one of greater Obligation, no one that is dearer and nearer to us, than that which we all of us bear to the Publick. We have a tender Concern and Regard for our Parents, for our Children, our Kindred, and Acquaintance, but the Love which we have for our native Country swallows up all other Loves whatever; for which there is no honest Man but would die, if by his Death he could do it any necessary Service. How detestable then must the Wickedness and Barbarity of those People be, who have mangled and rent this their native Country by all Manner of Villanies, and have made it their Business (nay,

and ſtill do ſo) to bring it to Ruine and utter Deſolation? Now if there ſhould happen any Conteſt or Competition between theſe Relations, which of them ſhould have the greateſt Share of our Duty, we ſhould pay the firſt Regard to our Country and Parents, from whom we have received the moſt endearing Obligations; the next to our Children and Family, who all have their Eyes upon us alone, and have no Body elſe they can depend upon; next in order to theſe come our Kindred and Relations, whoſe Fortune is generally the ſame with our own. To each of theſe therefore, whom I have juſt now mentioned, we moſt of all owe what is neceſſary for their Subſiſtance: But then, as for living and eating together, for mutual Adviſing, Diſcourſe, Exhortation, Comforting, and ſometimes (if Occaſion ſerves) Rebuking, Friendſhip is the propereſt Soil for them; and of all kinds of Friendſhip, there is none ſo pleaſant as that which is cemented by a Likeneſs of Manners.

CHAP. XVIII.

In Liberality the Neceſſity of the Perſon is eſpecially to be conſidered. Some Kindneſſes due to ſome Relatives more than to others. Rules ſignify but little of themſelves, unleſs they are confirmed by Practice and Exerciſe. Greatneſs of Soul, the third general Virtue, moſt glorious and ſplendid of them all. Is moſt of all praiſed, and its Contrary diſpraiſed among Men.

BUT in all theſe Duties of Beneficence and Liberality one principal thing to be taken Notice

Notice of is, What Neceſſity the Perſon we would be kind to lies under, and what he is able or not able to do without our Aſſiſtance: So that in ſome Caſes, the preſent Poſture and Circumſtances of a Man's Condition ought more to prevail with us, than the Degrees of Relation. Again, there are certain particular Offices, which are more peculiarly owing to ſome one ſort of Relatives, than they are to another: In the Buſineſs (for Example) of getting in his Corn, 'tis our Duty rather to aſſiſt a next Neighbour, than either a Brother or familiar Friend; but if the Buſineſs be a Caſe at Law, then a Kinſman or Friend muſt rather be defended, than only a next Neighbour. Theſe things therefore, and ſuch like Circumſtances, ſhould be well conſidered, in the Practice and Exerciſe of every Virtue; and our Minds ſhould be brought to a kind of Acquaintance and Familiarity with them, that ſo we may be quick at the Accounts of our Duty, and able by caſting up all things together, to ſee at laſt what the Remainder is, and know what we owe to the ſeveral Sorts and Conditions of Men. For as a General, Orator, or Phyſician, however well skilled in the Rules of his Art, can never be perfect without the Aſſiſtance of Practice and Experience; juſt ſo it is in the Caſe now before us: Many have laid down the Rules and Precepts of *Virtue* and Good-living, (as I my ſelf am doing at this very Time) but there is moreover required to a due Degree of Height and Perfection in *it*, that one accuſtom himſelf to the Exerciſe of them. And thus have I ſhewn how Virtue and Honeſty (from which all our Duty does immediately flow) are deduced from thoſe things which concern the Society and Good of Mankind; which was the ſecond General I propoſed to diſcourſe of.

IT is to be obſerved, that whereas there were laid down four general Heads, from which all Virtue and Honeſty is derived; whatever proceeds from a brave and exalted Mind, that is raiſed above Fortune, and all the little Chances and Accidents of the World, is uſually made moſt account of amongſt Men. Hence in Reproaches we find there is nothing more common than ſuch things as theſe,

For Shame! Young Men, and yet have Womens Hearts!
While this brave Woman plays the Man ——

Or ſomething like this,

Dear Salmacis *give Spoils that coſt no Sweat or Blood!*

Whereas, on the contrary, in Praiſes or Panegyricks, thoſe things that are done with a Bravery of Mind, and have ſomething of extraordinary Courage in them, (I know not how) we commend in a nobler and loftier Strain, than we do any thing elſe. Hence *Marathon*, *Salamis*, *Platea*, *&c.* are ſo common a Field for all the Rhetoricians: Hence our COCLES; hence the DECII, the SCIPIO's, MARCELLUS, and a great many others; and eſpecially the People of *Rome* it ſelf, are particularly famous for Greatneſs of Courage. But the Value that is ſet upon military Glory appears from this, that almoſt all Statues are done in the Habit and Garb of a Soldier.

CHAP. XIX.

Courage is not truly a Virtue, unleſs it be accompanied with Juſtice, Truth, &c. *An excellent Definition of it given by the* Stoicks. *An admirable Saying of* Plato *to the ſame Purpoſe. Men of great Souls are apt to be Ungovernable and Ambitious; which prompts them to Injuſtice. A Man of a truly noble Spirit never injures another, but protects from Injuries; ſcorns Applauſe, and the Voice of the ignorant Multitude.*

BUT that ſort of Courage which is ſeen in the Dangers and Fatigues of War, unleſs a Man be governed by the Rules of Juſtice, and fight for the Safety and Good of the Publick, and not for particular Ends of his own, is altogether blameable; and ſo far from being a Part of true Virtue, that 'tis indeed a Piece of the moſt barbarous Inhumanity. Fortitude therefore is very well defined by the Stoick Philoſophers, when they call it, *A Virtue contending for Juſtice and Honeſty.* No Man therefore by Baſeneſs and Treachery has ever got the Name and Reputation of true Courage; for nothing can ever be Virtuous or Creditable, that is not Juſt. To which Purpoſe, that of PLATO was admirably well ſaid, " As that ſort of Knowledge, " which is not directed by the Rules of Juſtice, " ought rather to have the Name of *Deſign* and " *Subtilty*, than *Wiſdom* and *Prudence*; juſt ſo " that bold and adventurous Mind, which is hur- " ried by the Stream of its own Paſſions, and not " for the Good and Advantage of the Publick, " ſhould rather have the Name of *Fool-hardy* and " *Daring*, than *Valiant* and *Couragious*. The firſt

thing therefore I would have in a truly couragious Man, is, That he be a Follower of Goodneſs and fair Dealing, of Truth and Sincerity; which are principal and conſtituent Parts of Juſtice. But here 'tis one very unhappy thing, that moſt times theſe great and exalted Minds are naturally ungovernable and deſirous of Rule: So that what PLATO obſerved of the *Spartans, That all their Cuſtoms had no other Aim, but to get the Superiority,* may fitly enough be applied to theſe Perſons: For the more any Man has of this Greatneſs of Soul, the more eager he is of being a Sharer in the Government, or rather of obtaining it wholly to himſelf: And 'tis no eaſie Matter to be fair and equitable in all one's Actions, (which is the proper and peculiar Office of Juſtice) while one is endeavouring to make himſelf uppermoſt. From hence it comes to paſs, that they will never be conquered in any Debates, or over-ruled by the Laws and Conſtitutions of the Publick; but make it their Buſineſs by Factions and Bribery to get a ſtrong Party and Intereſt in the Republick; and rather chuſe to be Uppermoſt by Force and Injuſtice, than Equal to others by fair and upright Dealing. But the Difficulty of it can only ſerve to make it more honourable, *but never its contrary more excuſable:* For no ſort of Caſe or Circumſtance whatever, can excuſe any Man for being guilty of Injuſtice. Thoſe are therefore your truly brave and couragious Men, not who rob, plunder and injure others, but thoſe who ſecure and protect them from Injuries. But that Greatneſs of Mind, which is *truly* ſuch, and under the Direction of Wiſdom and Prudence, makes that Honour and Credit, which we naturally deſire, not conſiſt in the outward imaginary Applauſe, but in the real intrinſick Goodneſs of its Actions; and

is not ſo eager of *appearing* to be greater and better than others, as of *really being ſo*. For he that is ſo mean as to depend upon the giddy and ignorant Multitude, ought never to be accounted of a truly great and exalted Spirit: Beſides that, there is nothing ſo eaſily draws Men to Acts of Injuſtice, as a Loftineſs of Mind, when joined with this fooliſh Deſire of Applauſe. This is indeed a very dangerous Place, and requires our greateſt Concern and Watchfulneſs; becauſe you ſhall hardly find any Man, that, when he has gone through Labours and Difficulties, does not expect this Honour and Applauſe, as a kind of Reward for his Courage and Atchievements.

CHAP. XX.

Wherein true Greatneſs of Soul conſiſts. An excellent Deſcription of it. 'Tis an Enemy to Covetouſneſs, to the Deſire of Applauſe, and of Power. Produces a calm and unpaſſionate Mind. The Deſire of this Calm and Tranquility of Mind, has made ſome Men retire, and ſeparate themſelves from publick Buſineſs. In what a perfect Freedom conſiſts.

NOW all true Courage and Greatneſs of Mind is more eſpecially ſeen in theſe two things: The *firſt* is a generous Contempt or Diſregard of all outward Goods, proceeding from an Opinion, That 'tis unworthy of a Man *to admire*, or wiſh for, or endeavour after any thing, unleſs it be that which is Honeſt and Becoming; *to* make himſelf ſubject to any one's Will; *to* be a Slave to

his own irregular Paſſions; or any ways depend upon the Capricioes of Fortune. When he has gotten ſuch a Temper of Mind as I have now been deſcribing, then the *ſecond* thing is, That he perform ſuch Actions as are glorious and profitable, but withal very full both of Labour and Difficulty; and extremely dangerous to his Life it ſelf, as well as to thoſe things that are requiſite for its Preſervation. Now all the *Luſtre* and *Dignity* of theſe two Parts, nay, and I add all their *Uſefulneſs* too, is lodged only in the latter; but the Ground-work, as it were, and Foundation of all true Greatneſs, is laid in the former. For in that are contained thoſe generous Principles, which exalt Mens Minds, and raiſe them to a Contempt of all wordly things. But that former it ſelf is made up of two Parts, The *firſt* is an Opinion that nothing is truly and really Good, but only what is Honeſt: The *ſecond* a Freedom from all ſort of Paſſion or Diſturbance of Mind. For what can more diſcover a Man of a brave and heroick Spirit, than to make no Account in the World of thoſe things, which ſeem ſo glorious and dazling to the Generality of Mankind; but wholly to deſpiſe them, not from any vain and fantaſtick Humour, but from ſolid and firm Principles of Reaſon and Judgment? Or what can more ſhew a robuſt Mind and unſhaken Conſtancy, than to bear thoſe heavy and numerous Calamities, which are incident to Mankind in this Life, with ſuch a firm Temper and Fixedneſs of Soul, as never to offend againſt Nature and right Reaſon, or do any thing that is unworthy the Dignity and Character of a wiſe Man? Now it would not at all be conſiſtent or agreeable, that he who bore up ſo couragiouſly againſt *Fear*, ſhould be afterwards unable to reſiſt *Deſire*; or that he who could never be conquered by *Pain*, ſhould

ſuffer

ſuffer himſelf to be captivated by *Pleaſure*. Theſe things therefore ſhould well be conſidered, and of all Deſires, that of *Money* ſhould be avoided; for nothing is a greater Sign of a narrow, mean and ſordid Spirit, than to dote upon Riches; nor is any thing on the contrary more creditable and magnificent, than to contemn Wealth, if you have it not; and if you have it, to lay it out freely in Acts of Bounty and Liberality. The Deſire of Glory (as I before obſerved) ought alſo to be avoided: For it robs a Man wholly of his Freedom and Liberty, which generous Spirits ought of all things in the World to maintain and contend for. Neither ought Places of Power to be ſought after; but at ſome times rather to be refuſed when offered; at others, be laid down if they can conveniently. We ſhould free our ſelves, in ſhort, from all vehement Paſſions and Diſorders of Mind, not only thoſe of *Deſire* and *Fear*, but alſo of *Sorrow*, of *Joy* and *Anger*; that ſo the State of the Mind may be calm and undiſturbed, which will make the whole Life become graceful and uniform. Now there both *are* and *have been* many, who to gain this Repoſe of which I am ſpeaking, have betaken themſelves to a Life of Retirement, and wholly withdrawn from all Buſineſs of the Publick. Among theſe the nobleſt and moſt eminent of the Philoſophers; and ſome Men of rigid and ſevere Lives, who miſliked the Manners of the People or their Governours; others have withdrawn themſelves into the Country, being pleaſed with the Management of their own private Fortunes. Theſe Men propoſed the ſame End to themſelves that Kings and Princes do, *viz.* The Living ſo as to want for nothing, to be under the Power and Controul of none, but to enjoy a full and perfect Freedom; which conſiſts in living ſo, as one's ſelf beſt *pleaſes*.

CHAP.

Chap. XXI.

Thoſe who live a publick and a private Life aim both at Freedom. Their Lives compared: The former more uſeful, the latter more ſafe. In what Caſes a Man may be excuſed from ſerving the Publick. Thoſe ought to ſerve it who are qualified for the Service. Greatneſs of Soul more neceſſary for thoſe in a publick, than a retired Life. Two or three Rules to be obſerved before a Man enters upon Buſineſs.

THIS then being the common Deſign and End of them both, thoſe who are ambitious of Power and Authority, think to obtain it by enlarging their Fortunes and Intereſts in the World; but theſe whom I have mentioned as Men of Retirement, by contenting themſelves with their own Condition, tho' but humble and mean. In which they are neither of them wholly in the wrong; but the Life of the latter, I mean the retired, is both eaſier and ſafer, and begets leſs of Trouble and Diſturbance to others; whereas that of the former, who give themſelves up to Affairs of State, and the Management of great and important Concerns, is more adapted to the Benefit and Good of Mankind, and the getting of Credit and Reputation in the World. Thoſe People therefore are perhaps excuſable, who being of Parts and Capacities for Learning, give themſelves wholly to the Study of it, and never at all meddle with Publick Buſineſs: And ſo are thoſe alſo, who being diſabled by Sickneſs and Infirmities, or on any other good and allowable Account, have ſeparated themſelves from the Adminiſtration of Affairs, leaving the Power and Reputation of it

in

in the Hands of others. But as for thoſe People, who have none of theſe Reaſons? and pretend to deſpiſe thoſe Commands and Honours, which moſt Men admire; I am ſo far from thinking it a Virtue in them, that I rather eſteem it a very great Fault. Thus far, 'tis true, one can hardly condemn them, in that they deſpiſe, and make little Account of Glory and Applauſe; but their true Reaſon ſeems to be rather this, That they do not care to ſuffer the Labour and Fatigue of them, and are afraid of encountring with Rubs and Repulſes, as things that are attended with ſome Shame and Diſhonour. For you ſhall often find there is a great many Men, who are very inconſiſtent with themſelves in things of a contrary Nature: As for *Pleaſure*, they deſpiſe it with all the Severity of a Stoick; but yet are ſo effeminate, as not to be able to bear the leaſt *Trouble*; are mighty Contemners of *Fame* and *Applauſe*; but extremely concerned at any thing of *Diſgrace*: Which are things that do not very well agree together. Thoſe People then, whom Nature has endowed with Abilities for that Purpoſe, ſhould forthwith endeavour to procure themſelves Places, and manage the Buſineſs of the Commonwealth: Otherwiſe how ſhould the City be well governed, or the Greatneſs of their Endowments be made known to the World? But that Greatneſs of Soul, and Contempt of all humane things, (which we have often mentioned) together with that Calmneſs and Serenity of Mind, is requiſite in thoſe of a publick Station, as much, if not more than 'tis in Philoſophers, if ever they hope to be free from Anxieties, and arrive at any Steadineſs or Uniformity in their Lives. Now theſe things are eaſier to Philoſophers, than to them; foraſmuch as their Lives, being led in private, require for their Support

a leſs Number of things, and have fewer within the Power and Reach of Fortune: And if any ill Accident ſhould befal them, 'tis impoſſible their Sufferings can be very conſiderable. Thoſe Men therefore that are in publick Stations, having things of more Weight and Importance to be taken care of, muſt in reaſon be ſuppoſed to lye much more open to the Aſſaults of the Paſſions, than thoſe who ſpend their Days in Privacy and Retirement. Upon which Account they ſhould take the more Care, to fortifie themſelves with this Greatneſs of Spirit, and to free their Minds from the grievous Torments and Diſturbances of them. But he who takes upon him a publick Truſt, ſhould not only look that the Buſineſs be Honeſt, but that he himſelf be qualified for the Management of it. In conſidering of which there is a double Extream to be carefully avoided, That he neither deſpair through a mean Cowheartedneſs; nor yet be over confident through Eagerneſs of Deſire. And laſtly, in whatever he ſets about, let all things be diligently and carefully put in Order, before he goes on to the Execution of it.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

'Tis no less great and commendable to manage Affairs of Peace, than of War. Several Examples to prove this. Arms useless abroad, without civil Prudence at home. Cicero's *eminent Services to the Republick: A Saying of* Pompey *the Great to him upon that Subject.*

BUT seeing most People are apt to imagine, that 'tis greater and more glorious to manage Affairs of War, than Peace; I shall endeavour to lessen this general Opinion. For the Greatness of that Glory, which is given to Warriors, has made many People, for no other reason, desirous of Quarrels; especially Men of the greatest Parts and most aspiring Minds; particularly if they are qualified for a Soldier's Life, and their Disposition carry them to the Profession of Arms. But if we would make a just Estimate of the Case, we should find both greater and more glorious Actions done by Wisdom at home, than by Arms abroad. For what tho' THEMISTOCLES be deservedly commended, and his Name more illustrious than that of SOLON; and though *Salamis* be brought for the Proof of a Victory, which is commonly preferred to the Wisdom of SOLON in constituting and setling the Senate of *Areopagus*; yet, in Truth, ought *this* to be judged no less great and extraordinary than *that*: For THEMISTOCLES's Victory was only a Service to the Commonwealth once; but SOLON's Counsel will be so for ever: Seeing 'tis by *this* that the Laws of the *Athenians*, and Constitutions of their Ancestors, are kept up and maintained. Beside, THEMISTOCLES can name nothing in the World, wherein

wherein he assisted the *Areopagus*: But SOLON on his Part may truly say, That he, by his Wisdom, was assisting to THEMISTOCLES; for the War was carried on by the Directions of that Senate, which he by his Prudence at first appointed. The same may be said of PAUSANIAS and LYSANDER; for though by their Valour they are thought to have enlarged the Dominion of the *Spartans*, yet 'tis by no Means at all to be compared with the Laws and Discipline of the wise LYCURGUS: Beside, that it was solely to these Laws and this Discipline, they owed all the Courage and Obedience of their Armies. I, for my own Part, was always of Opinion, That MARCUS SCAURUS, when I was a Boy, was by no Means inferior to CAIUS MARIUS; nor QUINTUS CATULUS, since I meddled with the Republick, to CNEUS POMPEIUS; for Armies can signifie but little abroad, unless there be Counsel and wise Management at home. Neither was the raising and destroying of *Numantia*, by that incomparable Person, and brave Commmander the second AFRICANUS, a greater and more signal Piece of Service to the Republick, than the killing of TIBERIUS GRACCHUS by NASICA, though a meer private Citizen at the same time. 'Tis true, this Action had something of the Soldier in it, as being done by Force and downright Violence, and so does not wholly come under the Notion of Civil Concerns: However, I have brought it as an Instance of these, because it was effected by this Civil sort of Prudence, and without the Assistance of a Military Power. I cannot but therefore still extremely approve of that Saying of mine, which I am told some malicious and envious Fellows most mightily carp at,

Let

Let warlike Arms give Place to the peaceful Gown,
And to the Statesman's Praise the Victor yield his
Crown.

For not to say any thing of other People, when I my own self sat at the Helm of the Government, did not *Arms* then give Place to the *Gown?* Never was the State in more imminent Danger, and yet never were things better and more happily quieted. Thus by my Prudence and careful Management, the most impudent and audacious of all the Citizens let, as it were, their Arms fall out of their Hands. What Action then was there ever performed in War like this? or where is the Triumph that can be compared to it? For I think I may venture a little to boast before you, Son MARK, whose Happiness it is to succeed in the Glory, and whose Duty to imitate the Excellence of my Actions: This I am sure of, even POMPEY himself (a Man the most famous for martial Atchievements) did me that Justice, in the hearing of several, as to say, "That his returning home with his third Tri-"umph had been to but little or no Purpose, unless "my Endeavours and Services to the Republick "had preserved the City for him to triumph in. I conclude therefore, from what has been observed, That *that* sort of Courage which is seen in the Management of Civil Affairs, is no less deserving than *that* which consists in the Business of Fighting; and the former requires more Pains and Application to be perfect in it, than the latter doth.

CHAP.

Chap. XXIII.

The Body ought to be so far taken Care of, as that it may be able to bear Fatigues; but it is the Mind that truly makes great Men. War should be undertaken only for the sake of Peace. The Difference between a great Soul and a great Understanding, and the Duties of each. Fighting one of the least Parts of Courage.

NOW it is certain *that* Virtue, which consists in Greatness and Elevation of Soul, and makes up the Subject of our present Enquiry, is obtained by the Strength of the Mind, not the Body. However the Body ought not to be neglected, but by Exercise brought to such a Frame and Condition, as that it may obey the Prescriptions of the Mind, in performing that Business and bearing those Fatigues which are required of it. But still the Nature of the Virtue we are seeking for, consists in due Care and Application of Mind; in which Particular, the Publick receives as much Benefit from Gown-men, who manage and take Care of its Civil Concerns, as it doth from Soldiers, who are Generals of its Armies: For they by their Prudence have often either hindred the breaking out of Wars, or else have occasioned their speedy Conclusion; and sometimes too have been the Cause of their being undertaken, as the third with *Carthage* was entred into upon the Advice of Cato, whose Credit and Authority prevailed in that Case even after he was dead. Wisdom therefore, and Skill in determining Civil Affairs, is more to be desired than Courage in Fighting: But then we must always be careful in this Case, that our Design

Deſign be not the avoiding of War, but the being more uſeful and ſeryiceable to the Publick. And as for War, it ſhould never be undertaken with any other Aim, but only that of obtaining an honourable Peace. 'Tis the Part of a brave and unſhaken Spirit, not to be diſturbed under any Misfortune, or ſuffer it ſelf in Diſorder and Tumult to be thrown off the Saddle, (as we uſually ſpeak) but always to keep ſuch a Preſence of Mind, as to be able to conſult upon every Occaſion, and be hurried on to nothing, but what is agreeable to Reaſon and Diſcretion. And as this is the Part of an exalted Spirit, ſo is what follows of an elevated Underſtanding; to diſcover Effects even while they are yet in the Wombs of their Cauſes, and conſider before-hand whatever may happen on either Side, and accordingly what is to be done when it *does* happen; that ſo he may never be taken unawares, and brought to that lamentable Shift of crying out, *I never once thought of it.* Theſe are the Duties as of a truly couragious and lofty, ſo of a wiſe and judicious Mind; but raſhly to run and lay about one in Battle, and come to Wounds and downright Blows with an Enemy, is but a ſavage and brutiſh kind of Buſineſs: However, Neceſſity ſo requiring, a Man ſhould fight, and chooſe rather to part with his Life than his Liberty, or be guilty of any baſe or diſhonourable Action.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIV.

The Duty of a truly courageous Man, after he has conquered his Enemies. Cool and deliberate Counsels to be preferred before Heat and Boldness. Nothing more foolish, than to expose one's self to unnecessary Dangers. 'Tis a Duty rather to expose one's self, than the publick Affairs. They are to blame, who rather venture the Loss of their Armies, than their own Reputation. The Folly of CALLICRATIDAS *and* CLEOMBROTUS *in this; the Wisdom of* FABIUS MAXIMUS *in doing the contrary. Men should speak what they think for the Good of the Publick, without regarding what Offence it may give to others.*

IN the Business of razing and plundring Cities, there ought to be taken a very especial Care, that nothing of Rashness or Cruelty be shewn; and all true Greatness of Spirit obliges us, having first considered things calmly and maturely, to pardon the Multitude, and punish those only that were principally faulty; and in every State and Condition of Fortune, to observe the just *Medium* of Virtue and Honesty: For, as we have already observed of some, that they count it more noble to manage Affairs of War than of Peace, so you shall find there are a great many others, who imagine that hot and adventurous Undertakings have something that is greater and more glorious in them, than wisely cool and deliberate Counsels. Now as no Man ought, by too warily avoiding of Dangers and Labours, to get himself the Name of a Faint-heart and Coward; so, on the other Hand, Care should be taken that we thrust not our selves into

Hazards

Hazards and Difficulties, where there is no manner of Occaſion for it; than which there is no greater Folly upon Earth. It is a Duty therefore, in Attempts of any Danger, to imitate the Practice of skilful Phyſicians, who always to light and inconſiderable Diſeaſes, apply none but eaſy and gentle Remedies; but in deſperate Caſes are forced to have recourſe to deſperate Cures. It is a Madneſs therefore, while all things are calm and in a peaceful State, to deſire a Storm, but to keep off the Miſchiefs of it when it does happen, is the Part of a wiſe and a prudent Man; and ſo much the more, if the Good to be obtained by getting well rid of it, out-ballance the Evils you may be brought into by the Attempt. The Danger of ſome Actions only relates to the Perſon that undertakes them, but *that* of others to the whole Republick; and again, a Man's Life is endangered in ſome, in others his Reputation, and the Good-will of his Citizens. It is our Duty then, *in the former Caſe*, more willingly to expoſe and endanger our ſelves, than the whole State; and *in the latter*, to fight for our Glory and Reputation, more readily than any other Conveniencies whatever. Yet the contrary to this appears plainly in the Practice of a great many Men, who are willing to ſpend their Eſtates and Lives for the Good of their Country, but will not bear the leaſt Diminution of their Honour, tho' the preſent Occaſions of the Republick require it. Thus CALLICRATIDAS, Admiral of *Sparta*, in the *Peloponneſian* War, after he had done many ſignal Services, at laſt was the Occaſion of ruining all; for when he was adviſed to retreat with his Navy from *Arginuſſæ*, and not venture giving the *Athenians* Battle, he utterly refuſed it; and told his Adviſers, *That* if this whole Navy

ſhould

ſhould chance to be loſt, the *Lacedæmonians* could fit out another; but that he for his Part could never fly, without an irreparable Loſs of his Honour. And here the *Lacedæmonians* had, tho' a great, yet a tolerable Blow; but that other was mortal, and put a full Period to the *Spartan* Greatneſs, when their Leader CLEOMBROTUS, only for fear of being ſomewhat ill-ſpoken of, unadviſedly ventured to fight EPAMINONDAS. How much better did FABIUS MAXIMUS do? concerning whom ENNIUS has theſe Words:

One Man our State has ſaved by wiſe Delays:
For he regarded not the fooliſh Prate
Of idle People; but the City's Good.
Therefore his growing Fame now flouriſhes
More, when his Deeds are paſt.

THE ſame kind of Fault ſhould alſo be avoided in Civil Adminiſtrations; for a great many Men are afraid to ſpeak out what they really think, tho' perhaps it is for the beſt, for fear it ſhould give any Offence to others.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

Two Rules of Plato's *to be observed by those who govern the State. The Good of the Governed ought to be their sole Aim. An excellent Description of a good Minister of State. Ambition very destructive in a Government. A good Saying of* Plato's *to that Purpose. Men should carry themselves civilly towards those who are of an opposite Party in the State, and not count them their Enemies. The Example of* Scipio *and* Metellus. *Anger towards an Adversary no Part of Courage. Affability,* &c. *requisite in a Statesman. Severity and Chastisements sometimes necessary; and Rules to be observed about them. Nothing can be well done that is done in a Passion. Rulers should be like the Laws themselves.*

THOSE who design to be Partakers in the Government, should be sure to remember these two Precepts of PLATO; *First*, To make the Safety and Interest of their Citizens, the great Aim and Design of all their Thoughts and Endeavours, without ever considering their own personal Advantage. And, *Secondly*, so to take Care of the whole collective Body of the Republick, as not to serve the Interest of any one Party, to the Prejudice or Neglecting of all the rest. For the Government of a State is much like the Office of a Guardian or Trustee; which should always be managed for the Good of the Pupil, and not of the Persons to whom he is entrusted; and those Men who, whilst they take Care of one, neglect or disregard another Part of the Citizens, do but occasion Sedition and Discord, the most destructive things in the

the World to a State. From whence it comes to paſs, that, while ſome take Part with the popular Faction, and others make their Court to every great one, there is but very few left who are concerned for the Benefit and Good of the Whole. From this Root have ſprung many grievous Diſſentions amongſt the *Athenians*; and not only Tumults, but even deadly Civil Wars in our own Republick: Things which a worthy and truly brave Citizen, and one who deſerves to hold the Reins of the Government, will ſhun and deteſt; and will give himſelf ſo to the Service of the Publick, as to aim at no Riches or Power for himſelf; and will ſo take Care of the whole Community, as not to paſs over any one Part of it. Such a one will ſcorn, by the mean Arts of Calumny and a falſe Accuſation, to bring others into Hatred and Diſrepute with the People; but will always adhere to what is juſt and honeſt, and never be drawn from it, whatever Offence may be taken by others; nay will rather part with his Life it ſelf, than do any thing that is contrary to the Virtues I have mentioned. Eager Ambition, and contending for Honours, is of all things moſt ruinous and deſtructive to a State; concerning which PLATO has ſaid admirably well, "That for Men to contend and fall "out with one another, about which ſhould be "Chief in the Management of the State, is juſt as "if the Ship's Crew ſhould go together by the "Ears, about who ſhould be Maſter or Pilot of "the Veſſel. And the ſame Philoſopher has given us this for a Rule, "That only thoſe Men ſhould "be reckoned as Enemies, who have taken up "Arms in Oppoſition to the Republick; not thoſe "who would govern it after their own Schemes. Such was the Diſſention between P. AFRICANUS

and

and Q. METELLUS, without any great Bitterneſs or Animoſities between them. Some People think it the Part of a brave and heroick Spirit, to ſhew Heat of Anger and Paſſion againſt an Adverſary; but what they ſay is by no Means to be regarded; for it is certain, on the other Hand, nothing is more laudable, nothing more worthy of a great and brave Perſon, than Clemency, Meekneſs, and Gentleneſs of Spirit. In Cities that are free, and where all Men in common enjoy the ſame Privileges, Courteſy, and Affability, and that which they call *altitudo animi*, a calm and undiſturbed Temper of Mind, are peculiarly requiſite: For to fret upon every unſeaſonable Viſit, or at every impertinent and troubleſome Petitioner, makes a Man ſowre and moroſe in his Humour; which as it brings no kind of Good to himſelf, ſo it gets him the Hatred and Ill-will of others. But tho' Meekneſs and Clemency be laudable Virtues, yet no further than as they leave Room for a juſt Severity, whenever the Occaſions of the Publick require it; without which a City can never be well governed. Now every Reproof and Chaſtiſement, *in the firſt Place*, ſhould be always free from contumelious Language, and not inflicted for the ſake of the Perſon chaſtizing or reproving another, but the Good and Advantage of the whole Republick. Diligent Care ſhould be taken, *in the next Place*, that the Penalty be proportioned to the Nature of the Crime; and that ſome do not paſs without ever being queſtioned, while others are puniſhed for the ſame Miſdemeanours. But of all things, Anger ſhould be excluded in puniſhing; for whoever comes to this Work in a Paſſion, will never obſerve that due Mediocrity, which equally abſtains from too much and too little, ſo ſtrictly required

by the Peripatetick Schools: And they have very good Reason indeed to require it; but then I cannot but wonder they should commend Anger, and say, Nature has given it us to good Ends and Purposes: For *that* in Truth ought in no Case to be allowed of; and it were heartily to be wished that the Governours of a State would, in this Particular, be like the Laws themselves, which punish Offenders according to Justice, without being any ways guided by Passion.

CHAP. XXVI.

Greatness of Soul requires an even Temper, free from Haughtiness in Prosperity, and Dejectedness in Adversity. Philip *greater than* Alexander, *in bearing his good Fortune with an even Mind. The higher Men are, the more Care they should take of being humble and moderate. An admirable Saying of* Scipio *to this Purpose. In Prosperity we should especially consult our Friends, and have a Care of Flatterers. Greatness of Soul seen often among the Philosophers, and those who in private manage their own Estates. How an Estate should be got, improved, and used.*

ANOTHER great Duty of Fortitude, is not to be haughty, disdainful, and arrogant when Fortune favours us, and all things go forward according to our Wishes: For it shews as much Meanness and Poorness of Spirit to be transported with *good*, as it does with *ill* Fortune; whereas, on the other Hand, nothing is more brave than an Evenness of Temper in every Condition, and (as

is reported of SOCRATES and LÆLIUS) a constant retaining the same Air in one's Countenance, without ever seeming puffed up or dejected. I find that PHILIP, the King of *Macedonia*, was inferior to his Son in the outward Glory and Splendor of his *Atchievements*, but very far above him in good Nature and Condescension; therefore the Father kept always the Character of a great Person, whereas the Son often was guilty of base and dishonourable Actions. It is a good Rule therefore, I think, which is given by some Men, *That the higher our Station in the World is, the more Care we should take of our Lives and Actions, that they be kept within the Compass of Lowliness and Humility.* PANÆTIUS tells us it was an usual Saying with his Scholar and familiar Friend AFRICANUS, "That Men who give the Reins to their vitious "Appetites, and are high and presuming upon the "Greatness of their Fortunes, should be dealt with "like Horses, when grown fierce and unruly by "frequent Engagements: For as *these* are delivered to Breakers to tame and be made fit for riding; so *those* should be brought within the Barriers and Limits of Reason and Philosophy, to "teach them the Uncertainty of all humane things, "and the great Volubility and Changeableness of "Fortune. We should also in Prosperity more especially make use of the Counsel of our Friends, and pay more Respect and Deference to their Advices, than we were wont to do. At the same Time also we should take a great Care, that we do not give over-much Ear to Flatterers, nor suffer our selves to be wheedled and imposed upon by their deceitful Words: For there is nothing wherein we are more apt to be mistaken, than in this Particular; every one having such a fond Conceit

and Opinion of himſelf, as to think he deſerves thoſe Applauſes which they give him. Hence ſpring innumerable Errors in our Lives; whilſt Men, puffed up with a vain Imagination, and miſtaken Notions of their own great Merit, are expoſed to the Raillery of all the World beſides, and are cheated into great and dangerous Miſtakes. And ſo much may ſuffice upon this Head. From what has been ſaid we may eaſily gather, That thoſe who are over Affairs of the Publick do the greateſt Actions, and ſuch as expreſs the moſt Bravery of Mind; their Buſineſs affording them more Opportunities, and there being more Men who are concerned in *this*, than in any *other* Method of Living whatever. But after all, we cannot but acknowledge there *are*, and *have been*, a great many noble Spirits even in a Life of Retirement and Privacy; who being ſequeſtred from the Buſineſs of the World, have given up themſelves to Enquiries after Truth, and the great Concernment of the Practice of Virtue: Or elſe leading a Life in the Middle, as it were, between the Stateſman and Philoſopher, have been delighted with the Management of their own private Fortunes; not ſcraping up Money by all manner of ways, or hoarding it ſo as to make no Body the better for it; but parting with it freely for the ſake of their Friends, or to ſerve the Republick, when Occaſion required it. Now this private Eſtate I would have, in the *firſt Place*, to be *honeſtly* come by, not by any baſe, ſcandalous, or invidious way of gaining: *Then* let it be diſtributed to the Uſes and Neceſſities of as many as is poſſible, provided they are worthy and deſerving People; and let it be encreaſed by ſuch ordinary Methods of Saving and good Husbandry, as are agreeable to the Dictates of Reaſon and Prudence: And

laſtly,

laſtly, let none of it be ſpent in Debauchery and luxurious Living, but in Acts of Munificence and Liberality towards others. Whoever obſerves theſe Meaſures laid down, (let his way of Life be either publick or private) may perform all the Duties of Magnanimity, Conſtancy, and Greatneſs of Soul, as well as of Sincerity, Fidelity, and doing Good to Mankind.

Chap. XXVII.

The Virtues contained under the fourth Head of Honeſty. Whatever is honeſt, and nothing elſe but that, is becoming a Man; Honeſty and Decency being really the ſame thing, and diſtinguiſhed only by an Act of the Mind. Two ſorts of Decorum, and what the Nature of each of them is.

WE are now in the next Place to ſpeak of the fourth, and only remaining Part of Virtue or Honeſty, under which are comprehended Baſhfulneſs, Temperance, Modeſty, Government of the Paſſions, and the obſerving a juſt Order as to Time and Place in our Words and Actions; from all which ariſes a certain engaging kind of Beauty and Gracefulneſs, which ſerves to ſet off and adorn our Lives. Under this Head is contained that Becomingneſs [*Decorum*, as we call it in *Latin*] which among the *Greeks* has the Name of πρέπον; which is in its Nature ſo cloſely united and riveted to Honeſty, that there is no way left of pulling them aſunder; for whatever is *becoming* is likewiſe *honeſt*, and whatever is *honeſt* is likewiſe *becoming*. The Difference between them is ſo ve-

ry ſmall, that we may better conceive what it is, than explain it; for whatever Becomingneſs there is in any Action, it immediately ariſes from the Honeſty of it. From hence it appears, that Becomingneſs does not peculiarly belong to this one Part of Honeſty, whereof we are now undertaking to diſcourſe, but ſhews it ſelf alſo in each of the three former. To reaſon, for Inſtance, and diſcourſe according to the Rules of *Prudence*; to go about nothing but after due Conſideration, and on every Occaſion to be quick at eſpying and defending the Truth, are things that are *becoming*; whereas to be deceived, to be in an Error or Miſtake, and to be impoſed upon, are very *unbecoming*, as well as to be mad or beſides one's ſelf. So again, all Actions of *Juſtice* are *becoming*, but thoſe of Injuſtice are both ſcandalous and unbecoming. The ſame may be ſaid as to the Actions of *Fortitude*; whatever is done with a manful Courage and Bravery of Mind, as it is *worthy* of, ſo it *becomes* a Man; but whatever, on the other Hand, ſhews any Cowardice or Meanneſs of Spirit, is as contrary to Becomingneſs as it is to true Virtue. I conclude therefore, That the Decency whereof I am now diſcourſing, appertaineth to each of the four Parts of Honeſty; and ſo appertaineth, as not to ſtand in need of any mighty Reach of Underſtanding to perceive it, but is eaſily diſcoverable at the firſt View: For there is ſomething of Becoming contained in the very Notion and Idea of all Virtue, from which it is diſtinguiſhed by the Mind alone, and not by the Nature of the thing it ſelf. Juſt as the Beauty and good Colour of the Countenance can never be ſeparate from the Health of the Body, ſo this Becomingneſs, of which we are ſpeaking, in it ſelf is all

one,

one, and, as it were, incorporate with Virtue and Honeſty; but may be diſtinguiſhed from it by Thought and Imagination. Now there are *two kinds* or ſorts of it; the one *univerſal*, which belongs to the Nature of *Honeſty in general*; the other *particular*, and contained under this, which belongs to the *ſeveral Parts of it*. The *former* is uſed to be thus defined; *Decorum or Becoming is that, which is congruous or agreeable to that excellent Part of the Nature of Man, by which he is diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of the Creation.* As for the latter, which is contained under this, it is uſually deſcribed and defined to be *that, which is in ſuch Manner agreeable to the Nature of Man, as withal to ſhew ſomething of Temper and Moderation, with a certain ſweet Air of Gentility and good* Manners.

Chap. XXVIII.

Poetical Decorum what it is, and how differing from that we here ſpeak of. Nature has given us a Character of Reaſon, &c. which we ought to live up to. Nature teaches us to have a Reſpect for other Men. Proportion, Regularity, &c. pleaſe where-ever they are found. We ought to be concerned about other Peoples Opinion of us. How the Duties of Juſtice, and thoſe of Modeſty, Decency, &c. differ. We ſhould live agreeably to Nature, which will always lead us right. Decency relates both to the Actions of the Body and Mind. The Nature or Mind of Man conſiſts of Senſe and Reaſon. The former of theſe ought to obey the latter.

THAT this is ſo, will more plainly appear, if we conſider that *Decorum* or Convenience of Manners, which the Poets aim at in all their Writings; concerning which, were it anywiſe neceſſary to my preſent Purpoſe, I might largely diſcourſe. Suffice it at preſent for me only to obſerve, That the Poets are then ſaid to keep this Decorum, when each of their Perſons is brought in ſaying and doing thoſe things, which are ſuitable to the Character he bears in the World. Should Æacus, for Example, or Minos ſay,

E'en let them hate me, whilſt they dread me too.

Or,

The Child's entomb'd in its own Parents Bowels.

it

it would be an Offence againſt the Rules of *Decency*, becauſe they paſs in the World for Men of Juſtice and Honeſty; but let the ſame be ſaid by a cruel ATREUS, and the whole Theatre ſhall clap and applaud it, becauſe it is a Saying very agreeable to his Character. Now the Poet can judge what is becoming and convenient for every Perſon, according to the Character which he bears in the Poem: But Nature has given every one of us a Character, by endowing us with that Nobleneſs and Excellence of Being, whereby we are ſet above all other Creatures. The Poets then, there being ſo great a Variety of Characters, can ſee what is becoming and convenient for all, even the moſt vitious: But we have got only one Character to live up to, I mean that which is aſſigned us by Nature her ſelf; a *Character* of Temperance and Modeſty, of Conſtancy and Moderation. And the ſame Nature having alſo taught us, That we ought to be careful of our Carriage and Demeanour towards the reſt of Men: From hence it appears of how large an Extent that Becomingneſs is, which belongs to the Nature of *Honeſty in general*; and alſo that other, which is ſeen in the Exerciſe of the *ſeveral kinds of it*. For, as the Beauty and Comlineſs of the Body, draws the Eyes to it by the fit Compoſure of all its Members, and pleaſes us only upon this Account, becauſe all its Parts correſpond with a kind of Proportion and Harmony; ſo this Decorum, which gives a ſort of Luſtre and Grace to our Lives, engages the Approbation and Eſteem of all we live with, by that juſt and due Order, Conſiſtency, and Regularity, which it keeps up and maintains in our Words and Actions. We ought to have therefore a certain Reſpect and Reverence for all Men, and deſire to be approved not only by

the beſt, but by all the World: For not to care a Farthing what it is People think of one, is a Sign not only of Pride and Conceitedneſs, but indeed of having perfectly abandoned all Modeſty. But here we muſt obſerve, that there is a great deal of Difference between that which Juſtice, and that which this Modeſty, Reſpect, or Reverence demands, in relation to other People. It is the Duty of Juſtice, not to injure or wrong any Man; of Reſpect or Reverence, not to do any thing that may offend or diſpleaſe him; wherein more eſpecially the Nature of that Decorum we are ſpeaking of conſiſts. Theſe things then being thus explained, I ſuppoſe it may clearly enough appear what that is which we mean by *Becoming*. As for the Duties preſcribed by it, the firſt thing to which it conducts us is, To demean our ſelves ſuitably and agreeably to our Nature, and do nothing that may any ways ſtain or deface it: For whilſt we take *this* for our Guide and Conductreſs, it is impoſſible we ſhould ever go out of the way; but by her ſhall be led through all the Paths of Wiſdom, Truth, and Underſtanding; of Juſtice and Beneficence toward the Society of Mankind; and of true Magnanimity and Greatneſs of Soul. But the Nature of Decency is more peculiarly ſeen in the fourth Part of Honeſty, concerning which we are now diſcourſing; and relates not only to the Motions of the Body, but more eſpecially to thoſe of the Mind alſo; each of which then are approved and becoming, when they are ſuch as are ſuitable to Nature. Now the Whole of the Nature or Mind of Man, is made up of only theſe two Parts: The *firſt* conſiſts in the ſenſitive Appetite, which by the *Greeks* is called ὁρμὴ; by the blind and extravagant Impulſe of which, he is hurried and

tran-

transported from one thing to another: The *second* in Reason, which shews and instructs him in the way of his Duty, telling him what he should *do*, and what *not do*: From whence it follows, That it is Reason which ought to be the governing Faculty; and the Appetite subject to the Commands of it.

CHAP. XXIX.

Our Actions should neither be rash nor careless, &c. How the Sensitive Part should be subject to the Reasonable. Passion disorders the Body as well as Mind. Watchfulness and Consideration necessary for the subduing of the Passions. Men were not designed by Nature for jesting, &c. but serious Studies. Several sorts of Jests and Diversions. Measures to be observed about them.

EVERY Action therefore should be free, as from Precipitancy and Rashness on the one Hand, so from all Carelessness and Negligence on the other; nor should any thing be done, for which we cannot give a sufficient *Reason*; which is almost the very Definition of Duty. In order to this, the Passions must be brought under the Power of Reason, so as neither thro' Hastiness to run before its Orders, nor thro' Coldness and Heaviness to disregard them when given; but all their Motions must be so quieted and restrained, as to bring no Uneasiness or Disturbance to the Mind. And from this calm and peaceable State of the Soul, arises that Constancy and Moderation we have mentioned; for when once the Passions grow unruly and extravagant,

travagant, and refuſe to be guided in their Deſires and Averſions by the Rules of Prudence, they will run without Queſtion beyond all Bounds and Meaſure; for they abandon and caſt off their Allegiance to *Reaſon*, which they ought to obey by the Conſtitution of Nature. By this Means are all things turned topſy-turvy, and not the *Mind* only, but even the *Body* alſo, put very much into Diſorder and Confuſion. Do but mark thoſe who are enflamed with a vehement *Anger* or *Deſire*; who are tranſported with *Fear*, or an over-great *Joy*; and you will ſee an Alteration in their Countenances, Voices, Geſtures, and all their Actions; which ſufficiently gives us to underſtand (that we may return again to the Duty now before us) how neceſſary it is to reſtrain and give check to the Movements of the Appetite, and to be always watchful and ſtanding upon our Guard, that ſo we may neither be careleſs and inconſiderate, nor do any thing raſhly and at all Adventures. For Mankind were never deſigned by Nature meerly to ſport and idle away their Time, but to follow after grave and ſerious Studies, and Buſineſs of greater Importance than Play is. Not but that Jeſting and Diverſion are allowable, provided we uſe them but as we do Sleep, and other ſuch neceſſary Refreſhments of Nature, *viz.* after the Diſcharge of our ſerious and more important Duties. And even then we muſt ſee that our Jeſting be neither exceſſive nor immodeſt, but ſuch as is handſome and becoming a Gentleman: For as Boys are allowed not all kinds of Sports, but only ſuch as have nothing that is vicious or ill in them; ſo in this Jeſting we ſhould allow our ſelves nothing, but what is agreeable to Honeſty and Good-manners. We may therefore obſerve, that Jeſting or Merriment is of two ſorts,

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the *one* clowniſh, abuſive, ſcandalous, and obſcene, the *other* handſome, genteel, ingenious, and truly pleaſant. Of this kind are ſeveral Inſtances to be met with, as in our PLAUTUS, and the *old Greek* Comedians; ſo in the Writings of the Socratick Philoſophers; to which we may add the ingenious Sayings of ſeveral Men, ſuch as are collected by the Senior CATO, and uſually go by the Name of *Apothegms.* There is no great Difficulty then to diſtinguiſh between a genteel and clowniſh Jeſt; the *one*, if brought in at a ſeaſonable time, and when a Man's Mind is diſengaged from Buſineſs, is becoming for a Gentleman; the *other*, for no Man at all indeed, when baſe and unhandſome things are dreſſed up in filthy and obſcene Expreſſions. Our Plays and Recreations muſt alſo be kept within their due Bounds; and Care ſhould be taken that we do not run out into great Exceſſes, and ſuffer the Pleaſure which we take in them to carry us into any thing that is baſe or unbecoming. Hunting, and the Exerciſes of the *Campus Martius*, ſupply us with Examples enough of creditable and manly Recreations.

Chap. XXX.

The Excellence of Man's Nature above that of Brutes necessary to be considered. Wherein it consists. Some are really Beasts under the Shape of Men. Sensual Pleasures, Effeminacy, &c. unbecoming Mens Nature. Beside Reason, which is the common Nature of all Men, each Man has his particular Nature or Genius. The Difference of Mens particular Natures or Dispositions, shewn by a large Number of Examples.

BUT in all Enquiries concerning what becomes us, it is of very great Moment to be constantly reflecting *how much Man's Nature excels that of Beasts and inferior Animals.* These have no Taste or Relish for any thing but the Pleasures of the Body, towards which they are carried with a great deal of Eagerness; whereas nothing is more agreeable and nourishing, as it were, to the Mind of Man, than Learning and Contemplation. Hence he is always a seeking or contriving of something that is new, and is greatly delighted with seeing and hearing, for the Increase of his Knowledge. And if there is any one too much addicted to sensual Pleasures, unless he is transformed into a meer Brute, (for some such there are, who are Men in Name, and not in Reality;) but if, I say, any one is too much addicted, and suffers himself to be conquered by Pleasures; yet, for very Shame, he will hide and conceal his Propensions towards it, as much as is possible. And what is this now but a plain Indication, that sensual Pleasures are unbecoming the Dignity of a reasonable Creature, and ought to be despised and rejected by it? and that whoever

whoever ſets any Value upon them, ſhould be ſure to take Care that he keep within the Limits of Reaſon and Moderation? From hence it follows, that we ſhould not have any reſpect to Pleaſure, but only to the Preſervation of our Health and Strength, in our Victuals, Cloaths, and other Conveniencies belonging to the Body. And does not the Conſideration of the ſame Dignity and Excellence of our Natures, plainly inform us how baſe and unworthy a thing it is to diſſolve in Luxury, Softneſs, and Effeminacy! And how brave and becoming it is, on the other Hand, for a Man to lead a Life of Frugality and Temperance, of Strictneſs and Sobriety? And here we muſt obſerve, that Nature has given us, as it were, a *double* Part to be acted in the World: The *firſt* is extended to all Men in common, foraſmuch as we are all Partakers of Reaſon, and that Prerogative of our Nature, whereby we are exalted above other Animals; it is this that conducts us in the finding out our Duty, and from it all Honeſty and Becomingneſs ariſes: The *ſecond* is appropriate to each in particular; for as there is a great deal of Difference in Bodies, (ſome being nimble and proper for running, others more luſty, and fitter for wreſtling; ſome of a noble and majeſtick Air, others of a ſweet and engaging kind of Beauty;) ſo there is no leſs, or rather a far greater, Variety in Humours. Thus Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus were Men of a great deal of Wit and Pleaſantry: Caius, the Son of Lucius Cæsar, of more than they, and a great deal more ſtudied. Whereas the young Drusus and Scaurus, at the ſame Time, were Men of extraordinary Gravity and Severity. Lælius had abundance of Mirth and Gayety; his Familiar Scipio much more Ambition,

tion, and greater Auſterity and Strictneſs of Living. Amongſt the *Greeks*, SOCRATES is ſaid to have been one, that was of a very eaſy and facetious Humour; that always loved to be merry and jeſting, and was a mighty Artiſt at hiding his Meaning under witty Ironies and drolling Expreſſions; (which ſort of Men are by the *Grecians* called εἴρονες;) whereas PERICLES and PYTHAGORAS got themſelves Credit by being of exactly the contrary Temper. HANNIBAL among the *Carthaginian* Generals, and amongſt our own FABIUS, was crafty and ſubtle; one that knew how to diſguiſe his Intentions and keep his Counſel; that could make Shew of one thing, whilſt he was really deſigning another; of exquiſite Skill for contriving of Stratagems, and preventing thoſe laid by the Enemy againſt himſelf. In this kind the *Grecians* give JASON the *Pheræan*, and THEMISTOCLES, the Preference before any others; and there is one thing of SOLON's, which ſhews he had his Share of this Cunning and Subtlety, when he feigned himſelf diſtracted to ſave his own Life, and withal to do a good Piece of Service to the Publick. There are others to be found of juſt an oppoſite Humour, who think it unlawful to do any thing by Stratagem and underhand Dealing, but are all for Simplicity and Plainneſs in their Actions; Lovers of open and undiſguiſed Truth, but Haters of every thing that looks like a Trick. There are ſome that will undergo any thing in the World, fawn and crouch to any manner of Perſon, if they can but obtain their own Ends and Deſigns by it; as MARCUS CRASSUS we know did to SYLLA. Of which ſort of crafty and complying kind of People LYSANDER the *Lacedæmonian* is ſaid to have been the chief; whereas CALLICRATIDAS, who was Admiral of the Navy

next after LYSANDER, was quite the contrary. *Again,* There is as great a Variety in Mens ways of Diſcourſe, as in their Humours and Complexions: Some who are able to ſpeak very nobly, can yet ſuit their Language to the Humours and Capacities of the ignorant Vulgar; as I remember CATULUS, Father and Son, as alſo MUTIUS MANCIA could do; and I have heard old People relate the ſame of SCIPIO NASICA; but his Father, on the contrary, he who, by ſlaying TIBERIUS GRACCHUS, put a full End to his ruinous Attempts, had none of that affable familiar way of ſpeaking. No more had XENOCRATES, the moſt rigid and ſevere of all the Philoſophers; and for that very Reaſon was noted and eminent. *In ſhort,* There is almoſt an infinite Number of theſe different Natures and Characters in Men, not one of which is in it ſelf to be condemned.

CHAP. XXXI.

Every one ſhould follow his own Genius, ſo far as it is innocent. Uniformity or Conſiſtency moſt becoming a Man, which cannot be kept if we run counter to our own Natures. The great Force of this Difference in Mens Natures. Cuſtom of the Actors on the Stage. Several other Rules relating to the ſame.

THE more eaſily then to arrive at that Decorum of which we are ſpeaking, let every one ſtick to his own *peculiar* Character and Humour, provided it has nothing that is vicious in it: I ſay *provided it has nothing that is vicious in it;*

it; for we ſhould always take a particular Care to do nothing that is contrary to that *univerſal Character* which Nature has imprinted on every one of us; but ſaving the Reverence we owe to *that*, then to live according to our own particular one, ſo as to follow after that kind of Study, and apply our ſelves to that Courſe of Life, which is moſt ſuitable and agreeable to our own Inclinations, though others perhaps may be more uſeful and important; for it is in vain to ſtruggle againſt the Bias of your Nature, or at firſt to ſet upon that ſort of Buſineſs which you can never arrive at any Perfection in. From what has been ſaid it more fully appears, what that is which we call *Becoming*; ſince nothing can be ſuch, that is done (as we ſay) in deſpite of Nature, *i. e.* contrary to the Bent and Tendency of a Man's Genius. Now it is certain if any thing in the World is becoming, it is a conſtant Uniformity in our whole Lives and particular Actions; which is utterly impoſſible we ſhould ever maintain, ſo long as we run counter to our own Inclinations, and fooliſhly follow after thoſe of other People: For as we ſhould uſe our own native Language, which all are ſuppoſed to underſtand beſt, and not *lard* our Talk (as a great many do) with Expreſſions out of *Greek*, who are therefore deſervedly laughed at by others; ſo we ſhould keep to one conſtant Tenour and regular Conduct in our Lives and Actions, ſo that nothing may be in them which is not well ſuited and of a Piece with the reſt. And this Difference in the Characters or Natures of Men is of ſo great Moment, as that in conſequence of it one Man may be obliged to make away with himſelf, whilſt another, tho' like him as to all other Circumſtances, may be obliged to the contrary. CATO, for Inſtance, and thoſe who in

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Africk ſurrendered themſelves to CÆSAR, were all of them under the ſame Condition; and yet any of the reſt might perhaps have been blamed for it, had they murdered themſelves ſo as CATO did, becauſe they were Men of leſs Strictneſs in their Lives, and leſs Severity in their Manners. But CATO was a Perſon whom Nature had endowed with incredible Firmneſs and Strength of Soul, which he had augmented by perpetual Conſtancy, and unalterably adhering to his once undertaken Deſigns and Reſolutions: It became his Character therefore to die, rather than to ſee the Face of the Tyrant. How many things did ULYSSES undergo in his tedious Wandrings, when he was forced to be at the Pleaſure of Women, (if CIRCE and CALYPSO may be called Women) and by fawning Words, and fair complaiſant Speeches, wheedle himſelf into the Favour of all he met with? How did he bear the contemptuous Uſage of his Servants and Maids, even in his own Palace, that at laſt he might arrive at his wiſhed for End? Whereas AJAX, according to the Character we have of him, would rather have died you a thouſand Deaths, than ever have ſubmitted to ſuch mean Compliances. Theſe Obſervations ſhould teach us all to look carefully every one into himſelf, and conſider well what is his peculiar Genius, and endeavour to make the beſt uſe of it he is able; and not to be fooliſhly trying Experiments, to ſee how he can ſucceed in what is another Body's Talent: For it is certain that nothing becomes a Man ſo well, as that which is beſt ſuited to his own Inclinations. Every one therefore ſhould inform himſelf thorowly which way his Humour and Genius lies; and be ſevere in examining what he is well fitted or not fitted for; otherwiſe the Players may ſeem to be wiſer than we are;

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for they, when they pitch upon what they will act, do not always chooſe thoſe Parts that are beſt, but thoſe that are beſt ſuited to their Humours and Abilities. They that have the ableſt Voices, for Inſtance, EPIGONI or MEDUS; they that have moſt Action, MENALIPPA or CLYTEMNESTRA; RUPILIUS, whom I remember, always had ANTIOPA, and ÆSOP very rarely AJAX. And ſhall Actors obſerve this in chooſing their Parts, and wiſe Men not do it in chooſing their Buſineſs and way of living in the World? We ſhould therefore apply our ſelves eſpecially to that which we find moſt agreeable to the Bent of our Natures; but if we ſhould chance to be driven upon any thing which is not ſo proper for our Parts and Talents, we ſhould make it our Buſineſs, by Care and Application, if not to go through with it the moſt perfectly that is poſſible, yet at leaſt with as few Faults as ever we are able. And let us rather labour to avoid thoſe Vices which we are naturally inclined to, than try to arrive at thoſe Excellencies and Perfections which we were never made for.

CHAP. XXXII.

Duties ariſing from Mens ſeveral Stations and Profeſſions in the World. They whoſe Fathers have been famous, imitate their Virtues, or add to them. The Choice of a Profeſſion very difficult. Prodicus's *Story of* Hercules. *What uſually determines Men in the Choice of a way of Life.*

BUT beſide thoſe two Parts which I have already mentioned, there are ſtill two others remaining

remaining behind: The *one* is allotted us by Time and Chance; the *other* we our ſelves chooſe voluntarily to our ſelves. To the firſt appertain one's being a King, a General, or a Magiſtrate; coming of a great Family; having Riches and Power; together with the Contraries of all theſe; which are all of them things that depend upon Fortune, and alter according to the Difference of Times. As for the *ſecond*, it is altogether left to our own Choice what ſort of Calling we have a Mind to be of: Accordingly ſome chuſe to ſtudy Philoſophy, others the Civil Law, and a third ſort Eloquence: And of the Virtues themſelves, ſome are deſirous of being eminent in one kind, and ſome in another. Now thoſe Men whoſe Fathers or Anceſtors have been eminent in any one kind, for the moſt Part endeavour to excel in the ſame: As QUINTUS the Son of PUBLIUS MUCIUS did in the Civil Law; AFRICANUS the Son of PAULLUS in Martial Achievements. And ſome, not content with the Glory of their Anceſtors, have added ſomething elſe of their own to it; as that AFRICANUS, whom I juſt now mentioned, who beſide his great Fame for military Exploits, made himſelf noted for his Learning and Eloquence. The ſame did TIMOTHEUS the Son of CONON, who was equal to his Father in the Glory of War, and obtained that of Learning and Ingenuity beſides. But it happens ſometimes, that, omitting to tread in the Steps of their Fathers, ſome take new Methods and Deſigns of their own; which, generally ſpeaking, is the Caſe with thoſe who are born of mean Parents, and propoſe to riſe and make their Fortunes in the World. Each of theſe things ſhould be throughly conſidered and revolved in our Minds, whenever we deliberate about what will *become* us. The firſt thing then to

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be determined is, what ſort of Men we deſign to be, and what Courſe of Living to take to in the World; which is a Caſe of all others the moſt hazardous and difficult. For *when* People are young, and conſequently moſt fooliſh, they generally pitch upon that way of Life which *then* beſt pleaſes their unexperienced Fancies; ſo that they are fixed and engaged in a certain Courſe, before they have the Judgment to diſcern what is beſt. PRODICUS indeed (as I find it in XENOPHON) tells us this Story concerning HERCULES, "That when he was a "Youth, (which is the proper Seaſon allotted by "Nature for chuſing a way of Life) he withdrew "himſelf into a ſolitary Place, and there having "found out a couple of Ways, the one of *Plea-* "*ſure*, and the other of *Virtue*, he ſat muſing, and "conſidered a while with himſelf which of theſe "two he had beſt to follow. Such a thing as this might happen to HERCULES a Son of JUPITER; but it is not for us to expect the ſame, who each of us take whom we pleaſe for our Patterns, and ſuffer our ſelves to be drawn any whither, according as they lead us. We have moſt of us Principles inſtilled by our Parents, and follow their Cuſtoms and Manners of Living; others are guided by popular Opinion, and like that *beſt* which takes with the *moſt*. However there are ſome, whether it be out of meer good Fortune, or an happy Temper and Diſpoſition of Soul; or laſtly, by the Care and Inſtructions of their Parents, that purſue right Methods and Ways of Living.

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CHAP. XXXIII.

Few so happy, as to consider throughly what way of Life they should chuse. The principal thing to be regarded in chusing is one's own Genius; next to that one's Fortune in the World. After a Man has chose, he should stick to his Choice, without great Reasons to the contrary. How a Change should be made. Two Cautions to be observed about imitating our Ancestors. Those Men whose Nature is not capable of some, should take the more Care that they have other Virtues. The best Inheritance a Father can leave his Son, is the Fame of his Virtues. It is a mighty Shame for a Son to be unworthy of the Fame of his Ancestors.

BUT those of all are the most difficult to be found, who having sufficient natural Parts, or sufficient Improvements of Learning and Education, or both these together, have withal had due time to consider with themselves what is the best Course of Life they can follow in the World. Now in this Deliberation, the principal thing which we ought to regard is each Man's peculiar Nature and Genius: For since the Decorum of each particular Action, as before was observed, is taken from the Disposition of the Person that does it; sure that Disposition should be carefully consulted, before we determine upon our whole way of Living; it is otherwise impossible we should keep a due Tenour and Consistency in our Lives, and not sometimes faulter in the Performance of our Duty. But though Nature in this Case has much the greater Sway, yet Fortune comes in for a Share next

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after her: Both of them therefore ſhould be duely conſulted in making choice of a Calling, but more eſpecially Nature; for Fortune is unconſtant and often changing, but Nature is firm, and will abide by us; ſo that for the *former* to oppoſe this *latter*, is like a mortal Power's contending with an immortal. That Man then, who has choſe a way of Living that is ſuitable to his Nature, (provided *that* Nature be no ways vicious) ſhould make it his next Care never to alter it; for nothing is leſs becoming than a Humour of changing. But if upon Trial he ſhould find that he was miſtaken in the choice of his Method, (as it is poſſible ſuch a thing ſometime may happen) there is no way left but to unravel again what is already done. If the Times themſelves favour the making ſuch a Change, it may be the more eaſily and conveniently done; but if not, it muſt be brought about gradually and inſenſibly; according to that Rule which is given by wiſe Men, Whenever you deſign to break off any Friendſhip or diſpleaſing Acquaintance, you ſhould looſen the Knot by little and little, and not try to cut it aſunder all at once. And when by this Means we have changed our Courſe of Life, great Care ſhould be taken that we may ſeem to have done it upon very good Reaſons. But having before recommended the Imitation of our Fathers and Anceſtors, I muſt here interpoſe an Exception or two: In the firſt Place then, we ſhould take great Care not to follow them in any thing that is vicious or blameable; nor, ſecondly, ſhould we attempt it, when we find our Conſtitution will not carry us through with it. Thus, for Inſtance, the Son of the former AFRICANUS, (who adopted this *latter* being Son to PAULLUS) by reaſon of the Weakneſs and Indiſpoſition of his Body, could not

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ſo well tread in the Steps of his Father, as his Father had done in thoſe of his Grandfather. But then if a Man be of ſuch a Conſtitution, as that he is unable either to plead at the Bar, or to harangue the People, or conduct an Army, he ſhould take the more Care that he do thoſe things which *are* in his Power; ſuch are the Duties of Juſtice and Fidelity, of Modeſty, Temperance, and Liberality; the Performance of which may ſerve to make amends for his want of the others. Now the nobleſt Inheritance that can be left by a Father to his Son, and far exceeding *that* of Houſes and Lands, is the Fame of his Virtues and glorious Actions; and for a Son to live ſo as is unworthy of the Name and Reputation of his Anceſtors, is the baſeſt and moſt abominable thing in the World.

CHAP. XXXIV.

The reſpective Duties belonging to each Age. Old Men ſhould have an Eye upon Youth. Vice is doubly evil in old Men, becauſe of the ill Example given to the Young. The Duties of Magiſtrates, private Citizens, and Strangers. Nothing more becoming in all ſorts of People than Conſtancy and Regularity.

AND ſince each Age has its reſpective Duties belonging to it, and the ſame things become not both young and old, I muſt add ſomething alſo upon this Diſtinction. It is required then of the younger ſort of People, that they pay due Reverence to thoſe that are old, and chooſe out the beſt and moſt approved among them, by whoſe

Counſel and Direction they may ſteer their Lives; for indeed the Unskilfulneſs and Ignorance of Youth, does ſtand in ſome need of the Prudence of old Age to be its Guide and Director. This Age eſpecially ſhould be kept from all looſe and effeminate living, and be enured to Labour, and enduring Hardſhips both of Body and Mind; that ſo they may be able to bear with the Toils and Fatigues of Buſineſs, whether in Peace or War: And if they do at any time ſlacken their Minds, and give themſelves up to their Pleaſures and Refreſhments, great Care ſhould be taken that they exceed not the Limits of Temperance and Modeſty. And in order to this, it would be very convenient, if ſome aged People would keep a conſtant Eye upon their Sports and Recreations. As for old Men, it is their Duty to leſſen the Labours of the Body, and employ more frequently thoſe of the Mind; and make it their Buſineſs, by prudent and wiſe Counſels, to do what Good they can to the younger ſort of People, to their Friends and Dependents, and more eſpecially to the Republick. And old Men of all things ſhould eſpecially be careful, not to languiſh out their Days in unprofitable Idleneſs. Luxury and Riot is unbecoming in all, but is perfectly ſcandalous and intolerable in old Age: But ſhould Luſt and Wantonneſs come into the Bargain, thoſe who are guilty of it are doubly faulty; for firſt they bring a Shame and Diſgrace upon themſelves, and withal make the young Men more ſhameleſly wicked. Beſide theſe Duties already mentioned, it may not be amiſs to ſay ſomething of thoſe which peculiarly belong either to Magiſtrates, private Citizens, or Strangers. Firſt then, a Magiſtrate ought to conſider, *that* he does in his Perſon repreſent the whole City, and

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accordingly is bound to maintain the Credit and Dignity of it: *That* he is to preſerve the Laws, and ſee that all People have their due Rights; remembring that theſe things are committed to his Truſt, which he is bound to render up faithfully and honeſtly. It is the Duty of thoſe in a private Capacity to live as the reſt of their Citizens do, neither debaſing themſelves below their juſt Height, nor endeavouring to raiſe themſelves up above it; and to follow thoſe things which are honeſt and peaceable in the Common-wealth: Theſe are they whom we uſually call and account good Citizens. And, *laſtly*, for Strangers and Sojurners in a Place, it is their Duty to follow their own Buſineſs, and not intermeddle with any Body's elſe; not to take upon them in what no way concerns them, or be curious in prying into the Secrets of a State which they have nothing to do with. By obſerving theſe Rules, we may, generally ſpeaking, be ſure to find our Duty, whenever it is enquired what is ſuitable and becoming for ſuch a *Perſon*, ſuch a *Time*, or ſuch an *Age*: I ſhall only add, that in all our Deſigns and all our Undertakings, nothing is more becoming than Conſtancy and Regularity.

Chap. XXXV.

Decorum ſhews it ſelf outwardly in three things. Rules of Modeſty taken from Nature in the Frame of our Bodies. Obſcene Talk diſcovers ill Inclinations. The falſe Reaſoning of the Cynicks *and ſome* Stoicks *upon this Subject. Rules of exterior Decency in our Carriage, Poſtures, &c. The great Care the old* Romans *took of Modeſty.*

BUT ſeeing this Decorum, of which we are ſpeaking, is ſeen more eſpecially, and diſcovers it ſelf in our Actions, our Words, and our Carriage and exterior Ornaments of the Body, and conſiſts in one of theſe three things, in a certain kind of natural Beauty and Comlineſs, in Pertinence and well-timing our Words and Actions, and ſuch other kind of Ornaments and outward Embelliſhments as are proper for the Buſineſs one is going about (things which it is no eaſy Matter to expreſs, but I hope I am underſtood, and that is ſufficient;) and ſeeing that Care which we ought to take, of making our ſelves agreeable to thoſe we converſe with, conſiſts in a due Regulation of theſe; I ſhall proceed to diſcourſe of them each in particular. In the firſt Place then it may be worth our obſerving, how much Care and Concern has been ſhewn by Nature, in ordering the Frame and Compoſition of our Bodies: Thoſe Parts which were handſome and agreeable to the Sight, ſhe has placed in view; but thoſe which could *not* be ſo handſomly ſhewn, and were only given to ſerve certain Ends and Neceſſities of Nature, theſe ſhe has been careful to conceal and cover. A Senſe of Shame and Modeſty in Men has ſeconded this

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her Diligence in framing their Bodies; for all that are not wholly bereaved of their Reaſon keep thoſe Parts hidden which *ſhe* has concealed, and are always as ſecret as they can in thoſe Actions which natural Neceſſity forces them upon. Neither do they call by their proper and broad Names the Parts that are given to ſerve ſuch Neceſſity, nor the Uſes of them; and Modeſty forbids us to mention thoſe things, which may be done very honeſtly, provided it be in ſecret. Therefore the plain and open *talking* of thoſe things, as well as the plain and open *acting* of them, diſcovers immodeſt and wanton Inclinations. The *Cynicks* therefore are wholly to be rejected, and ſome of the *Stoicks* little better than *Cynicks*, who laugh at and blame us for calling thoſe things by their proper Names which are really diſhoneſt and ſcandalous in themſelves, while we count it a Shame to ſpeak plainly of thoſe, in the doing of which there is no manner of Diſhoneſty. To *rob*, for Example, to *cheat*, and *whore*, are Actions in themſelves the moſt ſhameful and ſcandalous, and yet it is not counted immodeſt to name them; whereas to *make one's ſelf a Father of Children* is an Action that is honeſt and creditable in it ſelf, and yet forſooth muſt not be plainly mentioned, for fear of its giving Offence to chaſte Ears. This, and much more to the ſame Purpoſe, they commonly urge againſt Modeſty and Baſhfulneſs: But let us follow where Nature has ſhewed us the way, and whatever may offend either the Eyes or Ears, *that* let us ſhun in our Carriage and Converſation. In all our Poſtures and Geſtures of Body, ſuch as ſtanding, walking, ſitting, and leaning; nay in our very Countenance, in the Caſt of our Eyes, and Motions of our Hands, we ſhould be careful to keep

and obſerve what is becoming: In which there is a double Extream to be avoided, *that* of too much Niceneſs and Effeminacy on the one Hand, and *that* of meer Clowniſhneſs and want of Breeding on the other. Nor let any one imagine that theſe things do well in an Actor or Orator; but that we are left free to obſerve, or not obſerve them. The Actors indeed have had always ſo much regard for Modeſty, as that, Time out of Mind, it has been their Cuſtom never to appear upon the Stage in publick, without ſomething on to conceal thoſe Parts which ought to be kept ſecret; for fear leſt their Cloaths being opened by any Accident, ſomething might be ſeen which Modeſty bids them hide. And our common Cuſtom forbids the Son, when grown toward Man's Eſtate, to bathe with his Father, and likewiſe the Son-in-law with his Father-in-law. We ſhould therefore take Care to be ſtrict Obſervers of theſe Rules of Modeſty, eſpecially being ſuch as even Nature herſelf has directed us to.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Two ſorts of Beauty, one proper for Men, the other for Women. Men ſhould avoid Niceneſs, &c. Nothing affected can become. Rules about Cloaths, Walking, and outward Ornaments. Outward Carriage diſcovers the inward Diſpoſitions of the Mind. More Care ſhould be taken to keep Decency in the Motions of the Soul. How this may be done. Two ſorts of Motions in the Soul, the ſenſitive Appetite and Reaſon. How each ſhould be managed.

BUT ſince there are two ſorts of Beauty in the World, *one* of which conſiſts in Charms and Sweetneſs, the *other* in Gracefulneſs and Majeſty; the former of theſe ſhould be left to the Women, and the latter only be thought proper for the Men. From hence it follows, that *theſe* ſhould avoid all unmanlike Ornaments and Niceneſs in their Habits, and the ſame in the Motions and Geſtures of their Bodies: For all People hate the affected Motions and Carriage of thoſe, who would be taken for Maſters of a genteel Air; and your Actors on the Stage have a great many fooliſh impertinent Geſtures, which are very diſpleaſing and offenſive to the Spectators: And in each of theſe kinds, what is ſimple and unaffected, is always beſt liked of and approved by the World. In order to have a true graceful Comelineſs, you muſt endeavour to keep a good Colour in your Face; and the way to do that, is to uſe frequent Exerciſe. Nor do we forbid Men the uſe of all Ornaments and Graces to recommend them, but only of thoſe that are too exquiſite and affected: So far they are

allowable, as they are neceſſary to keep a Man from being thought a Clown, and from ſhewing a Diſreſpect for the Perſons he has to do with. And the ſame Rule may ſerve very well for our Cloaths; in which to be moderate, as in moſt other Caſes, is certainly the beſt way. We ſhould alſo avoid an effeminate Softneſs and Slowneſs in our Gait, like thoſe that are marching along in Proceſſion; and no leſs an over-great Haſtineſs and Speed, which only begets a deep panting and breathing, diſtorts the Face, and perfectly changes the whole Air of the Countenance, which diſcovers a Lightneſs and Inconſtancy of Humour. Now if the Motions of the Body deſerve all this Pains and Concern about them, how much Care ſhould we take to keep thoſe of the Mind within the Limits preſcribed them by Nature and right Reaſon? Which never can be done any other way, than by keeping the Soul in ſuch an even Temper, as not to be concerned or dejected at any thing; and by a conſtant Care and Application of Thought, ſo as to mind nothing but what is honeſt and becoming. Now the Motions of the Soul are of two ſorts, ſome of them proceeding from the reaſonable or thinking, others from the ſenſitive and paſſionate Part: The former is buſied in nothing but ſearching and finding out of Truth; by the latter we are puſhed and driven forward to Action. It is our Duty therefore to employ our Thoughts about laudable Objects; and ſo to reduce and overrule the Paſſions, as that they may ebb and flow in obedience to Reaſon.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Decorum shews it self in speaking. Two sorts of Speech. There might Rules be given about our ordinary Discourse. Two things required in the Voice and Pronunciation. How each of them may be gotten. Several Examples of good Speakers. Rules about the Manner, Subjects, and Measure of our common Talk.

ANOTHER great Instance in which this Becomingness shews it self, is our Speech and Discourse. But whereas of this there are two sorts, the *one* proper only for Argument and Contention, the *other* for common and ordinary Talk; we should make use of *that* when we plead at the Bar, or speak in the Senate and publick Assemblies; of *this* when we meet and discourse with our Friends, when we walk in any of the publick Places, or are sitting at Table, and over a Glass of Wine. There are Teachers of Rhetorick who give Rules about the *former*; but there are no Rules given about the *latter*: Not but that I think there might some be invented; but the Business is, there is no Body to be found that would study them if they were; otherwise Masters would never be wanting, if there were but Learners that would study and employ them. Hence we are almost over-run with Rhetoricians; tho' no small Part of the Rules which they give, *viz.* those that concern either the Words or the Sense, may be very well applied to our ordinary Discourse. The Voice is that, whereby we can talk, and convey our inward Thoughts from one to another; in which there are two things chiefly required; first, that it be *clear*; and,

ſecondly, *harmonious*. Each of theſe muſt be the Gift of Nature, and is not attainable any other way; but where they are naturally, Practice and Exerciſe will encreaſe the one, and Imitation of thoſe who ſpeak ſweetly and agreeably, better the other. This was the principal thing in the CATULI, which made them be counted Men of Judgment and Learning; though they had ſome Skill in the Matter it is true, and ſo had ſome others as well as they; but this one thing recommended them ſo much, that they were eſteemed the moſt perfect Maſters of the *Roman* Language. The Sound of their Voices was pleaſing and harmonious; they neither ſlurred over things negligently in their Pronunciation, not yet were too exact in expreſſing every Letter; the former of which would have made their Speech obſcure, and the latter affected. They never ſpoke ſo as to ſtrain their Voices, but equally avoided the double Extream, that of Faintneſs and Sicklineſs (as it were) on the one Hand, and of too much Loudneſs and Elevation on the other. CRASSUS's Diſcourſe was full out as witty, and not near ſo barren, as that of the CATULI; yet theſe had as great a Reputation as he, upon the Score of good ſpeaking. CÆSAR, who was Brother to the elder CATULUS, was far more facetious and witty than any of them; ſo that in Court, when before the Judges, he would do more by his eaſy familiar way of talking, than others could do by all the Powers of their Eloquence. Each of theſe things ſhould be diligently taken Care of, if we deſire to act decently on all Occaſions. Our common Diſcourſe then I would have to be ſuch as that wherein the Followers of SOCRATES excel; eaſy and good-natured, without any Stubbornneſs or Stiffneſs in Opinion: Let it be

be ſeaſoned with Mirth and Pleaſantneſs, and not be too tedious, pert, and aſſuming, as though it had a Right to the Attention of the Hearers, and no Body elſe had any thing to do with it; but think it reaſonable, as in all other Caſes, ſo in this of Diſcourſe, to let every Man fairly take his own Turn. But eſpecially in the firſt Place it ought to be conſidered, what is the Nature of the Subject we are diſcourſing upon; if it be *ſerious*, we ſhould handle it with Seriouſneſs; but if it be *merry*, with Gayety and Briskneſs. But the moſt important thing to be taken care of, is, that our Talk do not diſcover any Viciouſneſs in our Manners; which is apt to appear by nothing ſo much as by falling too foul upon thoſe that are abſent, either by turning them into Ridicule, or miſrepreſenting them by malicious reproachful Language. Now the Subject of Diſcourſe in common Converſation is uſually one of theſe three things; either our own private domeſtick Concerns, or thoſe that relate to the Common-wealth in general, or, laſtly, ſome Matter of Study and Learning: Therefore when our Talk begins to ramble from theſe, we ſhould always be careful to fetch it back to them again. But whatever Subjects preſent themſelves, (for we are not all pleaſed with the ſame things, nor with any thing equally at all times;) but whatever Subject, I ſay, we are upon, we ſhould conſider how far our Diſcourſe may be entertaining; and as we could find a Time when to begin, ſo we ſhould learn when to make an end.

CHAP.

Chap. XXXVIII.

Diſcourſe ſhould be free both from Paſſion and Heavineſs; and ſhew a Reſpect for thoſe we converſe with. Chiding and Correction ſometimes neceſſary: Rules to be obſerved in it. In Quarrels with Adverſaries we ſhould avoid flying out into Paſſion. To talk great of one's ſelf very unbecoming.

IT is a general Rule for the Conduct of our Lives, that we make it our Buſineſs to be free from Paſſion; that is, from all violent Motions of the Soul, which reject and caſt off their Allegiance to Reaſon. This ſhould be applied to the Matter now before us; and all our Diſcourſe ſhould be calm and unpaſſionate, without any Tranſports of Anger or Deſire; as alſo, on the other Hand, without Deadneſs and Heavineſs, or any ſuch Vice: And in every Company we ſhould carefully endeavour to ſhew a ſort of Kindneſs and Reſpect for thoſe Perſons with whom we converſe. It ſometimes comes to paſs that *Chiding* is neceſſary; in which we may be allowed a little to raiſe our Voices, and to uſe more Sharpneſs and Authority in our Expreſſions: However, we muſt be careful that we do not diſcover any Paſſion; but let it rather be ſeen that we come to ſuch Corrections as Phyſicians do to cutting and ſcarrifying Wounds, but ſeldom, and with a great deal of Regret and Unwillingneſs. And indeed we ſhould never come to them at all, unleſs it be neceſſary, and when no other Methods will do any good. And even then, when we are forced to it, we muſt be ſure (as was ſaid) to avoid all Anger; for whatſoever is guided

guided by its Influence and Directions, can never be done with any Prudence or Moderation. Our Rebukes ſhould be generally mild and gentle; but nevertheleſs ſuch, as may carry ſome Weight and Authority along with them; obſerving a Mean betwixt too great Eaſineſs, and breaking out into angry and contumelious Language. And whatſoever Sharpneſs we may expreſs in our Reproofs, we ſhould let the Perſon ſo corrected know that we do it altogether for his Good, and not for any By-Ends or Self-Deſigns. In the Quarrels we have even with our greateſt Adverſaries, whatever dirty Language may be thrown upon us, it is the beſt way to keep our Minds calm and ſedate, and never let Anger break in upon them: For whatever is ſpoken or done in a Paſſion, can neither be conſiſtent with the Rules of Gravity, nor be approved of by thoſe who are preſent in the Company. Laſtly, it is a very unbecoming thing for a Man to talk great of himſelf in Diſcourſe, and eſpecially when that which he ſays is falſe; which is but to imitate *Braggadocchio* in the Comedy, and make himſelf the Laughing-ſtock and Jeſt of the Hearers.

Chap. XXXIX.

What ſort of Houſe is fitting for a Perſon of Honour. What ſhould be the End of Building. The Examples of Octavius *and* Scaurus. *A great Houſe brings a Reproach on its Maſter, if his Worth be not anſwerable to it, and if he do not keep up the Laws of Hoſpitality. Meaſures to be obſerved in Building. Three Rules to be obſerved for the keeping a Decorum in our Actions.*

AND ſince we take in (or deſire at leaſt to take in) all the ſeveral Branches of Duty, we muſt not forget to add a Word or two about what ſort of Houſe is becoming a Gentleman or a Perſon of Honour. Now the main End of Building is Lodging, and other neceſſary Uſes of an Houſe; and therefore the Draught or Contrivance of it ſhould be ſuited accordingly. But we ſhould not ſo much regard bare Neceſſities, as not to have an Eye to Convenience and Magnificence. Cneius Octavius, the firſt of that Family that was ever Conſul, built himſelf a noble and magnificent Houſe upon the *Palatin* Hill, which is ſaid to have gained him a great deal of Reputation; inſomuch that the People coming uſually to ſee it, the very Houſe was ſuppoſed to have gone a great way toward advancing its Owner (tho' a kind of an Upſtart) to the Dignity of Conſul. This ſome time after was pulled down by Scaurus, that ſo he might make his own ſomewhat the bigger by it: But whereas Octavius, by building *his* Houſe, had made himſelf Conſul; this Man, on the contrary, by enlarging of *his*, (tho' the Son of a great and moſt eminent Citizen) not only cauſed himſelf to be put by that Office, but was moreover brought

brought into Shame and Diſhonour, and at laſt utterly ruined. It is well if a Man can enhance that Credit and Reputation he has got by the Splendor of his Houſe; but he muſt not depend upon his Houſe alone for it; for the Maſter ought to bring Honour to his fine Seat, and not the fine Seat bring Honour to its Maſter. But, as in all other Caſes, a Man ſhould not have Reſpect to himſelf alone, but to other People alſo; ſo it is in this of a Nobleman's Houſe, which ought to be made very large and capacious, becauſe he muſt keep up the Laws of Hoſpitality, and entertain Multitudes of all ſorts of Perſons in it. For a fine and large Houſe that gives Entertainment to no Body, ſerves but to reproach and upbraid its Owner; and eſpecially if it were uſed to be frequently viſited under its former Maſter: For it is an odious thing to have Paſſengers cry, as they go along,

Ah! good old Houſe, alas thy preſent Lord
Is not like thy former one!

which may juſtly be ſaid of but too too many in our own Days. Care ſhould be taken, eſpecially when a Man builds himſelf, that he be not too extravagant in his Magnificence and Expences; which is a very ill thing, tho' it had no other Harm in it but only *that one* of giving a bad Example: For moſt Men are apt, more than in any thing elſe, to imitate the great Ones as to this Particular. Where, for Example, ſhall we find the Man that rivals the famous LUCULLUS in his Virtues? whereas how many have done it in the Statelineſs and Magnificence of his Country-houſes? But there certainly ought to be *ſome Bounds* fixed and preſcribed to theſe things, and *thoſe* to be according

to the Rules of Moderation; but the Measure whereby we are to judge of their being moderate, is their Subserviency to the Ornaments and Conveniencies of Life: And so much may suffice upon this Head. As for our *Actions*, the way to maintain this Decorum in *them*, is constantly to observe these three following Precepts: First, *That we keep all our Passions and Appetites under the Government and Direction of Reason*, than which there is nothing of greater Efficacy toward the constant Preservation of our Duty. Secondly, *That we consider the Quality and Moment of the thing which we go about*; that so we may proportion our Endeavours accordingly, and take neither more nor less Pains about it than it really deserves. And lastly, *That in all those exterior Circumstances, which are only designed for a genteel Show and Grace of the Action*, we should keep within the Measures of Prudence and Moderation. Now the best Measure we can observe is this, To keep our Eyes fixed on those Rules of Decorum I have before laid down, and never to transgress them. But of these three Rules the first is the most important, *That the sensitive Part be kept obedient to the reasonable*,

CHAP.

Chap. XL.

Order to be obſerved in our Words and Actions. Wherein it conſiſts. The Duties ariſing from it. An excellent Saying of Pericles *to that purpoſe. Of how great Moment the due Timing a thing is. We ſhould be particularly careful to avoid little Indecencies. Harmony and Agreement more neceſſary in our Lives, than our Muſick.*

IT remains in the next place that we ſhould ſpeak of that *Order*, which is to be obſerved in our Words and Actions; and of the proper Seaſons and Opportunities of them. And here will fall under our Conſideration, that which by the *Greeks* is called *εὐταξία*; by which I do not mean that *εὐταξία*, which by us is moſt commonly rendered *Moderation*, and ſignifies the *keeping within due Bounds*: But that which contains in the Notion of it, *The Preſervation of Order*. We ſhall crave Leave, however, to call even this latter by the Name of *Moderation*, which is thus defined by the *Stoick* Philoſophers, *Moderation is the Knowledge of putting whatever we ſay, or do, in its proper Place.* From whence it appears, That *Order* and the *Well-placing* of Things are but different Words to expreſs the ſame Notion: For *Order* is defined by the ſame Sect of Men to be *the ranging of things in their fitting and proper Places.* Now the Place of an Action they tell us is, *The Seaſon of Time for doing it*; and by the *Seaſon of Time* they mean nothing elſe, than that which the *Greeks* call *καιρὸς*, and which we expreſs by the Word *Occaſio*: So that, in ſhort, by *Moderation* here (in the Senſe of the Word which I have juſt now given) we mean no more

more than *the Knowledge of Well-timing whatever we do.* Prudence may be defined the ſame way too, about which we have ſpoken at the Entrance of this Work: But now we are diſcourſing of Temperance, Moderation, and ſuch-like Virtues. What the Duties of Prudence are, is ſufficiently explained in its proper Place; what thoſe of Modeſty, and ſuch other Virtues as ſerve to recommend us to thoſe we converſe with, and make up the Subject of our preſent Enquiry, remains now to be conſidered. *In the firſt place then,* We ought to obſerve a due Regularity and *Order* in our Actions, as that the ſeveral Parts of our whole Lives, like thoſe of a regular and coherent Diſcourſe, may agree and be ſuitable one with another. For what is more unſeemly, and contrary to good Manners, than when we are engaged about ſerious Buſineſs, to bring in ſome pleaſant and merry Diſcourſe, that is proper for a Feaſt, or over a Glaſs of Wine? It was a very good Anſwer to the preſent Purpoſe, which PERICLES once gave to SOPHOCLES the Tragedian: They were both of them Prætors of *Athens* together, and meeting one Day about ſome Buſineſs of their Office, it happened a beautiful Boy paſſed by; whom SOPHOCLES eſpying, *Heavens!* ſaid he, PERICLES, *What a delicate Youth is there!* To which he replied, *A Magiſtrate,* SOPHOCLES, *ſhould keep a ſtrict Guard, not over his Hands only, but his Eyes too.* Now had SOPHOCLES happened to have ſaid the ſame Words at a Time when they were chuſing of Wreſtlers or Racers, ſuch a Rebuke had been wholly undeſerved: So much may the Merit or Demerit of an Action depend upon the Circumſtances of Time and Place. Suppoſe, for Example, a Man had ſome conſiderable Cauſe upon his Hands, or Buſineſs that required attentive

Think-

Thinking: Could any one blame him for being very thoughtful as he walked or rid? But ſhould he ſhew himſelf ſo at a Feaſt among Company, it would be counted a great Piece of Rudeneſs and ill breeding, and this for not obſerving the Difference of Seaſons. Now as for thoſe things, which notoriouſly offend againſt the Rules of good Manners, ſuch as for a Man to ſing openly in the Streets, or any other groſs and apparent Abſurdity, theſe are ſo eaſy to be obſerved by all, that we need give no Rules or Directions about them; but we ought more eſpecially to employ our Care, in avoiding thoſe little unheeded Indecencies, which are hardly underſtood by the generality of Mankind. And as the leaſt Fault or Diſagreement in the Notes, is immediately perceived by a skilful Muſician; ſo we ſhould take all imaginable Care, that there be no Diſagreement in our Lives and Actions: And that ſo much the more, as the Harmony in our Lives is of much greater Conſequence, than that in our Muſick.

Chap. XLI.

Decency to be kept even in the leaſt things, as the moving of the Eyes, &c. We ſhould obſerve what is unhandſome in others, and correct it in our ſelves. We ſhould ask the Advice of experienced Perſons. Cautions in taking this Advice. We ſhould follow Cuſtom and Civil Conſtitutions. Some things allowable in ſome great Men, which are not ſo in others. Nothing immodeſt is becoming. Some particular Duties to be obſerved by all good Men.

AS therefore the delicate Ear of the Artiſt can quickly diſcover the leaſt Fault in his Muſick; ſo, would we take as much Care in detecting and cenſuring our Vices, we might from the leaſt and moſt trivial Matters, make ſeveral Obſervations that would be much to our Advantage. From the moving of our Eyes, for Example; from our way of ſmoothing or wrinkling our Brows; from the merry or ſorrowful Air of our Countenances; from our Laughter, Freedom or Reſervedneſs in Diſcourſe; from the raiſing or falling the Tone of our Voices, and a great many other ſuch little kind of Circumſtances, we might eaſily judge what is handſome and becoming us, and what is repugnant to the Rules of our Duty, and to that which our Nature or Character requires. Now in this Particular it is a very good way, To obſerve firſt in others how each of theſe ſuits, that ſo we may avoid and correct in *our ſelves*, whatever we ſee bad and misbecoming in *them* For, I know not how, we can ſooner ſpy Faults out in other People, than we can in our ſelves; upon which

which Account there is no better way to correct any Learner, than for the Master to mimick his Faults before him; that so he, perceiving their Deformity in another, may the sooner be brought to amend them in himself. Another good way is, Whenever we are in Doubt and Suspence about a Duty, to go to some learned or experienced Person, and ask his Advice upon the Matter in Question, before we resolve and determine with our selves: Because, generally speaking, when left to themselves, Men are apt to be guided too much by their own Inclinations and Natures. And in asking this Advice we should diligently observe, not only what every one tells us in Words, but what his real inward Opinion is, and what Reasons and Grounds he may have for such Opinions. For *as* your Statuaries, Painters and Poets, use to set their Works out to be publickly viewed; that so they may be able to correct such Faults as are generally found by Spectators in them: And *as* they consider with themselves and their Friends, what Oversights or Mistakes they have been guilty of in them; *so* should we make use of other People's Judgments as well as our own, and do or not do, correct or alter a great many things upon their Advice. As for those things that are settled by Custom and Civil Constitutions, I shall give no Directions at all concerning them; for they are sufficient Directions of themselves: I shall only observe, That it is a great Mistake in any one to think, because such Men as ARISTIPPUS and SOCRATES have ventured to say, or do a great many things, which are contrary to Rule and received Custom, that therefore he may be allowed to do the same: For these were Persons of extraordinary Merits, and almost more than humane Perfections; and on that

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Account might demand ſome Privileges, which are not to be granted to the reſt of the World. But as for the Practice and Manner of the *Cynicks*, it is wholly to be diſcarded; for it is a plain Offence againſt the Rules of Modeſty, without which nothing can be virtuous and becoming. It is our Duty to pay a Reſpect and Deference, as to all thoſe that are virtuous and couragious, who deſign for the Good and Advantage of the Republick, and ſerve or have ſerved her in any of her Intereſts; ſo to thoſe alſo who bear any Office or Command in the State. We ſhould pay in like Manner a peculiar Regard and Reverence to old Age; never reſiſt any publick Magiſtrate; make a Diſtinction between Citizens and Strangers; and of Strangers themſelves, between thoſe in a private and publick Capacity. In fine, not to mention any more Particulars, we ought in all Caſes both to keep *our ſelves*, and endeavour to uphold and maintain among *others*, that common Correſpondence and univerſal Society that is among all Mankind.

CHAP. XLII.

Of the ſeveral ſorts of Trade which are creditable and which not. All thoſe that adminiſter to Vice and Debauchery ſcandalous. Lying in Tradeſmen abominable. How far Merchandiſe is creditable. Husbandry particularly commended.

AS for Trades, and the Ways of getting Money, which of them are creditable and which otherwiſe, I have only theſe very few things to obſerve: *Firſt*, All thoſe are unworthy Ways of gaining,

gaining, which procure one a general Hatred and Ill-will; as that of the *Uſurers* and *Tax-gatherers*, for Inſtance. *Secondly*, Thoſe Arts are mean and ungenteel, in which a Man is paid for his *Work*, not his *Skill*; for the very receiving a Reward for one's Labour, is like taking of Earneſt to bind himſelf a Slave. Nor are they to be eſteemed as better than mean and ordinary People, that buy things up by the Lump of Merchants, to ſell them out again by little and little; for what they gain is but a very poor Buſineſs, unleſs they are guilty of abominable lying, than which there is nothing in the World more ſcandalous. Again, all Handicrafts-Men have but a mean ſort of Calling; and it is impoſſible that a Work-houſe ſhould have any thing that is genteel in it. *Further yet*, all thoſe Trades are pitiful and low, that purvey and cater for the ſatisfying Mens Pleaſures; Fiſhmongers, Butchers, Cooks, *&c.* as TERENCE reckons them up; to which we may add, if you pleaſe, Perfumers, Dancing-maſters, and thoſe who ſupply us with Dice or Cards. But Arts that have ſomething of Knowledge and Skill in them, or thoſe that are uſeful and neceſſary for the Publick; ſuch as Phyſick, for Inſtance, or Architecture, or the Inſtruction and Education of Youth in Good-manners, theſe are very creditable and commendable in thoſe, whoſe Rank and Condition is ſuited for ſuch Employments. As for Merchandiſe, it is ſordid and mean, when the Trade that is driven is little and inconſiderable; but when it takes in a great Quantity of Buſineſs, and bringing home Goods from every Country, ſells them out again without lying or deceiving, we can hardly ſay but that it is creditable enough: Nay, it is moſt certainly very commendable, when thoſe who are concerned in

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it only design (after they are *sated*, or rather *contented*, with what they have gained) to betake themselves wholly from the *Haven* to the *Country*, as before they had done from the *Sea* to the *Haven*, and there enjoy quietly their private Possessions. But among all the Methods of enriching one's self, there is no one better, no one more profitable, pleasant, and agreeable, no one more worthy of a Man and a Gentleman, than *that* of manuring and tilling the Ground; concerning which I have spoken at large in my *Cato Major*, from whence you may borrow what is necessary to be said upon this Subject.

Chap. XLIII.

The comparing of two Parts of Honesty one with another. The Duties of Prudence or finding out Truth, and those of Justice or maintaining human Society compared; and the Preference given to the latter.

And thus have I finished what I had to say upon the first Question, and, I think, sufficiently made it appear, how the particular Instances of Duty are to be drawn from the several Heads of Honesty. But it often comes to pass, that those very things themselves which are honest, *rival* as it were, and come into Competition with one another, so as to make it be another Question, *Of two that are honest, which is the most so?* Which is a Point not mentioned at all by Panætius. For the whole of Virtue receiving its Rise from those four Fountains: First, *Prudence*, or the Know-

Knowledge of Truth. Secondly, *Juſtice*, or doing Good to the Community and Society of Mankind. Thirdly, *Fortitude*, or Greatneſs of Soul. And, Laſtly, *Temperance* or *Moderation*; it cannot but happen, that ſeveral of theſe muſt be compared together, before we can be able to ſatisfy our ſelves, which it is our Duty to prefer before which. *Firſt then*, If the Duties of *Juſtice*, or preſerving the Community, and thoſe of *Prudence*, or the Knowledge of Truth, ſhould come into Competition one with another; the former, I think, ſhould take place of the latter, as being more conſonant to the Dictates of Nature, which may eaſily be proved by this following Argument: Suppoſe a wiſe Man to be in ſuch a Place, as afforded him all the Conveniencies of Life, and all the Opportunities of Leiſure in abundance, ſo that he might ſtudy and contemplate every thing that was any ways worthy his Knowledge or Contemplation; *yet* were he wholly deprived of all Company, and had no body ever come near him to be ſeen, he would quickly be tired, and grow weary of his Life. Again, The Principal of all the Virtues is that ſort of Wiſdom which the *Greeks* call σοφία; (for as to *that* ſort of it which they call φρόνησις, and we *Prudentia*, it is a thing of a perfectly different Nature, as being no more than *The Skill of diſcerning what it is that we ought, or ought not to do*:) But that Sort of Wiſdom, which I ſaid was the principal, is, *The Knowledge of Things both Divine and Human*; and ſo comprehends the *Society* and *Relation* of Men with the Gods, and with one another. If then this, as moſt certainly it is, be the greateſt Virtue; it follows, that the Duties which flow from Society muſt as certainly be the greateſt: For the deepeſt Knowledge and Contemplation of

Nature, is but a very lame and imperfect Buſineſs, unleſs it proceed and tend forward to Action: Now the Occaſions wherein it can ſhew it ſelf beſt, conſiſt in maintaining the Intereſts of Men, and of Conſequence belong to the Society of Mankind: From whence it follows, That the maintaining of *this*, ſhould in reaſon take place before Learning and Knowledge. Nor is this any more than what all good Men ſhew they judge to be true by their Actions and Practices: For who is there ſo wholly addicted to Contemplation and the Study of Nature, as that, if his Country ſhould fall into Danger, while he was in one of his nobleſt Reſearches, he would not immediately throw all aſide, and run to its Relief with all poſſible Speed; nay, though he thought he might number the Stars, or take the juſt Dimenſions of the whole World? And the ſame would he do in the Caſe of any Danger to a Friend or a Parent. From all which things it undeniably appears, That the Duties of *Knowledge* and ſearching after Truth, are obliged to give way to the Duties of *Juſtice*, which conſiſt in upholding *Society* among Men, than which there is nothing we ſhould be more concerned for.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLIV.

Even those, whose Business is the Search after Truth, are serviceable to the Society of Mankind, and how. Speaking well preferable to the highest Speculations, and why. Man by Nature a sociable Creature. Knowledge of little Use, unless it tend to Action, and do some Good to the World. Necessity not the Reason of Mens joining in Societies.

NAY those very Men, who have spent their whole Lives in Philosophy and Learning, have yet always endeavoured, as much as they could, to be serviceable to the Interest and Good of Mankind. For many brave Men, and very useful Members of their several States, have in great part been made such by their Institutions. Thus EPAMINONDAS, the famous *Theban*, was indebted for his Education to LYSIS, the *Pythagorean*: DION of *Syracuse*, for *his* to PLATO; and the same may be said of a great many others; even I my self, whatsoever Service I have done the Republick (if at least it may be said that I have done it any Service) must wholly ascribe it to that Learning and those Instructions I received from my Masters. Neither is their Teaching, and Instructing others, determined to the time of their living here; but they continue to do it even after they are dead, by the learned Discourses which they leave behind them: For there is no one Point they have left unhandled, relating either to the Laws, Customs, or Discipline of the Commonwealth: So that they seem to have sacrificed their Leisure and Opportunities of Study, to the Benefit of those who are engaged in Business.

And thus we see how those Men themselves, whose Lives have been spent in the Pursuit of Wisdom, have nevertheless endeavoured by their Learning and Prudence, to be some way profitable to the Community of Mankind. And for this one Reason, perswasive Speaking, if joined with Prudence, is a greater Accomplishment than the acutest Thinking, if destitute of Eloquence: For *Thinking* is terminated in it self alone, but Speaking reaches out to the Benefit of those with whom we are joined in the same Society. Now as Bees do not *therefore* unite themselves together, that so they may the better prepare their Combs; but *therefore* prepare their Combs, because they do by Nature unite themselves together: So Men, and much more, being Creatures that naturally love Society, in consequence of that, seek how they may find Methods of living happily in it. From hence it follows, that the Knowledge of things, unless it is accompanied with that sort of Virtue, which consists in defending and preserving of Men, *i. e.* in the Maintenance of human Society, is but a barren and fruitless Accomplishment; and even *Greatness of Soul*, without a Regard to this Society and Conjunction, is very little better than Savageness and Barbarity. Thus we may see, that the getting of Knowledge is a Duty of much less Concern and Moment, than the preserving this Society and Union amongst Men. It is a very false Notion that hath been advanced by some People, *That* Necessity alone was the Motive to this Society, which we have so often mentioned; and *that* Men would never have associated together, but that they were not able, in a solitary Life, to furnish themselves with the Necessaries of Nature; and *that* every great and exalted Genius, would

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Providence ſupply him with Food and the other Conveniencies of Life, would withdraw from all Buſineſs and Entercourſe with Mankind, and give himſelf wholly to Study and Contemplation. This is not ſo; for he would avoid Solitude, endeavour to find a Companion in his Studies, and always be deſirous of Teaching and Learning, of Hearing and Speaking. From all which things it is abundantly evident, That the Duties belonging to Human Society, ſhould in reaſon take place before thoſe which relate to *unactive* Knowledge.

CHAP. XLV.

The Duties of maintaining Society not always preferable to thoſe of Temperance, Modeſty, &c. What Duties of Juſtice ought to take place of others.

IT ought perhaps to be enquired here, Whether the Duties of this Society, which is thus agreeable to the Principles of Nature, ought always to be preferred before the Duties of Temperance, Decency and Moderation? Indeed I think not: For ſome things there are ſo very highly ſcandalous and abominably wicked, that a wiſe Man would hardly be guilty of them, ſuppoſing he could bring Safety to his Country by it. POSIDONIUS has heaped up a great many Inſtances of Things of this Nature; ſome of which are ſo exceeding filthy, and intolerably obſcene, that it is a Shame even ſo much as to repeat them after him. Theſe then muſt never be done for one's Country; nor will one's Country ever deſire that they ſhould; for the beſt of it is, it is impoſſible ſuch a Conjuncture

ſhould happen, as can make it be the Intereſt of any Republick, to have wiſe Men be guilty of ſuch abominable Actions. We may lay down this then for a certain Concluſion, That when ſeveral Duties come into Competition, thoſe ſhould take place before any others, which relate to the Maintenance of Human Society. For wiſe and conſiderate *Acting*, is the End of all *Knowledge* and prudent Thinking; and by Conſequence *that* is more valuable than *this*. And ſo much may ſuffice upon this Subject; for, I think, I have ſufficiently cleared the Way, ſo that hereafter there will be no Difficulty to know which Duties are to be preferred before which. But thoſe very Duties which relate to Society, are of different Rates and Degrees among themſelves; but it is no hard Matter to ſee in what Order they ought to be performed. As in the *Firſt* place, Thoſe to the Immortal Gods. *Secondly*, To our Native Country. *Thirdly*, To our Parents; and ſo on to all others in their reſpective Places. What has been ſaid in a few Words on this laſt Head, I hope, is ſufficient to make it appear, that it is uſual for Men not only to doubt, *Whether ſuch and ſuch an Action be honeſt or diſhoneſt*; but alſo, *Of two, that are both of them honeſt, which is the moſt ſo.* This is one of thoſe two Heads, which I at firſt obſerved were omitted by PANÆTIUS: Let us now paſs on to the remaining Part of our propoſed Diviſion.

The End of the Firſt Book.

TULLY'S OFFICES.

The SECOND BOOK.

CHAP. I.

What will be the Subject of this Second Book. He applies himself to the Study of Philosophy, as his greatest Consolation in the Midst of the publick Calamities of his Country.

WHAT those Duties are, Son MARK, which *Honesty* and *Virtue* require of us, and how they arise from their several Fountains, is, I think, plain enough from the former Book. I am now in the next Place to speak of those others which wholly regard the Convenience of Life, and are requisite for the Getting and Enjoyment of those things which serve for our comfortable Subsistence here, such as Interest, Riches, *&c.* And here I told you the common Heads of Deliberation were, *What is profitable and what unprofitable?* and, *Of several Profitables, which is more, and which most of all such?* Concerning which I

ſhall begin to ſpeak, after I have premiſed but a Word or two in Vindication of my ſelf and my preſent Undertaking. For tho' my Books have excited ſeveral both to the reading, and even writing of Philoſophy; yet I am now and then apt to be afraid, leſt ſome, who are otherwiſe very good Men, ſhould hate and deſpiſe the very Name of that Study, and wonder at me for beſtowing ſuch Portions of my Time and Pains in ſo very fruitleſs and inſignificant a Manner. To whom I anſwer, That ſo long as the Republick was governed by thoſe, to whoſe Care and Management ſhe had intruſted her ſelf, I was ever diligent, and employed all my Thoughts for her Good and Preſervation: But *when* one Man had ſeized of her wholly to himſelf, and there was no Place left for my Counſel or Authority; and *when* I had loſt thoſe extraordinary Perſons, who had been my Companions in labouring for her Intereſt; I reſolved not to ſink into Anguiſh and Deſpair, which had wholly overwhelmed me if I had not reſiſted them; nor to follow ſuch Pleaſures or idle ways of Living, as were improper and unbecoming a Man of Learning. I could heartily wiſh, had it ſo pleaſed the Gods, that the Republick had continued in its ancient Condition, and never fallen into the Hands of thoſe Men, who are not ſo much for changing as overturning every thing! I ſhould then, as I did in its flouriſhing Circumſtances, ſpend my Time rather in Buſineſs than Writing; and what I did write would not be things of this moral Nature, but my publick Orations, as I have often done. But when the poor State, which had taken up all my Care and Thoughts, and for which I had laboured with all my Power, was utterly ruined and ſunk into nothing, there was quickly no

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Room left for ſuch Orations, either at the Bar or in the Senate-houſe: And my active Mind, which had always been employed in that kind of Studies, now not being able to lie wholly idle, I thought I could find out no better way to get rid of thoſe Troubles which oppreſſed my Mind, than by returning again to the Studies of Philoſophy. I had ſpent a good Part of my Time in theſe whilſt I was young, for the Improvement of my Reaſon; but when I came once to be a Candidate for Places, and devoted my ſelf to the Service of the Publick, I had little Time left for philoſophical Enquiries, only ſo much as could be ſpared from the Buſineſs of my Friends and the State; which was wholly taken up in nothing elſe but reading, without any Leiſure at all for writing.

Chap. II.

Some Advantage to be drawn out of Evils. The Commendation and Definitions of Wiſdom and Philoſophy. It is the only way of obtaining Virtue and Happineſs. The Opinion of the Academicks, *and why they diſpute againſt every thing.*

HOWEVER then we have this Advantage in the Midſt of all our Miſeries and Calamities, that by them we are brought to the writing of thoſe things which were not ſufficiently known amongſt us, tho' nothing in the World more deſerves our Knowledge. For what is there, O ye Gods! more deſirable than Wiſdom? what more excellent and lovely in it ſelf? what more uſeful

and becoming for a Man? or what more worthy of his reasonable Nature? Now those who are busied in the Pursuit of this, are called Philosophers; and the Word *Philosophy* signifies no more, if you would take it literally, than *a certain Desire and Love for Wisdom:* And Wisdom is defined by the old Philosophers, *the Knowledge of things both Divine and Humane, together with the Causes upon which they depend*; the Study of which whosoever finds Fault with, I confess I cannot perceive what it is he would commend: For what Study is there that brings so much Quiet and Satisfaction to the Mind, (if these are the things which we propose to our selves) as theirs who are always a searching out something which may contribute to the Welfare and Happiness of their Lives? Or if it be Virtue and Constancy that we desire, either *this* is the Method of obtaining them, or else there is not any to be found in the World. To say there is *no* Art of those weightier Concerns, when none of the most trivial Matters is without Art, becomes only those who talk without thinking, and deceive themselves in their most important Business: But if there *is* an Art of attaining Virtue, in what other way do we hope to find it, if this be forsaken of which I am now speaking? But these things use to be more fully handled, when we excite and perswade Men to cultivate Philosophy; which I have endeavoured to do in another Work. My Design at present was only to shew, why I particularly chose this Study; being thrust from all Business and Concern in the Government. There are others, and those Men of no small Learning, who object against me, and ask *if I am not inconsistent with my self, who affirm that nothing at all can be known, and yet have discoursed upon several Subjects,*

jects, and at this very time am laying down Rules and Directions about Duty? I could wiſh thoſe Perſons had underſtood our Opinions a little more throughly; for we are not of *thoſe*, whoſe Minds are perpetually wandring in Uncertainties, and have nothing whereby to determine their Aſſents; (for what ſort of Mind muſt a Man needs have, or rather what Life muſt he needs lead, when he is utterly debarred from all Liberty of diſputing, and obſerving any regular Conduct in his Actions?) nor yet of *thoſe others*, who call ſome things *certain* and others *uncertain*: But rejecting both theſe, *we* ſay ſome things are *probable* and others *improbable*. Is there any thing then that ſhould hinder me from approving of that which I think moſt probable, and laying aſide that which I think the contrary? Or where is the Inconſiſtency, if leaving that arrogant Pretence of *Demonſtrating*, I am neither too raſh nor preſumptuous in my Opinions, which of all things in the World are the fartheſt from Wiſdom? Now this is the Reaſon why we *Academicks* diſpute againſt every thing, becauſe what is probable could not appear without comparing the Arguments upon either Side of the Queſtion. But theſe things are cleared, I think, accurately enough in my Books entitled *Academical Queſtions*. But you, my Son, are already engaged in the Study of a moſt noble and ancient Philoſophy; and have gotten CRATIPPUS for your Maſter and Inſtructor, who is hardly inferior to its moſt glorious Founders: However, I would have you acquainted with our Doctrines, which are very little different from thoſe of your own Sect. But it is high time now to return to our Purpoſe.

CHAP.

Chap. III.

The Knowledge of Honeſty is of greateſt Moment. Profit and Honeſty really the ſame, and diſtinguiſhed only by an Act of the Mind. The cuſtomary Opinion to the contrary, very pernicious. The Diviſion of things that are profitable and hurtful to Men. The Good we receive from inanimate Beings, owing to Man's Induſtry.

THERE being then, as was before obſerved, five general Heads of deliberating and conſulting for the finding out our Duty; two of which relate to what is honeſt and becoming; two to the Uſes and Conveniencies of Life, ſuch as Plenty, Power, Riches, *&c.* and the fifth to the teaching us how we ought to chooſe, if any of the former ſhould ſeem to contradict and run counter to one another: We have gone through with that wherein *Honeſty* is the Queſtion, with which I deſire you would be more eſpecially acquainted: The Point which now comes under Conſideration, is what uſually goes by the Name of *Profitable*; concerning which Cuſtom is mightily in the wrong, and by little and little has brought it to ſuch a Paſs, as to make a Diſtinction between Profit and Honeſty; and ſettle it as a conſtant and received Maxim, *That a thing may be honeſt without being profitable, and again may be profitable without being honeſt*; the moſt pernicious Error, and moſt deſtructive of all Goodneſs, that ever could have crept into the Minds of Men. The greateſt however, and moſt eminent Philoſophers, have been always ſo ſtrict and ſevere in their Writings, as to make the three Natures of *Juſtice*, *Profit*, and *Honeſty*

neſty be blended and interwoven together in Reality; and diſtinguiſhable only by an Act of the Mind: For whatever is *juſt*, ſay they, the ſame is alſo *profitable*; and whatever is *honeſt*, the ſame is alſo *juſt*; from whence it follows, that whatever is *honeſt*, the ſame muſt be alſo *profitable*. Did People but conſider this Matter as they ought, they would not, as now they commonly do, admire a crafty and ſubtle ſort of Fellows, and eſteem that Wiſdom which in Truth is Roguery. This Error therefore ſhould wholly be rooted out of the Minds of Men, and all ſhould be taught, That if ever they hope to obtain their Ends, they ſhould not ſet about it by the ways of Knavery and underhand Dealings, but by Juſtice and Integrity in their Deſigns and Actions. Now all things that tend to the Good and Preſervation of the Life of Man, are either *Inanimate*, ſuch as Gold, Silver, the Productions of the Earth, and other ſuch like; or *Animals*, which have natural Powers, Inclinations, and Appetites. Of theſe ſome are *unreaſonable* and others *reaſonable*: The *unreaſonable* are Horſes, Oxen, and other ſorts of Cattle; to which we may add Bees, which produce and make ſomething that contributes to the Convenience of the Life of Men: The *reaſonable* are Gods and Men. The Means for procuring the Favour of the Gods, is to live a religious and holy Life: Next to the Gods, there is nothing ſo capable of contributing to the Happineſs and Welfare of Men, as Men themſelves. The ſame Diſtribution may ſerve for thoſe things which tend to the Hurt and Inconvenience of Men. But becauſe it is believed, that to hurt is incompatible with the Divine Nature, the Gods for that Reaſon are excepted here; ſo that Men are ſuppoſed, of all things in Nature, to do both the moſt

Service

Service and Diſſervice to one another. For, *firſt*, thoſe things which are called Inanimate, are moſt of them owing to the Induſtry of Men; which we neither could *get* if it were not for their Labour and Art in procuring them, nor afterwards *uſe* without their Aſſiſtance. For where ſhould we have ſuch a Science as Phyſick, as Navigation, or Agriculture? How ſhould we gather and preſerve our Corn, and the reſt of our Fruits, if it were not for Men? And then how ſhould thoſe Commodities which we want be imported, or thoſe with which we abound be exported, if there were not Men to do each of theſe Works? In like manner, how could Stone be fetched out of the Quarries for our neceſſary Uſes? How could Iron, Braſs, Gold, and Silver be dug and drawn out from the Bowels of the Earth, did not Men ſet their Hands to work for theſe Purpoſes?

Chap. IV.

Other Conveniencies from inanimate Beings and unreaſonable Animals received by Mens Induſtry. The Advantages ariſing from Mens joyning in Society.

So Houſes, which ſerve to defend us from the Extremities of Heat and Cold, could neither at firſt have been made by Mankind, nor afterwards, if by Earthquake, Tempeſt, or Length of Days they had fallen to Decay, have been repaired or rebuilt; had not Men joyned together in one common Society, learned to borrow Help and Aſſiſtance of one another. To this Induſtry of Men we

we are alſo indebted for Conveyances of Water, for making new Channels and Arms to Rivers, and for turning the Streams after ſuch a Manner, as thereby to water and fatten our Grounds; for throwing up Banks to defend us from the Waves, and making of new Harbours in convenient Places. From all which Inſtances, and a great many others that might eaſily be produced, it is abundantly manifeſt, that the Fruits and Advantages reaped from thoſe things which are called *Inanimate*, are entirely owing to Mens Labour and Induſtry. *Secondly*, Thoſe we receive from *unreaſonable* Animals, how very little and inconſiderable would they be, if they were not augmented by the ſame Peoples Induſtry? For who was it but Men that firſt diſcovered the Uſes to which Beaſts in their ſeveral Kinds might be ſerviceable? And how at this Time could we feed or break them? How could we keep them, and get the moſt Profit and Advantage by them, without the Endeavours and Aſſiſtance of the ſame Men? It is *they* that deſtroy us thoſe Creatures which are hurtful, and procure for us thoſe which may be ſerviceable to us. Why need I mention a Multitude of Arts, which are abſolutely neceſſary to our Well-being here? For what Help or Succour could thoſe that are ſick, or what Pleaſure thoſe that are healthy find? How could Mankind be ſupplied with Victuals, and other Conveniencies or Comforts of Life, if it were not for that Number of Callings in the World, which are wholly deſigned to provide them of ſuch things? By which Men are brought to live better and more handſomely, and are raiſed to a Condition ſo far above that of unreaſonable Animals. Again, Cities could neither have been built nor frequented, without a Community and Society of Men: From hence have

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ariſen all Laws and Cuſtoms; the Bounds of Equity and Juſtice have been ſettled, and a certain and regular Method laid down for the Conduct of Mens Lives. This has brought Modeſty into requeſt, and filed off the natural Roughneſs of Mens Tempers; has contributed to the greater Security of their Lives, and eſtabliſhed ſuch a Commerce and Correſpondence among them, as by mutual giving and receiving of Benefits, by bartering and changing one Commodity for another, one Convenience for another, ſupplies them to the full with whatever they ſtand in need of.

CHAP. V.

Nothing extraordinary either in War or Peace, can be done without the Help of Men. Nothing the Cauſe of ſo much Evil to Men, as they themſelves are to one another. What is the Office of Virtue. The whole Buſineſs of it conſiſts in three things.

WE dwell much longer than we needed to do upon this Subject: For who does not *ſee*, which PANÆTIUS has ſpent many Pages to *make out*, that neither a General in War, nor a Stateſman in Peace, could ever perform any glorious Exploits, or do any notable Service to the Publick, without the Concurrence of other Mens Endeavours: To confirm this Aſſertion, he brings in THEMISTOCLES, PERICLES, AGESILAUS, and ALEXANDER; and tells us that no one of all theſe, without the Aſſiſtance of others to ſupport them, could ever have atchieved ſuch glorious Actions.

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What he tells us is undoubtedly true, and ſuch a Number of Witneſſes altogether ſuperfluous. And as *Men* thus receive moſt extraordinary Benefits, from agreeing and conſpiring to lend mutual Aſſiſtance; ſo we ſhall find, upon changing the Scene, that there are no Misfortunes or Calamities ſo great, as thoſe which they bring upon one another. DICÆARCHUS, a learned and eloquent *Peripatetick*, has written a whole Book *concerning the Deſtruction of Men*; where, firſt *having* reckoned up all other Cauſes of it, ſuch as Innundations, Peſtilences, and Famines, and even ſudden Incurſions of furious wild Beaſts, (by which he aſſures us ſome whole Nations have been devoured;) and then placing on the other Side Wars, Seditions, and ſuch like Misfortunes, which Men were the Occaſions of; he endeavours to ſhew, at the Foot of the Account, that a great many more have been deſtroyed by *theſe*, than by all other Accidents or Calamities whatſoever. This then being indiſputably true, That the *Goods* Men enjoy, and the *Evils* they ſuffer, proceed for the moſt Part from Men themſelves; I lay down this as one principal Part of Virtue, to procure the Good-liking and Favour of Men, and ſo to engage their Endeavours and Affections, as to make them ſtill ready to do us any Kindneſs. It is the Buſineſs therefore of laborious Callings to ſupply us with all the Conveniencies of Life, which may be had from the Uſe of inanimate Beings and unreaſonable Animals; but to gain the Affections of Men on our Side, and beget in *them* always a Readineſs and Deſire to advance our Intereſt, is a Work that requires the Wiſdom and Virtue of the greateſt Men. For the whole Work and Exerciſe of Virtue, in general, conſiſts in ſome one of theſe three things: The *firſt* is a

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Knowledge, in all we undertake, of what is agreeable to Truth and Sincerity; what is becoming and ſuitable to every one's Character; what will be the Conſequence of ſuch or ſuch Actions; what are the Materials out of which things are made, and what the Cauſes that firſt brought them into Being. The *ſecond*, A reſtraining the violent Motions and Paſſions of the Soul, which by the *Grecians* are termed πάθη; and bringing the irregular Inclinations of the Appetite, which by the ſame are called ὁρμαὶ, under the Power and Government of Reaſon. The *third* is a Skilfulneſs of Addreſs in our Carriage, and a winning Demeanour toward the reſt of Men, with whom we are joined in one common Society; that ſo by their Help we may be ſupplied in abundance with all thoſe things which our Natures ſtand in need of; and by the ſame may be enabled, ſhould any Injury be offered us, to keep our ſelves ſecure from the Violences of it; and not only ſo, but to revenge our ſelves alſo upon the guilty Perſon, and inflict ſuch Puniſhments as are according to the Rules of Humanity and Juſtice.

CHAP. VI.

How far the Power of Fortune over Men reaches. The ſeveral Reaſons why Men favour any one, or ſubmit to his Authority.

WHAT Means ſhould be uſed for the gaining and ſecuring Men firm to our Intereſts, we ſhould mention immediately; but we have one Obſervation to make before-hand. There

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is no one but knows that the Power of Fortune is very great, both as to the *good* and *ill* Succeſs of our Actions: For when ſhe favours us, we quickly arrive at our deſired Haven; but when ſhe turns againſt us, we as quickly are Shipwreck'd and run a-ground. Now of thoſe Events which depend upon Fortune, there are ſome that come to paſs but extraordinary ſeldom; ſuch as Storms, Tempeſts, Shipwrecks, Ruins, Fires, *&c.* which proceed from *inanimate Beings*; and from *brutiſh Animals* Kicks, Bites, Puſhes, *&c.* all which, as I ſaid, do but rarely happen: But the *Overthrows of Armies*, as of three but a while ago, and a great many others at ſeveral Times; *the Deaths of Commanders*, as lately of a great and extraordinary Perſon; *the Hatred and Violence of the enraged Multitude*, and, as a Conſequence of that, the Baniſhments, Flights, and utter Undoings of well-deſerving Citizens; As alſo on the other hand *proſperous Succeſſes*, ſuch as Honours, Commands, Victories, *&c.* though they are all of them truly fortuitous Things, yet they cannot ſucceed either the one way or the other, without the Aſſiſtance and Endeavours of Men. This being noted, we are now to diſcourſe of thoſe Ways and Methods, whereby Men are drawn and enclined to be for us, and to endeavour all they can for our Intereſt and Advantage: Upon which if we ſeem to dwell longer than we ſhould do, I deſire the Uſefulneſs of the Subject may be conſidered, and then we may poſſibly be thought too ſhort. Whatſoever then is contributed by Men toward any one's Advancement in Riches, Honours, Power, *&c.* is always done upon ſome of theſe Motives: *Firſt*, *That* of Kindneſs, Benevolence, or Good-will; when for ſome Reaſons they *love* any Perſon. *Secondly*, Honour

or

or Admiration; when they *reſpect* any one for his Virtues, and think he deſerves to be highly promoted. *Thirdly*, Confidence, Truſt, or Reliance; when they think they may ſafely *confide* in a Man, as one that will certainly take care of their Affairs. *Fourthly*, Fear, when they ſtand in any *Awe* of his Power and Authority. *Fifthly*, Hope, when they expect to get ſomething from him; as when Princes or popular Men promiſe great Donations. And, *laſt of all*, Hire, when they are drawn to it by Money or Preſents; which is much the moſt pitiful and ſordid Way, as for thoſe on the one hand that are taken by it, ſo likewiſe for thoſe that endeavour to make uſe of it: For it is never well when People ſhall attempt to get that by Money, which ought to be the Reward of Virtue and Merit. However, ſeeing ſometimes one muſt have Recourſe to this Method as a Refuge, I ſhall give ſome Rules for our Direction in the Uſe of it; but firſt ſpeak of thoſe that are more nearly related to Virtue and Honeſty. In much the ſame manner, and for ſeveral ſuch Reaſons, Men ſubmit to the Power and Authority of another: Either becauſe they have a *Kindneſs* for him; or have formerly received ſome Obligations from him; or *reſpect* him for his Worth; or *hope* they ſhall get ſomething by it; or *fear* they ſhall be forced to it, if they do not do it voluntarily; or are drawn by fair *Promiſes* and large Donations; or, laſtly, (as we ſee it too often practiſed in our own Republick) are downright *hired* to it.

CHAP.

Chap. VII.

A Governour ſhould endeavour to make himſelf loved, and not feared. The Fates of ſeveral, who have taken the contrary Method.

NOW of all thoſe Methods, which tend to the Advancement and Maintenance of onr Intereſt, there is none more proper and convenient than *Love*, and none more improper and inconvenient than *Fear*. For, as it is very well obſerved by ENNIUS, *Whom Men fear, they alſo hate; and whom they hate, they wiſh out of the World.* But that no Force of Power or Greatneſs whatſoever can bear up long againſt a Stream of publick Hate, if it were not ſufficiently known before, was of late made appear by an Inſtance of our own. And not the violent Death of that Tyrant only, who by Force of Arms oppreſſed the City (which now moſt obeys him when taken out of the World;) but the like untimely Ends of moſt other Tyrants, who have generally been attended by the ſame ill Fate, is a manifeſt Token that the Hatred of the People is able to ruin the moſt abſolute Authority: For Obedience proceeding from *Fear* cannot poſſibly be laſting; whereas that which is the Effect of *Love*, will be faithful for ever. It is well enough in thoſe, who by open Force have reduced any Nation, and accordingly Rule it with an high Hand, if they *do* ſometimes uſe Rigour and Severity, like Maſters towards their Slaves; when there is no other Way of holding them in Subjection: But for thoſe who are Magiſtrates in a *free* City, to endeavour to make themſelves feared by the People, is one of the maddeſt and moſt deſperate Attempts upon the Face

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of the Earth. For though a Man ſhould by his Power and Greatneſs oppreſs the Laws, and over-awe Liberty by Terrour and Threatnings, yet ſtill they will find Time to recover again, firſt by the private Reſentment of the Citizens, and afterwards by their chuſing in ſecret Conſults, ſome worthier Perſon to free them from the Oppreſſor. And Liberty, after ſhe has been chained up a while, is always more curſt, and ſets her Teeth in deeper, than ſhe would otherwiſe have done if ſhe had never been reſtrained. Let us therefore embrace and adhere to that Method, which is of the moſt univerſal Influence, and ſerves not only to ſecure us what we have, but moreover to enlarge our Power and Authority: That is in ſhort, Let us rather endeavour to be *Loved* than *Feared*, which is certainly the beſt way to make us ſucceſsful, as well in our private as our publick Buſineſs. For thoſe who deſire to have others be afraid of them, muſt needs be afraid of thoſe others in their Turns: What, for Inſtance, ſhall we imagine of the elder DIONYSIUS? With what eternal Fears and Apprehenſions muſt he needs be racked, when daring not to venture his Throat to any Razor, he was forced even to ſinge off his Beard with Coals; Or what of ALEXANDER, who was ſirnamed the PHERÆAN? In what Torment, think we, muſt he perpetually live? When (as it is uſually reported of him) he dared not ſo much as to riſe from Table, and go to his own Wife THEBE's Chamber, one whom he loved with an entire Affection, without a *Barbarian*, and him (as it is ſaid) too a branded *Thracian*, to lead the Way with his naked Sword? And would always diſpatch ſome of his Guards before him, to ſearch all the Cloaths and Coffers of the Women, for fear leſt any

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Weapon might be concealed within them. O miſerable and unhappy Man! who could think a *Barbarian*, one who carried the Marks of his Condition in his Forehead, would be faithfuller to him than his own Wife. Neither, it ſeems, was he miſtaken in it; for he was afterwards murthered by her Procurement, upon Suſpicion of having to do with ſome other Woman. Nor indeed can any Authority, how abſolute ſoever, ſubſiſt very long when it is thus generally feared: PHALARIS himſelf, who is particularly remarkable for his barbarous Cruelties, may ſerve for a Witneſs to this Truth; who was not deſtroyed by domeſtick Treacheries, like that ALEXANDER, whom I juſt now mentioned; nor yet by ſome *few* Men conſpiring his Death, like our late Tyrant; but by a general Inſurrection of all the *Agrigentines* falling upon him at once. Again, Did not the *Macedonians* revolt from DEMETRIUS, and all with one Conſent march over to PYRRHUS? And when the *Lacedæmonians* grew inſolent and tyrannical, did not their Allies upon a ſudden forſake them, and ſhew themſelves idle and unconcerned Spectators of their Ruin at *Leuctra*, without ever ſtirring one Foot to their Aſſiſtance?

Chap. VIII.

The juſt and gentle Government of the old Romans: *When changed, and the fatal Conſequences of that Change.* Cæſar *and* Sylla's *unjuſt Cruelties. One Cauſe of Civil Wars, is Mens hoping to raiſe themſelves by them. All have Occaſion for ſome Friends, though not for general Love.*

I Much rather chuſe, upon ſuch a Subject, to bring Inſtances from Foreign, than our own Nation. However, I cannot but obſerve thus much, That ſo long as our Empire ſupported it ſelf, not by the Methods of Injuſtice and Violence, but rather by Actions of Kindneſs and Gentleneſs; Wars were undertaken to protect its Allies, or defend its Honour, and accordingly their Iſſues were attended with Mercy, or at leaſt no more Rigour than was abſolutely neceſſary. The Senate then was a kind of Port or Refuge for Princes and Nations to have Recourſe to in their Need; and our Officers and Commanders made it their greateſt Glory to defend their Provinces, and aſſiſt their Allies, with Juſtice and Fidelity. This City therefore was not then the *Empreſs*, ſo properly as the *Protectreſs* of all the World. This Conduct and Method of managing the State, began by little and little to *wear off* before, but utterly *vaniſhed* immediately after the Victory of *Sylla*; for People began to think nothing could be unjuſt to their Confederates and Allies, when once they had ſeen ſo great Cruelties exerciſed even upon their very Fellow-Citizens. This Man therefore was in a juſt Cauſe, but which was followed by a cruel and

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moſt unjuſt Victory: He having had the Boldneſs and Impudence to ſay, when in full Market he was ſelling the Goods of ſome honeſt and wealthy Men, and whom he himſelf knew to be *Roman* Citizens, *That he was going to make Sale of his own Booty.* But there has come *one* after him, whoſe Cauſe was impious, and his Victory yet more ſcandalous and inhuman: Who did not ſtop at ſelling of private Mens Eſtates, but involved all our Countries and Provinces together in one common Calamity. Hence we have ſeen, after Havock and Devaſtation made in other Countries, as it were by way of Prælude to the Loſs of our own Empire, the City *Marſeilles* drawn along in Triumph; and that very Place, without whoſe Aſſiſtance our former Generals never brought Triumph from beyond the *Alpes*, has now found one that could have ſo much Impudence, as to triumph over its own Deſtruction. I might bring a great many other Examples of moſt impious Treatment that hath been ſhewn towards our Allies: but this ſingle Inſtance is abundantly ſufficient, being one of the baſeſt that was ever committed before the Face of the Sun. The Truth of it is, we have deſerved theſe Misfortunes; for if *others* had not eſcaped without Puniſhment for their Wickedneſs, *this Man* could never have arrived at that Inſolence; who though he has left but few Heirs of his Eſtate, I am afraid will have a great many wicked ones of his Ambition. For as long as ſome diſſolute and profligate Fellows remember that former inhuman Auction, and are in hopes one Day of ſeeing the ſame again, they will always be for propagating Civil Diſſentions. Thus PUBLIUS SYLLA, who was ſo buſy in *that* mentioned, when his Kinſman was Dictator, was never contented till he

had managed a worſe and more inhuman Auction ſix and thirty Years after: and another, who was *Scribe* in that former Dictatorſhip, in this latter was advanced to be *Treaſurer* of the City. By all which it is eaſie enough to perceive, that we are never to expect we ſhall be free from Civil Wars, ſo long as People hope to make their Fortunes by them. We have therefore only the Walls of our City remaining entire, and even *they*, as it were, expecting to feel the Effects of their abominable Wickedneſs; but as for the Republick it is abſolutely ſunk into Ruins and Nothing. And all theſe Misfortunes have fallen upon us (that I may return to the Subject which occaſioned this Digreſſion) by our chooſing to Govern rather by *Fear* than *Love*. What then ought particular Perſons to expect, when Tyranny and Oppreſſion could bring all theſe Evils upon the whole *Roman* Empire? This then being ſo manifeſtly plain, That *Love* is a moſt powerful Motive to Obedience, but *Fear* a moſt weak and dangerous one; it follows in the next place, that we ſhould diſcourſe of thoſe Means, whereby ſuch a *Love*, joined with *Honour* and *Confidence*, may moſt eaſily be gotten. Now this is what all Men do not equally ſtand in need of; but each ſhould conſider his own way of living, and accordingly judge what is convenienteſt for him; whether to be *beloved* by the generality of Men, or only by ſome few and ſelect Perſons. This however we may lay down for certain, as a firſt and moſt neceſſary Rule in this caſe, to procure at leaſt ſome *faithful* and ſincere Friends, who may have a true Kindneſs and Eſteem for us. As far as this reaches, there is very little difference between even the greateſt and meaneſt of People, and all ſorts of them are almoſt equally concerned to endeavour after it. As for

Honour,

Honour, Glory, and the general Good-will of *all* the Citizens, these indeed are things, which are not alike useful and necessary for all. However for those that have been able to get them, they are very good Helps, as for most other Purposes, so for the obtaining of faithful Friends: But of Friendship I have treated in another Work, which is entitled *Lælius*.

Chap. IX.

What the Ingredients of true Glory are. By what Means the Love of the People may be obtained. How Men may be brought to place a Confidence in us. Justice more powerful than Cunning to this End.

LET us now proceed to discourse of *Glory*; though *that* too is a Subject, upon which I have two Books already extant; however I shall touch upon it here in short, because it is a thing of such Weight and Moment toward the successful Management of the most important Affairs. True and perfect Glory, then, is always made up of these three Ingredients: *First*, the Love and Good-will of the Multitude. *Secondly*, their Trusting and Reliance upon a Man. And, *Lastly*, Their Valuing and Admiring him so, as to think him a Person that really deserves Honour. The Means of getting these three from the Multitude, (to give one short and easy Rule) are very much the same as from particular Persons. However there is another peculiar Way of approaching the People, and gaining Admittance into the Hearts and Affections of all

Men in general. Of those three then, which I just now mentioned, let us first see the Ways of obtaining *Love*. Now the Love of the People is moved by nothing so much, as by Bounty and doing Kindnesses: Next they are pleased with an hearty Desire and Inclination toward it, though a Man have not wherewithal to exercise it. Thirdly, The very Name and Reputation of having Beneficence and Liberality, Justice and Fidelity, with the rest of those Virtues which give a kind of Smoothness and Agreeableness to our Conversation, is of very great Efficacy in getting us the Favour and Love of the Multitude: and the reason of it is, because Honesty and *Decorum* delight us of themselves, and by their own native Beauties and Excellencies move and engage the Hearts of all Men: which seeing they appear with more Lustre in the Virtues, which I just now mentioned; it follows that by Nature we must Love those People, in whom we suppose such Virtues to reside. And these are the principal Causes of Men's Loving us: there might, I confess, be some others given, but not of equal Weight and Importance with these. We are to speak in the next place of their *Trusting* or *Confiding* in us; for the compassing of which, it is necessary we should be supposed to have two Qualifications, *viz. Prudence* and *Justice*. For we trust those Men, whom we believe *to* understand Matters better than we do; *to be* wise enough to see things before they are arrived; and in the Management of them, if any Danger should happen, *to be* ready at finding out Ways and Expedients, to disentangle themselves from the Perplexities of it: in which Men imagine that all true and profitable Wisdom consists. But when a Man is found really *Just* and *Faithful*, that is *Good*, we place so much Trust and

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Confidence in ſuch a one, as not to entertain any the leaſt ſuſpicion of Deceit or Injury. To ſuch a Man therefore we think we may wiſely, and with a ſecure Confidence, entruſt our Safeties, our Children and our Fortunes. Juſtice therefore, of theſe two Virtues, has much the more ſtrong and effectual Tendency, to procure this Credit and Confidence from the People. For *that*, even without Wiſdom, can go a great way toward the obtaining of this End; whereas Wiſdom, without *that*, is unable to do any thing: For the more Shrewd and Cunning any Perſon is, the more he is Suſpected and Hated by the World, if he be not counted Honeſt and Upright withal. Juſtice therefore, in conjunction with Wiſdom, can make a Man be truſted as far as he pleaſes: Juſtice without the other can do a great deal; but the other without *that* is of no Force at all.

Chap. X.

Why he talks of Wiſdom and Juſtice as ſeparate from one another, though really there is a mutual Connexion between them. What will make Men admire any one. The difference between Deſpiſing *and* having an Ill Opinion *of a Man.*

SOme Men perhaps will be ready to admire, ſince it is ſo generally agreed on by Philoſophers, and has been ſo often aſſerted by me my ſelf, That whoever has *one* muſt have *all* the Virtues; why I ſhould ſpeak of them ſeparately now, as though it were poſſible for a Man to have Prudence, without having Juſtice at the ſame time. I

anſwer, That the Way of Expreſſion is highly different, according to the difference of the Subjects we are treating of; whether they are ſuch as require a Niceneſs and Subtilty in handling, or to be ſuited to the Capacities of ordinary People. I do but ſpeak here with the Vulgar therefore, when I call one Man *Couragious*, another *Juſt*, and a third *Prudent*; for in treating upon a Subject which concerns the People, we muſt make uſe of common and ordinary Expreſſions; which is what has been done by PANÆTIUS himſelf. But to return to our Purpoſe: Of the three Ingredients, which we ſaid were required to the making up of Glory; the third was this, That Men ſhould Admire and Value us ſo, as to think we are Perſons that really deſerve Honour. Now generally ſpeaking they are apt to *Admire* whatever they ſee Great, and beyond their Apprehenſions; and likewiſe in particulars, if they diſcover any Excellency which they never expected. They Admire thoſe therefore, and extol them even to the Skies, in whom (as they think) they have found any rare and extraordinary Qualities: But as for thoſe others, who have neither Virtue, Spirit, nor Courage in them, theſe Men they wholly deſpiſe and ſet light by. For they cannot be ſaid to *deſpiſe* all thoſe, of whom they entertain but *an ill Opinion*. They are *far from thinking well* of your roguiſh, backbiting, cozening ſort of Fellows, who are never unprepared for the doing Man an Injury: but by no means *deſpiſe* them for all that; their Contempt (as was ſaid) lighting only upon thoſe, who neither do Good to themſelves, nor others (as we commonly ſpeak;) that is, who ſpend all their Lives in meer Idleneſs and Sloth, without ever minding or taking care of

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any thing. Thoſe, who are eſteemed to excel in Virtue, more eſpecially draw Men to Wonder and Admiration; who keep themſelves free, as from all other things that are Baſe and Unbecoming, ſo more eſpecially from thoſe ſorts of Vices, which the reſt of Mankind cannot ſo eaſily ſtand againſt. *Pleaſures*, for inſtance, are very alluring and charming Miſtreſſes, which are apt to enſnare the better part of the Soul, and entice it aſide from the Paths of Virtue; and *Pain* on the contrary racks and torments us, ſo that the dread of it carries moſt Men beyond the Bounds of Reaſon. Thus again, when *Life* and *Death*, *Riches* and *Poverty*, are the things in queſtion, there are very few Men but are wholly tranſported with *Deſire* of the one, and *Abhorrence* of the other. When a Man therefore has got ſuch a great and exalted Soul, as that he can look upon all theſe with Indifference; and cloſely purſues and adheres to Honeſty, in whatever Shape ſhe preſents her ſelf; then it is that Virtue appears with ſuch a Brightneſs, as that all the whole World muſt admire her Beauties.

Chap. XI.

Juſtice, and a Contempt of Riches, are eſpecially Cauſes of Mens Admiration. Juſtice alone procures all the three things which make up Glory; and how. It is a neceſſary Virtue for all ſorts of People. Even Robbers and Pyrates cannot ſubſiſt without it. Some Examples to this Purpoſe.

SUch a Conſtitution of Soul therefore, as can make a Man deſpiſe all theſe Goods or Evils, begets him a mighty Eſteem and Admiration: But eſpecially *Juſtice* (which ſingle Virtue ſerves to give Men the Name and Denomination of *Good*) ſeems much the moſt admirable to the generality of People. And not without Reaſon; it being impoſſible for any one to be Juſt, who is afraid at the Approaches of Death, of Pain, of Baniſhment or Poverty; or prefers thoſe things which are contrary to theſe, before the great Duties of Juſtice and Honeſty. And more particularly yet, Men admire thoſe, whom they find unconcerned as to the matter of *Money*; and count them tryed, as it were like Gold in the Fire, who have been able to withſtand the Temptations of it. Juſtice therefore of it ſelf is ſufficient to procure thoſe three things that are requiſite to Glory: In the *firſt* place, The Love and Good-will of the People; becauſe of the Kindneſſes it ſhews to very many. *Secondly*, Their Confidence: And *Thirdly*, Their Admiration: Both for the ſame Reaſon, *viz.* Becauſe it neglects and deſpiſes thoſe things, which the reſt of Men purſue with ſuch Eagerneſs and Paſſion. Now, in my Opinion, not only the being in a publick Station, but e-

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very Method of Living whatſoever, requires the Helps and Aſſiſtances of Men; as for other Ends, ſo particularly for this, that we may have ſome familiar Friends to converſe with; which it is no eaſie Matter for a Man to obtain, without at leaſt the Shew and Reputation of Honeſty. From hence it follows, That it is neceſſary even for thoſe Men themſelves, who have withdrawn from the World, and choſen the Quiet and Retirements of the Country, to be reputed at leaſt Men of Honeſty and Integrity: And that ſo much the more, becauſe otherwiſe they will certainly be counted Diſhoneſt; and then, having nothing of Guard or Defence, they muſt needs be expoſed to perpetual Injuries. The ſame Juſtice alſo is neceſſary for thoſe (if ever they hope to ſucceed in their Buſineſs) who Buy, Sell, Lett, Hire, and are concerned in the Commerce and Affairs of the World: Nay, it is a thing of ſuch powerful Moment and univerſal Influence, as that thoſe who live only upon Villanies and Wickedneſs, can never ſubſiſt without ſomething of Juſtice: For ſhould any Thief ſteal from another that belonged to the ſame Confederacy, he would immediately be expelled, as unfit to be a Member even of a Society of Robbers; and ſhould the Leader himſelf not diſtribute their Booty, according to the Meaſures of Juſtice and Honeſty, he would either be murthered or deſerted by his Company: Nay, it is ſaid that your Robbers have ſome certain Statutes, which they are all of them bound to obſerve amongſt themſelves. THEOPOMPUS tells us of a certain Rogue, one BARDYLIS an *Illyrian*, that got a great Power by the Fame of his Juſtice in dividing the Prey: And VIRIATUS the *Luſitanian*, got a much greater, to whom even ſome of our Armies and Generals were forced to yield; till he was beaten and weakened by

that CAIUS LÆLIUS, who was ſirnamed the *Wiſe*, in the time of his Prætorſhip; who brought down his Haughtineſs to ſo low an Ebb, as to render the War eaſie for thoſe that came after him. If Juſtice then be of ſo great Efficacy, as to raiſe and increaſe even the Power of Pirates; of what mighty Force muſt we ſuppoſe it to be, in the midſt of Laws, and in a well-conſtituted Republick?

CHAP. XII.

What made Men at firſt chooſe Kings, and make Laws. The juſteſt Men uſually made Kings; and why. How to make uſe of the Glory he hath been diſcourſing of. An excellent Rule of Socrates. *Glory muſt be founded upon ſolid Virtue. Whatever is Counterfeit will ſome time be diſcovered.*

IT was for the ſake of enjoying the Benefits of *this Juſtice* (the great Uſe of which we have now been diſcourſing of) that the *Medes* heretofore, as we are told by HERODOTUS, and I am apt to imagin our own Anceſtors too, choſe always the honeſteſt Perſons for their Kings. For the poorer ſort of People, being oppreſſed by the richer, had recourſe to ſome one of remarkable Virtue, to ſave and protect them from Violence and Injuries: who conſtituting Meaſures of Equity and Juſtice, bound the greateſt to obſerve them as well as the meaneſt. And that which was the reaſon for their chooſing Kings, in like manner put them upon making Laws: For Men have always deſired to enjoy ſuch a Right, as all ſorts of them might have

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an equal Share in, (for otherwiſe indeed it would be no *Right* at all,) which when they *could* get by the Juſtice and Honeſty of ſome one Perſon, they were contented with him, and never looked any further; but when they *could not*, they were put upon a neceſſiy of inventing Laws, which could never be partial, but uſe the ſame Language to all Ranks and Conditions. It is very plain therefore, that thoſe Men were uſually choſen to be Kings, who were counted by the People Men of Honeſty and Integrity: But if they were held Prudent and Wiſe withal, the People thought there was nothing they might not obtain by their Conduct and Management. By all means therefore let us conſtantly follow, and ſtick cloſe to Juſtice; as for its own ſake, (for otherwiſe indeed it will not be properly *Juſtice*) ſo for the increaſe of our Honour and Reputation. Now as it is not ſufficient for a Man to get Riches, unleſs he has the Wiſdom to diſpoſe of them ſo, as thereby to furniſh out all his Expences; not only thoſe of his bare Neceſſities, but thoſe of his Bounty and Liberality too: So neither is it enough for a Man to get Glory, unleſs he knows how to make uſe of it with diſcretion: Though what SOCRATES ſays is very excellent to this purpoſe, *That the readieſt Way, and, as it were, ſhorteſt Cut, to arrive at Glory, is* really to be, *what one deſires* to be accounted. Thoſe People therefore are highly miſtaken, who think of obtaining a ſolid Reputation, by vain Shews and hypocritical Pretences; by compoſed Countenances and ſtudied Forms of Words: for true Glory takes deep rooting, and grows and flouriſhes more and more; but that which is only in Shew and meer Outſide, quickly decays and withers like Flowers; nor can any thing be laſting that is only Counterfeit. I might

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bring a great many pregnant Examples for the proof of these Assertions; but for brevity sake, I shall content my self with those of but one single Family. TIBERIUS GRACCHUS, the Son of PUBLIUS, will always be Praised and had in Admiration, as long as there shall any Memorials remain of the *Roman* Atchievments: But his Sons, on the contrary were not in their Lives-time approved of by good Men; and since their Decease have been numbered among those, who were justly Slain.

CHAP. XIII.

What young Men should do to make themselves known, and taken Notice of in the World. Courage in War, the first thing that sets off young Men. Another, Temperance, Sobriety, &c. Keeping often Company with Wise and Good Men, another thing that very much Recommends them.

IT is the Business therefore of those, who desire to get true Glory, strictly to discharge all the Duties of Justice: what those are we have shewn already in the former Book. I shall now proceed to lay down some Directions, How a Man should do to appear before the World what he is in himself; though that of SOCRATES is certainly the wisest that can possibly be given, *To make sure in the first place, that he* really *be in himself, that which he desires to* appear *before the World.* For when a young Gentleman is just come into the Publick, and is already known and remarkable in it; either by the Fame of his Father's Actions (which I think, Son MARCUS, may be your Case;) or by any

any other Means or Accident whatſoever; the Eyes of all are immediately upon him, and every one is enquiring after what he does, and how he ſteers his Life; and, as 'tho' he were ſet in the publick View, ſo none of his Actions, or ſo much as his Words, can be long kept in ſecret. But thoſe, who at the beginning and entrance of their Lives, by reaſon of their Meanneſs, are unknown to the World; as ſoon as ever they come up to years of Diſcretion, ſhould ſet before their Eyes the moſt honourable Places, and bend all their Studies and honeſt Endeavours toward the obtaining of them: which they ought to do with ſo much the more boldneſs, becauſe Men are ſo far from envying Youth, that they rather encourage and forward them in their Progreſs. The firſt thing then, that ſets a young Man off, and recommends him to the Publick, is Courage and Bravery in Martial Affairs; by which a great many amongſt our Forefathers, who were ſcarce ever wholly diſengaged from Wars, very nobly diſtinguiſhed and ſignalized themſelves. But you, my Son, have had the misfortune to light upon the times of a Civil War, wherein the one Party was wicked and deteſtable, and the other unfortunate and unſucceſsful: In which however, when POMPEY had given you the Command of one Wing, you got much Praiſe from that great Commander and all his Army, by your riding, darting, and patiently abiding all the Fatigues of War. But as for this piece of your riſing Glory, *that*, and the whole Conſtitution of the Republick, are both of them fallen to the ground together. But I never deſigned ſo to model this Diſcourſe, as that it ſhould be proper for none but you; but as that it might be applicable to all Men in general: I ſhall go on therefore to the remaining part of it.

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As then in all things the Functions of the Soul are more noble and excellent than those of the Body; so the Effects of our Reason and Understanding are greater and more powerful, as to this Particular, than those of meer Strength. Now of these there is none that can more recommend and adorn a young Man, than Temperance and Sobriety, Duty and Respect to his natural Parents, Love and Good-nature towards his Friends and Relations. Another good Way for young People to get Known, and have a good Reputation, is often to attend on some Great and Wise Men, who are thought to design for the Good of the Publick: For when they are observed to be frequently with such, the People are presently apt to imagin, that they will be like those Men, whom they choose for their Patterns. Thus PUB. RUTILIUS, when he was young, had the general Vogue of a very honest Man, and an able Lawyer, because he frequented the House of MUTIUS. As for CRASSUS, whilst he was very young, he was not beholden to any one else, but obtained of himself everlasting Honour, by undertaking that noble and glorious Accusation: when at that term of Years, wherein others are commended if they begin but to Study and Exercise the Art; (as we have it recorded of the famous DEMOSTHENES) at that Age, I say, did CRASSUS make it appear, that he could perform *that* laudably in the open Courts of Justice, which he might without disparagement have been Studying at home.

CHAP.

Chap. XIV.

Diſcourſe, of two Sorts. Affability very powerful to obtain Mens Love, &c. But Eloquence much more. Several Occaſions of ſhewing a Man's Eloquence. To defend more Laudable than to Accuſe; but the latter in ſome Caſes honourable enough. Several Examples of brave Accuſations. 'Tis lawful in ſome Caſes to defend the really Guilty; but never to accuſe the Innocent. The Judges and Advocates Duties. Defending the Accuſed, eſpecially honourable, when it is againſt ſome powerful Oppreſſor.

BUT of Speaking or Diſcourſe there are two Sorts; the one proper only for common Converſation, the other for Pleadings and Debates in the Publick. Of theſe two the latter, which is what we call Eloquence, is apparently moſt powerful towards the Procurement of Glory; but yet it is unexpreſſible of what Influence Courteſie and Affability are, in the Buſineſs of obtaining Mens Love and Affections. There are extant Letters of PHILIP to ALEXANDER, ANTIPATER to CASSANDER, and ANTIGONUS to PHILIP; in which theſe moſt *Wiſe* and *Prudent* Princes (for *ſuch* we are told they really were) adviſe each his Son to ſpeak kindly to the *Multitude*, and try to win the Hearts of both *them*, and the Soldiers, by gentle Words and familiar Appellations. But that other Diſcourſe, which is proper for Pleadings and Harangues in Publick, does oftentimes move and tranſport the whole Multitude: For when a Man ſpeaks ſo wiſely and fluently, they are preſently rapt into a ſtrange Admiration, and cannot but conclude, as ſoon as ever they hear him, that he is wiſer and more

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knowing than the reſt of Men are. But if there be Modeſty joyned with the Power and Weight of his Eloquence, there is nothing in the World can more raiſe their Admiration; and eſpecially too, if he be a young Man that ſpeaks. Now the Subjects and Occaſions, that ſtand in need of Eloquence, are more than one; and ſeveral young Gentlemen, in our own Republick, have made themſelves eminent in ſeveral of them: Some, for Example, by ſpeaking in the Senate-Houſe, and others by pleading in the Courts of Juſtice. Of theſe Ways the latter is moſt fruitful of Admiration, the Duties of which are only two, *Defending* and *Accuſing*. It is much more commendable to Defend than to Accuſe; however this *latter* has oftentimes brought Men to a conſiderable Reputation. We mentioned the Example of CRASSUS but juſt now, and MARCUS ANTONIUS, when he was a young Man, did the ſame; and nothing got SULPITIUS ſo much Credit for his Eloquence, as his brave Accuſation of CAIUS NORBANUS, a very ſeditious and troubleſome Citizen. This nevertheleſs muſt be done but ſeldom, or indeed never, unleſs it be undertaken on the Behalf of the Republick, as it was by thoſe three whom I juſt now mentioned: Or, Secondly, upon the Account of ſome Injury received, as by the two LUCULLUSES; or elſe for the ſake of thoſe under our Protection, as was formerly done by my ſelf for the *Sicilians*; and by JULIUS for the *Sardians* againſt MARCUS ALBUTIUS: In like manner FUSIUS made his Induſtry be taken notice of, by his accuſing AQUILIUS. Once then or ſo, it is allowable enough; but by no means often. However, ſhould the Commonwealth call a Man to it, he might do it oftner upon her Account; it being no Diſgrace to be often employed in taking Vengeance

ance on her Enemies. Yet, even in this Caſe, it is ſtill the beſt way to be moderate and cautious: For he ſhews himſelf a Man of a very unnatural and mercileſs Temper (or rather indeed not a Man at all, but a ſavage Monſter) who can endure to make it his very Buſineſs and Employment, to bring many People into Danger of their Lives: Beſide that it is dangerous to the Perſon himſelf too; and not only ſo, but even ſcandalous and ſhameful, to get himſelf the odious Name of *An Accuſer:* Which of late was the Fortune of MARCUS BRUTUS, a Perſon that was ſprung of a noble Family, and Son of that BRUTUS, who was ſo particularly famed for his Skill in the Civil Laws. It is another Rule of Duty more eſpecially to be taken notice of, and which cannot be broken without manifeſt Villany, *Never to bring an innocent Perſon into Danger.* For ſince kind Nature has given us Eloquence, to ſerve for the Good and Preſervation of all Men; what can be more, either wicked, or inhuman, than to turn it to the Ruin and Deſtruction of the beſt of them? It is our Duty then never to accuſe the Innocent: But we need not, on the other hand, make any Scruple of ſpeaking ſometimes in Behalf of the Guilty, provided he be not wholly villanous and abominable. For this is no more than what the People deſire, than what Cuſtom authorizes, and the common Bowels of Humanity encline us to. It is the Duty of a *Judge* to endeavour after nothing but the real Truth; but an *Advocate* ſometimes may ſpeak up for that, which carries no more than an outward Appearance of it: Which, I think, I ſhould hardly have ventured to ſay, (eſpecially in writing a Philoſophical Diſcourſe) but that I perceive it was the Opinion of PANÆTIUS, a Perſon of as great and conſide-

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rable Authority, as any among the *Stoicks*. But *Defending* is that which brings the largeſt Returns both of Glory and Intereſt; eſpecially if one happen to be aſſiſtant to thoſe, who ſeem injured and oppreſſed by the Power of ſome Great One. This was my Fortune, as a great many times, ſo more eſpecially in my younger Days; when I ſtood in Defence of Roscius Amerinus, againſt all the Greatneſs and Authority of Sylla: And you know the Oration, which I then ſpoke, is at this time extant.

Chap. XV.

Two ſorts of Liberality. Better to help Men by our Labour and Induſtry, than by our Money. Philip's *Reproof to his Son* Alexander *to this purpoſe. The Inconveniencies of the ſecond ſort of Liberality. Meaſures to be obſerved in it.*

HAving given this Account of the particular Duties, which young Men muſt do for the Attainment of Glory; we are next to diſcourſe of Beneficence or Liberality. Of this there are two Sorts; the one of which conſiſts in obliging thoſe, who need it, by our *Labour and Induſtry*; the other by our *Money*. The latter of theſe two is much the more eaſy, eſpecially for thoſe who have plentiful Fortunes; but the former, on the other hand, more glorious and magnificent, and more ſuitable to the Character of a brave and exalted Soul. For though there is a Good-will, and generous Readineſs to oblige, ſhewn in either; yet in the one Caſe we are beholding to the *Cheſt*, in the other to the

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Virtues and Abilities of the Perſon. Beſides, thoſe Sort of Kindneſſes, which are done by the Aſſiſtance of Money, or the like, within a ſhort ſpace of Time draw their own Fountain dry; ſo that this Liberality doth, as it were, eat out its own Bowels, and the more you have formerly obliged in this kind, the fewer you will be able to oblige for the future. But now, on the other hand, he whoſe Generoſity ſhews it ſelf in Labour, that is, in Virtue, and being Active for another's good, the more Men he hath formerly ſhewn himſelf kind to, the more he will have ready to aſſiſt him ever after: beſide that by the Cuſtom of doing good Offices, he gets a kind of Habit, and grows much more expert in the Art of Obliging. PHILIP the Father of ALEXANDER the Great, reproves his Son ſharply in one of his Epiſtles, for endeavouring to purchaſe the Good-will of the *Macedonians*, by giving them Donations; *In* the name of Wonder, *ſays he*, What Method of Reaſoning could lead you into ſuch a Thought, as to imagin that thoſe Men would ever be faithful to you, whom your ſelf had *Corrupted* with Money? 'What! do you deſign to 'be thought, not the King, but only the *Steward* 'and *Purſe-bearer* of the *Macedonians*? That *Steward* and *Purſe-bearer* is admirably well ſaid, becauſe it is ſo ſcandalous a Buſineſs for a Prince; and that calling Donations a *Corrupting the People*, is better yet; for thoſe who receive them are perpetually the worſe for it, and only made readier to expect the ſame again. PHILIP writ this to his Son alone, but it may ſerve for a Direction to all Men in general. I think we may take it for granted therefore, that *that* ſort of Bounty, which conſiſts in doing Kindneſſes by our Labour and Induſtry, is more Virtuous and Creditable, can oblige more People,

People, and has more ways of doing it, than that other has. Not but that *ſometimes* a Man ſhould *give*, nor is this ſort of Bounty to be wholly rejected; nay, one ought oftentimes to diſtribute ſome part of one's Money to thoſe, who are well-deſerving Perſons, and ſtand in need of ſuch Aſſiſtance: But ſtill it muſt be done with great Prudence and Moderation. For ſome Men have ſquandered away whole Eſtates by inconſiderately Giving; which is certainly the fooliſheſt thing in the World; for ſo a Man diſables himſelf ever after, from doing of that which he takes moſt delight in. But the worſt thing is this, that Profuſeneſs in Giving is uſually accompanied by unjuſt Ways of Getting: For when by this means Men have parted with what is their own, they are forced to lay hands upon that which is another's. And by this means they miſs what is their principal Deſign, *viz.* The obtaining Mens Love by their Bounty and Generoſity; for they get more Hatred from thoſe whom they Injure, than Good-will from thoſe whom they hoped to Oblige by it. We ought therefore neither *ſo* to Lock up our Riches, *as* that even Liberality it ſelf cannot open them; nor *ſo* to keep them open, *as* if they were common to all Men in general: The beſt way is, always to obſerve a due Medium, and give more or leſs in proportion to our Eſtates. In fine, we ſhould do well to remember a Saying, which is now grown ſo common as to be a Proverb amongſt us, *Bounty has got no Bottom*: For how indeed is it poſſible, there ſhould ever be any end of it, when thoſe, who are uſed to it, look to receive again; and others, from ſeeing them, are taught to expect the ſame?

CHAP.

Chap. XVI.

Two ſorts of Givers. How Liberality and Prodigality differ. What the chief Advantage of Riches. Publick Shows to the People very fooliſh. Several Examples of magnificent Ædiles among the Romans.

OF thoſe who give largely, there are two ſorts, the one of which are *Prodigal*, and the other *Liberal*. The *Prodigal* are thoſe, who conſume vaſt Sums in making publick Feaſts, and diſtributing Portions of Meat to the People; or in providing Gladiators to Fight with one another, or with wild Beaſts, in the Theatres; or in making Preparation for other ſuch Sports, and Recreations of the Multitude: things that are forgotten in a very ſhort time, if ever at all thought on, after once they are over. But the *Liberal* are thoſe, who diſpoſe of their Money in Redeeming poor Priſoners; in helping their Friends and Acquaintance out of Debt; in aſſiſting them toward the Marrying their Daughters; or putting them into ſome Method of making, or encreaſing their Fortunes. I admire therefore, what ſhould come into THEOPHRASTUS's Head, who in a Book of his, which he wrote *concerning Riches*, amongſt ſeveral noble and excellent things, has been guilty of one very grievous Abſurdity: for he runs out mightily in Commendation of Magnificence, and giving publick Shows or Donations to the People; and thinks the ſupplying of ſuch Expences as theſe, the very principal Fruit and Advantage of Riches: But in my Opinion it is both a much greater, and more durable Advantage, to be furniſhed with Money for theſe Acts of Boun-

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ty, of which I have just now been giving some Instances. But ARISTOTLE, with much more Reason and Judgment, reproves us for not being amazed at those Sums, which are daily thrown away to Caress the People: 'Should any one (says he) 'when a City is besieged and reduced to great 'Streights, give a large Sum of Money for a little 'Cup of Water; People would wonder and admire at it strangely, and hardly be perswaded to 'believe it at first: but afterwards possibly, upon 'farther Consideration, would be ready to pardon 'it, because it was a Case of meer Exigence and 'Necessity: But yet *we can see*, without any thing 'of Admiration, those vast Charges and infinite 'Expences, which Men put themselves to for no 'Reason in the World; neither for the Relief of 'any Want or Necessity, nor yet for the Encrease 'of their Glory and Dignity: And that Pleasure of 'the Multitude which is principally aimed at, is of 'short Continuance; and only tickles and sooths 'up the Meanest of the People, who themselves 'will forget the Satisfaction they received, as soon 'as ever the Show and Recreation is at an end. He adds moreover, with a great deal of Reason, 'That Children indeed and some trifling Women, 'together with Slaves, and the more servile Part 'of those who are free, might perhaps take a Pleasure in such foolish kind of Pastimes: but that 'Men of true Prudence, and those who judge of 'things by the Rules of Reason, can by no means 'either commend or approve of them. I know it is a Custom in our Republick, and *has been* from the time of our good Fore-fathers, to expect and demand, even from the sobereſt Citizens, something that is splendid and magnificent in their Ædileships. Hence PUBLIUS CRASSUS, who was sir-

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named *The Wealthy*, and really was ſuch, in his Office of Ædile was very magnificent and noble in his Entertainments: and Lucius Crassus, a little while after, was full-out as generous, though Collegue of Mucius the moſt moderate Man living. Next after theſe came Caius Claudius, the Son of Appius; and a great many others, *viz.* the Lucilli, Hortensius, and Silanus. But Publius Lentulus, when I was Conſul, exceeded all others that ever went before him: who was afterwards followed and copied by Scaurus. But of all theſe Shows, that have been given to pleaſe and entertain the People, thoſe of my Friend Pompey were the greateſt and moſt magnificent, exhibited when he was the ſecond time Conſul. In all which Caſes it is eaſie to ſee what is my Opinion.

Chap. XVII.

Expences to pleaſe the People allowable in ſome Caſes; and what they are. Some Examples of laudable ones. Upon what one may beſt lay out his Money in this kind.

No Man however ſhould be ſo far moderate, as to draw upon himſelf the Suſpicion of Avarice. Mamercus, a Perſon of very great Riches, was put by the Conſulſhip for no other Reaſon, but becauſe he refuſed to be Ædile firſt. If ſuch things therefore are demanded by the People, and *allowed* of, though perhaps not *deſired*, by good Men, they muſt even be performed; but ſo as to keep within the compaſs of your Eſtate, as I my ſelf did. Nay, though they ſhould not be demanded

manded by the People, yet they might wiſely enough be preſented them, upon a Proſpect of gaining ſome more conſiderable Advantage by it. Thus ORESTES of late got a great deal of Credit, by giving the People a Dinner in the Streets, under the Notion of paying his Tenths to HERCULES. Nor did any one ever find fault with M. SEIUS, for ſelling out Corn at an eaſie Rate, in the time of a very great Dearth and Scarcity: for he got himſelf free from a great and inveterate Hatred of the People, by a Coſt, which (conſidering he was at that time Ædile) was neither diſhoneſt, nor yet extraordinary great: But of all my Friend MILO got the greateſt Honour, by purchaſing Gladiators for the Defence of the Publick, which was wholly included in my ſingle Safety, and thereby defeating the mad and pernicious Attempts of CLODIUS. Such Charges therefore are not to be ſhunned, when either they are *neceſſary* or *very advantagious:* but even when they are ſo, we muſt ſtill not exceed the due Limits of *Mediocrity*. LUC. PHILIPPUS, the Son of QUINTUS, an extraordinary ingenious and eminent Man, was wont, I confeſs, to be making his Brags, That he got all the Honours the Republick could give him, without ever ſpending one Farthing that way: CAIUS CURIO uſed to ſay the ſame: and even I my ſelf have ſome reaſon to boaſt upon this account: for conſidering the greatneſs of the Honours I got, and that too by every one of the Votes, and the very firſt Years I was capable of them, (which is more than can be ſaid by either of thoſe two, whom I juſt now mentioned) the Charge of my Ædileſhip was very inconſiderable. But the beſt way of laying out Money in this kind, is to repair the City-Walls, make Docks, Havens, Aquæducts, and the like; things that may ſerve to

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the general Use and Advantage of the Publick. For though things which are present, and given down upon the nail, are more acceptable for a Time; yet the Memory of these will be more lasting, and continued even down to Posterity. I forbear to speak much against Theatres, Porticoes, new Temples and the like, out of respect to my old Friend POMPEY: but I find them not approved of by the famousest Men; particularly not by PANÆTIUS himself, whom I have very much followed, though not quite translated, in this Work. Neither are they liked by DEMETRIUS PHALERIUS, who blames PERICLES, one of the greatest Men amongst all the *Grecians*, for squandring away such a vast Sum of Money, upon that noble Structure at the entrance of the *Acropolis*. But I have spoken sufficiently upon all this Subject, in those Books I have written *concerning the Republick*. To conclude therefore, All such Profusions are *generally speaking* (I think) to be blamed; but yet at *sometimes, and upon certain Occasions*, may be rendred *necessary*: However even then they must be proportioned to one's Estate, and kept within the Limits of Reason and Moderation.

Chap. XVIII.

Liberality to be varied according to the Variety of Circumſtances. The Merits of the Receiver eſpecially to be conſidered. What Acts of Bounty we ſhould more particularly exerciſe. Meaſures to be obſerved in Receiving Money. It is profitable ſometimes to part with one's Right. When a Man uſes an Eſtate as he ought. Hoſpitality deſervedly commended.

IN that other ſort of Giving, which proceeds from *Liberality*, we ſhould not keep conſtantly to one certain Meaſure; but vary according to the Variety of Circumſtances in the Perſons that receive. His Caſe (for inſtance) who ſtruggles at preſent under ſome preſſing Neceſſity, is different from his, who is well enough to paſs, and only deſires to improve his Fortune. We ſhould lend our Aſſiſtance in the firſt place to thoſe, who are under the Burden and Weight of ſome Misfortune; unleſs they are ſuch as deſerve to be miſerable: We ſhould be ready however to forward thoſe likewiſe, who deſire only of us our Helping-hand, not ſo much to ſave them from being Unfortunate, as to raiſe them to ſome higher Degrees of Fortune. But here we muſt be careful to acquaint our ſelves throughly with the Fitneſs of the Perſons: for that of Ennius is admirably well ſaid,

I take good Actions, when ill applied, to become ill ones.

Now that which is given to a truly honeſt and grateful Perſon, is paid us in the Acknowledgment he

he himſelf makes, and in the Good-will that is got by it from the reſt of the World. For nothing is more pleaſing to all Mankind, than Bounty beſtowed without Raſhneſs and Precipitancy: and the generality of Men praiſe it ſo much the more, becauſe the Liberality of every great Man, is a common kind of Sanctuary for all that are Needy. We ſhould endeavour therefore, as far as we are able, to oblige many Men by ſuch Acts of Generoſity, as may not be forgotten as ſoon as ever they are over; but be remembered by the Children and Poſterity of the Receivers, in ſuch manner as to lay a Neceſſity upon them of ſhewing their Gratitude: I ſay *Neceſſity*; for all People hate one, that takes no care of being grateful to his Benefactors, and count him that is ſuch Injurious to themſelves; becauſe he diſcourages Bounty and Liberality, and ſo is a common Enemy to all the poorer Sort. Beſides, this way of Giving, whereby Captives are ranſomed, and the meaner Folk enriched, is uſeful and advantagious to the Publick it ſelf; and has frequently been practiced by thoſe of our Order, as appears very fully from the Oration of Crassus. That other way therefore of expending Money, which conſiſts in making Shows for the Entertainment of the Vulgar, ought (I think) by no means to be compared with this: The *one* comports well with the Character of a great, and a prudent Perſon; the other of ſuch as Cajole the People, and look out for Pleaſures to tickle the Fancies of the unſtable Multitude. And as it is a Duty to be generous in Giving, ſo is it not to be too rigorous in Demanding; but in every Tranſaction of Buying, Selling, Letting and Hiring, to behave our ſelves towards our Neighbours and Chapmen, with all the Fairneſs and Courteſie imagina-

ble; to let go ſomething of our ſtrict and juſt Rights, upon certain Occaſions; to avoid all Suits and Contentions at Law, as far as can reaſonably and fairly be expected; perhaps I might add, *And even ſomething farther*; for in ſeveral Caſes to deliver up one's Right, is not only generous, but advantagious too. However, a Man ſhould have a decent Regard to his Eſtate and Fortune; for it is not over-reputable to let *that* be ruined by his Eaſineſs and Neglect; and yet on the other hand he ſhould carry himſelf ſo, as to avoid all Suſpicion of a ſordid, mean or avaritious Temper. For it is then a Man uſes his Money as he ought to do, when he ſhews himſelf liberal, without ruining his Fortune. THEOPHRASTUS commends, and with very good Reaſon, another ſort of Bounty, which we call *Hoſpitality*: For there is nothing, in my mind, more handſom and becoming, than conſtantly to have the Houſes of Noble Men open, and ready to entertain all Strangers of Faſhion; and it is no ſmall Credit and Reputation to the Publick, that Strangers never fail to meet with that ſort of Bounty and Liberality in our City. Beſide that there is nothing can be more uſeful for thoſe, who deſign by honeſt Means to get an Intereſt in the World, than to recommend themſelves to the Eſteem and Good-liking of Foreign Nations, by the help of thoſe People whom they thus entertain. THEOPHRASTUS tells us of CIMON the *Athenian*, that he ſhewed his Hoſpitality even to all his Brethren of the *Lacian Tribe*; and not only made it his own conſtant Cuſtom, but alſo commanded his Bayliffs the ſame, to keep open Houſe for any one of the *Laciadæ*, that ſhould paſs that way.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

The Liberality which consists in doing good Offices for others: Two sorts of it. What sorts of Study afford most Opportunities of it. The Ruin of Civil Law and Eloquence. All Men may do Kindnesses of this Nature if they please. We should be careful of not Offending some, by obliging others.

I Come now to speak of that other sort of Bounty, which consists not in *Giving*, but in *Labouring* for another's Good; and extends it self as to the Republick in general, so to each Member of the City in particular. The Civil Law principally gives us Opportunities of exercising this: For there is nothing more proper to get a Man Interest and Credit in the World, than the managing the Lawsuits of a great many Persons, the assisting them with his Advice, and doing for them all that he can by his Knowledge, and Skill in that Learning. And therefore I admire the Wisdom of our Ancestors, as for several Reasons, so particularly for this, that the Knowledge and Interpretation of their excellent Civil Law, was counted a matter of the highest Credit and Reputation among them. This the greatest Men have kept constantly among themselves, till this late sad Disorder and Confusion of every thing: But now the Glory of this sort of Learning, together with all Honours and Degrees of Dignity, is utterly ruined and fallen to just Nothing. And to make the matter still so much the worse; all this has happened in the Days of One, who, as he equalled in Dignity all that have gone before him, so he was far above them in the Knowledge of the Laws. This Study then is ap-

proved of by moſt People, and puts it in one's power to aſſiſt a great many, and oblige them by Kindneſſes. There is another ſort of Knowledge near related to this, the Art, I mean, of Perſwaſive Speaking, which carries more Majeſty and Ornament along with it, and is more pleaſing and liked of, by the generality of Men. For what is there in the World more extraordinary than Eloquence, whether we conſider the Admiration of its Hearers, the Reliance of thoſe who ſtand in need of its Aſſiſtance, or the Good-will procured by it from thoſe whom it defends? Our Anceſtors therefore held this among the chief of their Civil Profeſſions. Any one then muſt oblige a great many, and have a large number of Clients and Dependants, who is able to ſpeak well, and willing to take pains, and (as it was the Cuſtom of our good Fore-fathers) is ready to undertake many Mens Cauſes, without ever expecting to be rewarded for his Trouble. And here I have a fair Opportunity offered me, to bemoan the great Downfal, that I may not ſay the utter Extinction, of Eloquence; but that I am afraid I ſhall ſeem to complain for my own ſake only. However I cannot but with ſome Concern take notice, what a great many excellent Orators we have loſt; how few there are riſing, whom we can expect any thing from; and how much fewer who are able to perform and do any thing; and for all that, how many full of Impudence and Preſumption. Now it is not for all, nor indeed very many, to be either skilful Lawyers, or eloquent Pleaders: However there is no one, if he would make it his Buſineſs, but may do friendly Offices to ſeveral People; either by begging ſome Kindneſſes for them, or by recommending their Caſes to the Judges and Officers;

Officers; or by being Induſtrious in promoting their Intereſts; or laſtly, by uſing his Endeavours with thoſe, who either are able Lawyers, or eloquent Orators: which whoever ſhall do, will make a great many be beholden to him, and get himſelf a general Intereſt in the World. There is one thing however I would advertiſe him of, (though I think it is ſo obvious, that I hardly need to do it) which is, to have a care of offending *ſome*, whilſt he is endeavouring to be ſerviceable to *others*. For it often comes to paſs, that ſuch do a Diskindneſs, either to *thoſe* whom they ought to have obliged, or to *thoſe* who are able to make them ſuffer for it afterwards: Which ſhews Careleſneſs and Negligence, if done undeſignedly; but if deſignedly, Raſhneſs and Imprudence. And if it ſhould happen that we are forced, though unwillingly, to diſoblige any Perſon, we muſt endeavour to excuſe it as well as we are able; by ſhewing the Neceſſity we lay under of doing ſo, and how it was utterly impoſſible for us to avoid it: and muſt be careful and induſtrious to repair the Injury, by making ſome reaſonable Amends for it afterwards.

Chap. XX.

Men are readier to aſſiſt one that is Wealthy and Great, than one that is Poor and Honeſt. Reaſons why they ought to do the contrary. The Evil Effects of Mens Love of Riches. Never to do an Injury to one, for the ſake of Obliging another.

NOW whenever we do a *Kindneſs* or Friendly *Office* to another, we uſually regard one of theſe two Things, *viz.* Either the *Honeſty*, or the *Greatneſs* of the Perſon. It is eaſily ſaid, and every one is ready enough to profeſs, That in placing their Favours, they have much more Reſpect to the *Merits* of the Perſon, than to his Fortune in the World. This is very fairly and honeſtly ſpoken: but yet I would be glad to be ſhewn that Man, who is more willing to Help one that is Honeſt and Poor, than to get the Favour of one that is Wealthy and Powerful. For who is not readieſt to be ſerviceable to thoſe, from whom he expects the moſt ſpeedy Requital? But People would do well to conſider more throughly the Natures of things: For though a poor Man, it is true, cannot make a Requital, yet if he is honeſt, he will acknowledge the Obligation: And it was no unhandſom Saying, whoever was the Author of it, "That "in Caſe of a *Debt*, the Man who *acknowledges* "it, doth not thereby *pay* it; and the Man who "*pays* it does no longer *acknowledge* it: But in "Caſe of an *Obligation*, both he who *returns* it "ſtill continues to *acknowledge* it, and he who "*acknowledges* it thereby ſufficiently *returns* it. But now thoſe, on the contrary, who value themſelves

ſelves upon their Riches, Honours and flouriſhing Condition, will ſcorn to acknowledge they are obliged for any Kindneſs; nay, will think they vouchſafe you a ſignal Favour, even whilſt you are doing them ſome conſiderable Service; and will always be jealous and ſuſpicious over you, as though you demanded and expected ſomething from them: But to have it ever ſaid they were defended by you, or to be numbered among your Dependants or Clients, is as inſupportable to them as even Death it ſelf. Whereas your *mean Perſon*, when any one does him a friendly Office, conſiders it was done out of Reſpect to himſelf, and not out of Regard to his Fortune or Condition; and endeavours to ſhew himſelf ſenſible of the Obligation, not to him only who has done him the Kindneſs, but (as ſtanding in need of ſome other Mens Aſſiſtance) to thoſe others alſo, from whom he hopes for the like. And if he ſhould chance to do another any Service, he does not endeavour to cry up and magnifie it, but rather to leſſen it as much as he is able. Another thing worth the conſidering is this, That if you defend one that is wealthy and powerful, the Obligation remains in the Perſon himſelf, or perhaps juſt his Children; but if you protect one that is needy and forſaken, provided withal he be virtuous and modeſt, all the lower ſort of People immediately, that are not wicked (which is no inconſiderable part of the Multitude) will look upon you as their Safe-guard and Protection. Upon all which Accounts I am wholly of Opinion, That a Kindneſs is better beſtowed upon *an honeſt*, than it is upon a *wealthy* and *fortunate* Perſon. We ſhould endeavour, it is true, to the utmoſt of our Power, to be ſerviceable to all Men of whatſoever Condition: But if there ſhould happen a Competi-

tion between them, I am clearly for following THEMISTOCLES's Advice, who being once asked, *How he would marry his Daughter, whether to one that was Poor, but Honeſt; or to one that was Rich, but of an ill Reputation?* made Anſwer, *I had rather have a Man without an Eſtate, than have an Eſtate without a Man.* But the mighty Reſpect, which is paid to Riches, has wholly depraved and corrupted our Manners. And yet what does it ſignifie to any one of us, that ſuch or ſuch a Perſon has got a plentiful Fortune? Perhaps it may be uſeful to him that has it; though not ſo neither always: But allowing it to be ſo: Suppoſe he has got the World more at his Command; yet how (I would fain know) is he ever the honeſter for it? But and if a Man be Honeſt, as well as Wealthy, though I would not have him helped for the ſake of his Riches, yet I would not have him hindred upon their account neither: But in every caſe have it fairly conſidered, not how Wealthy and Great; but how Good and Deſerving a Perſon he is. I ſhall conclude this Head with only one Rule more, which is, Never for the ſake of doing any one a Kindneſs, to venture upon that which is unjuſt in it ſelf, or injurious to a third Perſon. For no Credit can be ſolid and durable, unleſs built upon the Foundations of Juſtice and Honeſty; without which nothing can be Virtuous or commendable.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Two ſorts of that Bounty which relates to the Publick. Nothing to be done for the ſake of the Members in particular, which may any ways damage the Publick in general. The firſt Duty of the Governours of a State, to ſecure each Particular in the Poſſeſſion of his own. Levelling all Eſtates very deſtructive. Why Men firſt built Cities. Not to burden the People with Taxes, a ſecond Duty. A Third, To furniſh the People with Neceſſaries. Covetouſneſs in a Governour pernicious to any State. The unhappy Effects of it in the Roman *Empire.*

HAving thus diſcourſed of the one ſort of Kindneſſes, which are done to *particular Members* of the City; we are now in the next place to ſpeak of thoſe others, which are done to *them all*, and to the Commonwealth in general. Now theſe again are of two ſorts, The one more immediately relating to the Community; the other reaching down to each Member in particular; which latter of the two is more grateful and acceptable. We ſhould ſhew our Beneficence, as far as we are able, in both theſe Ways; but eſpecially in this latter, which relates to each one of the particular Members: In which however one Caution muſt be obſerved, That nothing be done in behalf of Particulars, but that which is uſeful, or at leaſt not prejudicial, to the Commonwealth in general. C. GRACCHUS, for Inſtance, made a large Diſtribution of Corn to the People; and the Effect of it was, that the Treaſury was exhauſted by it. MARCUS OCTAVIUS made one that was moderate,

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which was a Kindneſs to the Multitude, and no ways a Burthen or Grievance to the State; and accordingly both the Publick, and all the Members of the City, received Benefit from it. But the principal thing for a Governour to take care of, is, *That* each Individual be kept in the quiet Poſſeſſion of his own, and *That* private Men be not diſpoſſeſſed of what they have, under a Pretence of taking Care of the Publick. For nothing is more deſtructive to the Peace of any Nation, than to bring in a new Diſtribution of Eſtates, which was attempted by PHILIP, in the Time of his Tribuneſhip: However he quickly gave over his Deſign, and did not perſiſt ſtubbornly in Defence of it, as ſoon as he found it was ſo vigorouſly oppoſed: But in his publick Speeches and Harangues to the People, among a great many things to obtain their Favour, he was heard to ſay one of very dangerous Conſequence, That the whole City had not Two Thouſand Men in it, that were Maſters of Eſtates: A very pernicious and deſperate Saying, directly tending to bring all things to a Level; which is the greateſt Misfortune that can befal any People. For to what end were Cities and Commonwealths eſtabliſhed, but only that every one might be ſafer and ſecurer, in the Enjoyment of his own? For though Men by Nature are ſociable Creatures, yet it was the Deſign of Preſerving what they had, that firſt put them upon building of Cities for a Refuge. It is a *Second* Duty of the Governours of a State, to ſee that the People be not forced to pay Taxes; as they often were in our Fore-fathers time, partly becauſe they were always in War, and partly by reaſon of the Lowneſs of the Treaſury. This is an Inconvenience, which ought, as far as poſſible, to be provided againſt before-hand: But

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if *any State* ſhould be under ſuch Circumſtances, as that it muſt be forced to make uſe of this Expedient, (I ſay *any State*, becauſe I am unwilling to ſuppoſe ſo unhappy a thing of *our own*; beſide that I ſpeak here of all of them in general) but if, I ſay, any State ſhould be brought to ſuch a Pinch, due Care muſt be taken to let the People know, That it is abſolutely neceſſary as Affairs now ſtand, and that otherwiſe they muſt needs be inevitably ruined. Again, It is yet further required of thoſe Men, who Govern and Preſide in a Commonwealth, to ſee that it be furniſhed with all the Conveniencies and Neceſſaries of Life. To tell what *theſe* are, and how to be provided, would be altogether needleſs in this place, ſince it is ſufficiently known already; I only thought fit juſt to touch upon it by the *Bye*. But in all kinds of Buſineſs, and managing Affairs of a publick Nature, there is nothing more neceſſary, than always to keep one's ſelf clear and untainted, ſo as not to lye under the leaſt *Suſpicion of Avarice*. I could heartily wiſh, (ſaid CAIUS PONTIUS the *Samnite*) that Fortune had reſerved me to thoſe Times, and that it had been my Fate to be then born, whenever the *Romans* ſhall begin to take Bribes; I ſhould quickly have put an end to their flouriſhing Empire. Truly he muſt have waited a pretty many Ages; for that is a kind of Evil, which but lately has begun to infeſt this Republick. If PONTIUS therefore were ſo great a Man as he pretended to be, I am very well ſatisfied with his being born when he was; and not in thoſe times, which have lately happened. It is not yet an Hundred and Ten Years ago, ſince LUCIUS PISO got a Law to be enacted againſt the Corruption of Magiſtrates, whereas there had never been any one before. But ſince that

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time there have been ſo many Laws, and ſtill every new one more ſevere than the former; ſo many Perſons accuſed and condemned; ſuch a War ſtirred up in the Bowels of *Italy*, by thoſe who were afraid of being brought to Puniſhment; ſuch ſhameful Extortion and Pillaging our Allies, by thoſe who have defied all Laws and Courts of Juſtice; that we were rather beholden to the Weakneſs of others, than our own Strength or Virtues, that we are not utterly ruined.

CHAP. XXII.

Examples of Contempt of Money among the ancient Romans. *The Danger, &c. of the oppoſite Vice. The Honour gotten by this Virtue. The Danger, Folly, &c. of the Project of Levelling Eſtates.*

PANÆTIUS highly commends AFRICANUS, for his being uncorrupt as to the matter of Money. It is a Virtue that well deſerved his Commendation: but I think there were others in that great Perſon, which deſerved it much more: to be untainted with Money being not ſo properly a Virtue of that Man, as of thoſe Times in general. PAULUS ÆMILIUS had all the Wealth of *Macedonia* in his Power, which amounted to almoſt an infinite Value: ſo that he brought ſuch a Sum into the Treaſury, as that the ſingle Booty of that one General ſuperſeded the Neceſſity of all Taxes for the future: and yet he brought nothing into his own Houſe, but the eternal Memory of his Name and Atchievments. AFRICANUS followed the Example of his Father, and returned nothing richer from

from the Overthrow of *Carthage*. So MUMMIUS, who was afterwards his Partner in the Cenſorſhip; did he make himſelf ever a Farthing the Wealthier, by razing one of the wealthieſt Cities in the World? No; he rather choſe to make *Italy* fine with the Spoils of his Enemies, than his own Houſe; though in my Opinion the Fineneſs of *Italy* reflects a bright Luſtre upon his own Houſe too. There is no Vice then (that I may return to the Subject, from which I have digreſſed) more deteſtable than Avarice; more eſpecially in Great Men, and ſuch as bear Sway in the Government of a State. For it is not only *mean* for a Man to make a Prey and Advantage of the Commonwealth, but even impious and abominable. That Oracle therefore of the *Pythian* APOLLO's, *That nothing but Avarice ſhould be the Ruin of* Sparta, doth not ſeem deſigned for the *Lacedemonians* only, but for every wealthy and flouriſhing Nation. And as Avarice is thus very deſtructive to a State; ſo to appear Upright and Regardleſs of Money, is the certaineſt Method thoſe in Power can make uſe of, for procuring the Love and Good-liking of the *People*. But thoſe, who deſigning to curry *their* Favour, attempt new Laws about the Levelling Eſtates, ſo as to force the right Owners from their lawful Poſſeſſions; or propoſe to make Creditors remit all the Debts, which in Juſtice are due to them; plainly undermine the two principal Pillars and Supports of the Government: In the *firſt* place, Concord and Unity amongſt the Citizens, which can never be kept up, whilſt ſome are deprived of what is juſtly their Due, and others diſcharged from the neceſſity of Payment: *Secondly*, Juſtice, which immediately muſt ſink into Ruins and Nothing, if Men cannot be ſecured in the Poſ-

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ſeſſion of what is their own: For *that* (as we before remarked) is the chief End and Aim of Mens gathering into Societies, and building of Cities, that each one might freely enjoy what is his Right, without any danger or fear of being deprived of it. Beſide this, the Authors of theſe pernicious Deſigns, never get that Good-will, which they propoſe, from their Citizens: For, as for thoſe Men, who are *Loſers* by ſuch a Method, it is certain that they will be their Enemies for it; and thoſe, who are *Gainers*, will be ſure to pretend that they never deſired it: eſpecially in the Buſineſs of having Debts forgiven; *there* every one diſſembles how glad he is of it, for fear it ſhould be thought that he was not able to pay them. But thoſe Men, to whom ſuch Deſigns are prejudicial, will hardly forget them, but ſhew a perpetual Grudge and Reſentment. And though the number of theſe, who are thus wickedly Befriended, be greater than of thoſe, who are injuriouſly Robbed; yet it doth not follow, that therefore they are more Powerful: for it is not the Number, but the Quality of the Perſons, that muſt carry it in this Caſe. Beſides, what Reaſon or Equity is there, when Eſtates have been held for a great many Years, or perhaps Ages, that the rightful Owners ſhould be thruſt out from them, and others, that never had any, ſhould come and poſſeſs them?

CHAP. XXIII.

Several Examples of the unhappy Effects of taking away Mens Eſtates, in order to bring Things to a Level. The wiſe Conduct of Aratus *the* Sicyonian *in doing the contrary. What a Magiſtrate's Duty in ſuch Caſes is.*

FOR ſuch kind of partial, injurious Proceedings, the *Spartans* once baniſhed LYSANDER, one of their Ephori; and put to Death AGIS their King for the ſame Reaſon; an Action unheard of before in that City. This was ſucceeded by ſuch grievous Contentions and Diſcords in the State, as that Tyranny and Oppreſſion got the Upper-hand amongſt them; the Nobles were baniſhed from their Native Country, and the beſt conſtituted Republick upon the Face of the Earth, was utterly diſſolved, and brought into Confuſion. Nor did this Miſchief end with the *Spartans* only, but, like a Contagion, ſpreading it ſelf further, involved all *Greece* in the ſame Miſeries and Calamities. Pray what was it ruined our own two GRACCHI, Sons of the famous TIBERIUS GRACCHUS, and Grandſons of AFRICANUS, but only theſe Controverſies about levelling Eſtates? ARATUS the *Sicyonian* is deſervedly commended as much on the other hand: He, when his Country, for fifty Years together, had been greatly oppreſſed and over-run by Tyrants, went ſecretly one Night from *Argos* to *Sicyon*, and made himſelf Maſter of the City by Surprize; and unexpectedly falling upon NICOCLES, the then Tyrant, he put him to Flight. This being done, he recalled Six Hundred of the wealthieſt Citizens, who had all been formerly baniſhed by the

the Tyrants, and by this his Arrival delivered the City from Slavery and Oppreſſion. But he afterwards found it would be a great deal of Trouble to ſettle the Buſineſs of their Eſtates and Poſſeſſions; for he thought on the one hand it was very unreaſonable, that thoſe Men, whom he had reſtored, ſhould want, whilſt others enjoyed what in Equity was theirs: And yet it ſeemed hard upon the other Side, that Men ſhould be thruſt out of thoſe Poſſeſſions, which now they had held for theſe fifty Years: If more eſpecially it were withal conſidered, That it could not but happen in ſo long a Time, that they muſt have gone, a great Part of them, from one to another, either by Inheritance, Purchaſe, Dowry, or the like; and therefore were poſſeſſed by the *preſent Incumbents*, without *their* having injured the rightful Proprietors. Upon theſe Conſiderations he judged it neceſſary, both to bear with the *latter* in the Enjoyment of what they had, and yet to ſatisfy the *former*, whom it juſtly belonged to. And finding a large Sum of Money was requiſite to ſettle this Buſineſs as it ought to be, he told them he had Occaſion to go to *Alexandria*, and ordered they ſhould not concern themſelves about it till his Return. He goes accordingly with all poſſible Speed to his old Friend PTOLOMY, who at that Time was reigning in *Alexandria*, being the ſecond King after the Founding of that City. Having told him his Deſign of ſettling Liberty in his Country, and the Reaſons that put him upon undertaking that Voyage, he quickly obtained of that wealthy Prince to ſupply him with a Quantity of Money for his Aſſiſtance. With this he immediately returns to *Sicyon*, and chuſing out fifteen of the principal Citizens, to help him with their Counſel upon this Occaſion; he heard both

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the Cauſes of thoſe who poſſeſſed what had belonged to others, and of thoſe who had loſt what had been formerly their own. At laſt he ſo managed the whole Buſineſs, as that, the Eſtates being ſet at their true Values, *ſome* were perſwaded to part with what they had, and take an Equivalent in Money for it; and *others* to neglect the Recovery of their own, and reſt themſelves content with being paid its full Value. By this means the Controverſy was fairly determined, and all went home ſatisfied without grudging or complaining. Here was a great and extraordinary Man now! Here was one that deſerved to have been born in our Republick! This is the true Way of dealing with Citizens; and not (as hath been practiſed amongſt us twice) to make Sale of their Goods in the publick Markets, and have them cryed by the Voice of the common Cryer. But this famous *Grecian* (as was the Duty of a wiſe and extraordinary Perſon) thought it became him to provide alike for all: And indeed every Magiſtrate, who proceeds upon Principles of Reaſon and Prudence, will always take care not to make any Difference between the Intereſts of his People; but will govern them all by the ſame Rule and Standard of Juſtice and Equity. Here is one Man ſhall dwell in what belongs to another: What *Reaſon* is there, I beſeech you, for this; that when I have bought, built, repaired, and laid out a great deal of Money, another ſhould come and enjoy all the Fruits of it, in ſpite of my Teeth? Is not this plainly to take away from one that which juſtly belongs to him, and give to another what he has nothing of Right to? As for the Project of forgiving Debts, I can ſee no Reaſon in the World for it, unleſs it be Reaſon, that another ſhould buy Land with my

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Money, and that he ſhould have the Land, but I never have my Money.

CHAP. XXIV.

Care ſhould be taken to prevent Peoples running too much into Debt. Faith *the Cement of publick Society.* Cicero's *Conduct in his Conſulſhip about the Matter of Debts. The Duties of a good Magiſtrate. How one's Health and Eſtate are to be taken Care of.*

CARE ought therefore to be taken beforehand (which it is eaſy to do by a great many Ways) to keep People from running ſo much into Debt, as may bring any Damage or Inconvenience to the Publick: And not, *when they are in,* to make the Creditors loſe what is their own, and let the Debtors gain what in Juſtice is another's: For nothing ſo cements and holds together in Union all the Parts of a Society, as Faith or Credit; which can never be kept up, unleſs Men are under ſome Force and Neceſſity of honeſtly paying what they owe to one another. This Deſign of having Debtors excuſed from Payment, was never attempted with greater Eagerneſs, than whilſt I was Conſul: Men of all Ranks and Degrees in the State took up Arms and formed Camps for the bringing it about; whoſe Endeavours I reſiſted with ſo much Vigour, as that the Republick was quickly delivered from ſo pernicious an Evil. There never were known greater Debts in the City, nor ever more eaſily and faithfully paid: And pray what was the Reaſon of all this?

this? Why becauſe when their Hopes of Defrauding were cut off, they found themſelves under a Neceſſity of Payment. It is true, there is one, who has ſince been a Conqueror, (though then he was conquered by my Vigilance) that has found out Means to effect theſe Deſigns, at a Time when they would bring *him* no manner of Advantage; but ſuch an Inclination had that Man to Villany, that the bare Doing of it was a Pleaſure to him, without any other Invitation in the World. The Sum then of what has been ſaid is this, That ſuch as deſign for the Good of the Republick, *muſt* be ſure to avoid *this* ſort of Liberality, which takes away from one what it gives to another; and *muſt* conſequently make it their principal Care to uphold each Member in his proper Rights, according to the Principles of Juſtice and Equity; ſo as neither to ſuffer the *poorer* Sort of People to be wronged or oppreſſed, by reaſon of their Poverty; nor the *richer* to be hindred from keeping or demanding what is juſtly their own, by the Envy of the others: And, in fine, *muſt* apply their moſt earneſt Endeavours, whether in War or Peace, to encreaſe the Power, and enlarge the Bounds and Revenues of the Republick. Theſe are the Duties and Exerciſes of great Men: Theſe are the things which were practiſed by our Anceſtors; and whoever goes on to perform the ſame, will not only bring great Advantage to the Republick, but gain a mighty Intereſt and Reputation to himſelf. In theſe Rules of Duty relating to Things profitable, ANTIPATER the *Tyrian*, a *Stoick* Philoſopher, who lately died at *Athens*, thinks that two Things have been omitted by PANÆTIUS: *Firſt*, The Care of getting or preſerving one's Health; And, *Secondly*, Of an Eſtate. I believe *that great Philoſopher* might

might omit them on purpose, because they are so easy and obvious to every one: However, it is certain they are both of them profitable. Now *Health* is preserved *by* considering the peculiar Temper of one's Body, and observing what agrees, or does *not* agree with it; *by* Temperance and Moderation in Meats and Drinks, and other Things relating to the Welfare of the Body; *by* Forbearance and Abstinence as to the matter of Pleasures; and, lastly, *by* the Skill of Physicians, and the like. An *Estate* should be *gotten* by nothing that is any ways scandalous or dishoneſt; *preserved* by Diligence and prudent Management; and, lastly, by the same means *bettered* and *augmented*. But this whole Subject is excellently handled by XENOPHON the *Socratick*, in his Book *of Oeconomicks*; which I formerly translated from the *Greek* into *Latin*, when much about as old as you are at present.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

The Comparing of Things profitable one with another. An Anſwer of Cato's *upon this Head. Who are beſt able to teach how to get Eſtates.*

THE fourth chief Head we propoſed to ſpeak of, was the *Comparing Things profitable one with another*; which is oftentimes neceſſary, however neglected or forgotten by PANÆTIUS. For we uſe to compare either the Goods of the *Body* with thoſe of *Fortune*; or *theſe* back again with *thoſe* of the Body; or, laſtly, thoſe both of *the one* and *the other* amongſt themſelves. *Firſt*, The Goods of the Body are compared with thoſe of Fortune, as, *It is more eligible*, ſuppoſe, *to be Healthy than Rich. Secondly*, Theſe back again with thoſe of the Body, as, *It is better to be Rich, than of a robuſt Conſtitution. Thirdly*, Thoſe of the Body with one another, as, *Health is preferable to Pleaſure*; or *Strength to Activity*. And, *Laſtly*, Thoſe of Fortune with one another, as if *Glory ſhould be preferred before Riches*, or *an Eſtate in the City before another in the Country*. To this latter Sort of Comparing may be referred that Anſwer of the *Senior* CATO's, who being once asked, What he conceived moſt profitable in the Management of an Eſtate? ſaid, *To feed Cattle well*. And what the ſecond? *To feed Cattle pretty well*. And what the third, *To feed Cattle, though but ill*. And what the fourth, *To till the Ground*. And then the Enquirer proceeding ſtill to ask, *Pray what do you think of letting Money out to Uſury? Pray what do I think*, replies CATO, *of killing a Man?* From what has been ſaid, and

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a great deal more, that might eaſily be added, it is ſufficiently manifeſt, That Profits are often compared with one another; and that we had Reaſon ſufficient on our Side, in making *this* a fourth Head for the finding out our Duty. But as for the Buſineſs of getting an Eſtate, and placing our Money to the beſt Advantage, and I wiſh I might add of applying it to the beſt Uſes, there are certain honeſt Men who attend at the *Exchange*, that can better inform you than any of the Philoſophers that diſpute in the Schools. It is worth while however to know theſe Things, becauſe they relate to the Buſineſs of *Profit*, which has made up the Subject of all this Book. Let us now paſs on to what remains behind.

The End of the Second Book.

TULLY's OFFICES.

The THIRD BOOK.

CHAP. I.

An excellent Saying of the Elder SCIPIO AFRICANUS. CICERO *betakes himself to a Life of Leisure and Retirement, the Republick being quite ruined. The Difference between his Retirement, and* AFRICANUS's. *Some Good to be drawn out of Evils.*

CATO, Son MARK, who was near of the same Age with PUBLIUS SCIPIO, the first that had the Sirname of AFRICANUS given him, tells us it was an usual Saying of *his, That he never was less idle, than when he was idle; nor ever less alone, than when he was alone.* A noble and excellent Sentence indeed, and worthy of so great and wise a Person; by which it appears, that in the midst of Leisure he could think of Business, and was used when alone to converse with his own Thoughts: So that he never was properly idle, and

needed no Company to entertain him in his Solitude. The two things therefore, which bring a kind of Dullneſs and Heavineſs upon others, ſerved but to ſharpen and invigorate his Mind, *viz.* Solitude and Leiſure. I wiſh I could truly ſay the ſame of my ſelf! But though I am not able to arrive at that inimitable Temper of Soul, I deſire at leaſt to come as near it as is poſſible; and being excluded by open Violence and impious Arms, from having ought to do with Affairs of the Senate, or Buſineſs of the Bar, I wholly betake my ſelf to a Life of Retirement; and for that very Reaſon have abandoned the City, and am often alone, only going from one Seat to another in the Country. But alas! my Leiſure is not to be compared with that of AFRICANUS, nor my Solitude with his Solitude! For he was employed at that very Time in Places of the greateſt Reputation in the Publick; and his *Leiſure* was only a voluntary Retirement, to give himſelf Reſpite from Buſineſs for a Seaſon; and his *Solitude* only a kind of Port or Haven, into which he withdrew himſelf from the Diſturbances of Company. Whereas my Leiſure proceeds not from any Deſire of Reſpite, but from a Want of Buſineſs to employ my ſelf about; for what proper Work can I find to do, when there is no more a Senate, nor any Courts of Juſtice remaining entire, in which I might honourably ſhew my ſelf? Therefore, whereas it was my former Cuſtom to appear much in Publick, and in the Eye of my Citizens; I now on the contrary hide my ſelf from them, to avoid the very Sight of ſuch Packs of Villains as are every-where abroad; and as much as is poſſible confine my ſelf to Solitude. But ſince this is given us for a Rule by the Learned, *That when ſeveral Evils are threatning*

ning us at once, we ſhould not only chuſe to undergo the leaſt, *but extract ſome Advantage out of* them *if it be poſſible:* I therefore, in the midſt of all theſe preſent Misfortunes, gain the ſmall Advantage of Quiet and Retirement, (though not ſuch a Quiet as he might have expected, whoſe Wiſdom had formerly procured the Peace of the Publick) and endeavour not wholly to languiſh out that Solitude, which not Choice, but Neceſſity, has laid upon me. Though AFRICANUS indeed, I my ſelf muſt confeſs, has got much greater Glory by his Solitude and Retirement: For none of his Thoughts are committed to Writing, nor any Monuments remain of what he did in his Leiſure, and when he was alone; whereby we are given to underſtand, That he never was idle, nor ever properly alone; becauſe he was always employed in Meditation, and his Mind was buſy in ſearching out thoſe Things which by Thinking he made himſelf Maſter of. But I, who have not got ſuch a Strength of Genius as to be content when alone with the Company of my bare Thoughts, am forced to apply all my Studies and Endeavours to the Drudgery of Writing: I have written more therefore within a very ſhort time, ſince the Ruin of the State, than I did for ſome Years, while it was in its flouriſhing Condition.

Chap. II.

The Subject of Duties the moſt uſeful part of all Philoſophy. An Exhortation to his Son to be diligent in his Studies. The Subject of this Third Book. Panætius *neglected to treat of it, though he did at firſt deſign it. A Saying of* Rutilius Rufus.

NOW though all Philoſophy (my dear Cicero) be a rich, as it were, and a plentiful Soil, which has not any part of it waſte and uncultivate: yet there is no part that is more fruitful in it, or from which more Advantage accrues to the Husbandman, than that which is employed about *Offices* or *Duties*; from whence thoſe Precepts and Directions are drawn, which lead toward a ſteddy and virtuous Way of Living. Wherefore, though I doubt not but that Cratippus, the greateſt Philoſopher of our Age, is daily inculcating theſe things to you, and you are receiving them with that Attention they deſerve; yet I have thought it not wholly unneceſſary my ſelf, to remind you of ſo important a Matter; and could wiſh that your Ears might continually ring, as it were, with ſuch Precepts, and not hear (as far as poſſible) any thing elſe. And as this is a Method which is uſeful for all Men, who deſign to lead virtuous and creditable Lives; ſo for no one living, perhaps, more than your ſelf. For conſider you are the Son of an induſtrious Father, one who has born the greateſt Honours in the Republick, and has gotten himſelf ſome Credit and Reputation in the World; People therefore will expect that you ſhould follow my Steps, and it is your Part

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to ſee that you anſwer their Expectation. Beſide, it is no ſmall thing you have taken upon you, by being at *Athens*, and under the Great CRATIPPUS; whither ſince you are gone, as it were to a *Staple* and Mart of good Literature, it will be ſcandalous for you to return again empty, and bring a Reproach both upon the Place and your Maſter. Wherefore, dear Son, be Induſtrious and Diligent, and ſpare no manner of Pains and Labour (if I may call it a *Labour*, and not rather a *Pleaſure*, to Study and Learn) that you may make a good Uſe of theſe Advantages before you; and when all things are thus plentifully ſupplied on my part, let it never be ſaid, That you your ſelf are wanting to your own greateſt Intereſt. But I ſhall ſay no more upon this at preſent, having heretofore written again and again to you, by way of Exhortation. Let us now proceed to the fifth and laſt Part of our propoſed Diviſion. PANÆTIUS then, who without all Controverſie has written moſt accurately upon the Subject of *Duties*, and whom in this Work, with a little Alteration, I have hitherto followed, lays down (as was ſaid) three general Heads, which Men uſe in Conſulting or Deliberating concerning their Duty: In the *firſt* it is queſtioned, *Whether the Action they are going about be Honeſt or Diſhoneſt.* In the *ſecond, Whether it be Profitable or Unprofitable.* In the *third, How a good Man ought to determine the Caſe, if that which ſeems Honeſt ſhould come into competition with that which ſeems Profitable.* Of the two former Heads he has given us an account in his three firſt Books, and therein has promiſed to go on with the third of them; but has failed, it ſhould ſeem, of being ſo good as his Word. Which I wonder at the more upon this account, becauſe we

are told by his Scholar POSSIDONIUS, That he lived thirty Years after thoſe Books were publiſhed. And I cannot but admire at the ſame POSSIDONIUS, that having an occaſion, in ſome of his Writings, to diſcourſe upon this Argument, he ſhould do no more than juſt touch upon it in ſhort; eſpecially ſeeing he himſelf has obſerved, That in all Philoſophy there is no one Subject more neceſſary and important. Some indeed think, whom I cannot agree with, that PANÆTIUS did not *forget* this Part, but *omitted* it on purpoſe; and that in plain Truth, it ought to be omitted, ſince Profit can never be *really* contrary to Honeſty. Whether it *ought* to be omitted or not, may perhaps be a Queſtion; but whether PANÆTIUS firſt deſigned it or no, and yet afterwards neglected it, I think can be none: For a Writer certainly, that propoſes three Heads, and goes through with but two of them, muſt needs deſign to diſcourſe upon the third; nay he tells us himſelf in the cloſe of his third Book, that he would afterwards proceed to this remaining Part. Beſide, we have the Authority of POSSIDONIUS to vouch it, who in one of his Letters has given us a Saying of RUTILIUS RUFUS, who was Scholar to PANÆTIUS as well as himſelf; *That as never any Painter had been yet ſo bold, as to venture upon finiſhing that Piece of* VENUS, *which* APELLES *left imperfect at the Iſland* COS; (*the Beauty of the Face making all Men deſpair, ever to paint a Body that ſhould be anſwerable to it*) *ſo the Excellency of that, which* PANÆTIUS *had writ upon this Subject, made others afraid of attempting to add that which he had omitted.*

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Whether PANÆTIUS *did well in making this third Head. Reaſons why he did not. The Danger of ſeparating Profit from Honeſty. What the* Stoicks *mean by* Living according to Nature. *Two ſorts of Virtue, the* Perfect *and* Ordinary. *The former belongs to the* Wiſe *only; the latter is common to all. The moſt perfect Virtue (as it is counted by the Multitude) is really imperfect.*

THat PANÆTIUS therefore did think he was obliged to Diſcourſe upon this Part, is beyond all Queſtion: But whether he was miſtaken in his Judgment or not, when he laid down this Head, as the *third of deliberating for the finding out our Duty*, may perhaps be diſputed. For whether, according to the Opinion of the *Stoicks*, we take *Virtue* or *Honeſty* to be the *only Good*; or, according to that of *your Peripateticks*, acknowledge it ſo to be the *chiefeſt Good*, as that all things elſe are juſt nothing againſt it; it is certain, upon either of theſe Suppoſitions, That Profit cannot be put in the Balance againſt Honeſty. We are therefore told, That SOCRATES uſed even to *curſe* thoſe People, who diſjoyned theſe things in Thought and Conception, which are one and the ſame in Nature and Reality. And the *Stoicks* are ſo far of his Opinion, as conſtantly to maintain, That whatever is Honeſt muſt be alſo Profitable, and whatever is Profitable muſt be alſo Honeſt. It is true had PANÆTIUS been one of thoſe, who aſſert that Virtue is therefore only deſirable, becauſe it brings ſomething of Profit along with it; like ſome, who

think nothing any further worth ſeeking for, than as it begets Pleaſure, or Exemption from Pain; we could then have allowed him the liberty of ſaying, That Profit is ſometimes repugnant to Honeſty. But ſeeing he was once of a different Sect, and thinks *nothing* to be *Good* except that which is *Honeſt*; and avows that whatever is contrary to *Honeſty*, and appears to us under the Notion of *Profit*, can neither, if we have it, make Life ever the better; nor, if we have it not, ever the worſe; he ſhould not, methinks, have brought in ſuch a Deliberation, wherein that, which ſeems Profitable, comes into Competition with that, which is Honeſt. For that, which the *Stoicks* call their *Sovereign Good* [to live in Conformity with the Dictates of Nature] means, I ſuppoſe, no more than this, That we ſhould always live agreeably to the Rules of Virtue; and ſhould uſe other things, which are ſuited and adapted to our natural Inclinations, no further than Virtue permits and allows them. Now this being ſo, there are ſeveral of opinion, That this general Head, wherein Profit and Honeſty are compared with one another, was improperly brought in; and that there ought not to have been given any Rules or Directions upon this Subject. Now your *Perfect Honeſty*, which is truly and properly called by that Name, is only to be found in your *perfectly Wiſe* Men, and can never be poſſibly ſeparated from Virtue: But thoſe Men, who have not this Perfect Wiſdom, muſt by no means pretend to ſuch a Perfect Honeſty, though they may have ſome Shadows and Reſemblances of it. For all *thoſe Duties*, of which we are treating in theſe Books, have the name of *Middle ones* given them by the *Stoicks*, which are common indifferently to all Men in general, and are not con-

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fined to any particular number of them. But ſeveral get them, either by the peculiar Happineſs of their Natures, or by a conſtant progreſs in Study and Learning. Whereas *thoſe others*, which they call *Right ones*, are perfect and conſummate, or (as they themſelves expreſs it) *have all their Numbers*, which none can attain to, but the *perfectly Wiſe*. It is true that the Vulgar, as ſoon as they ſee any Action of ſuch a Nature, as indeed is no more than a *Middle* kind of Duty, are immediately thinking it a *Perfect* and *Compleat* one: For the common ſort of People cannot tell what is Perfect, and by conſequence do not know how much any Virtue or Excellency comes ſhort of it: but finding it anſwer the higheſt of their Conceptions, they imagine it wants nothing of being as perfect as can be. Juſt as it happens in judging of Poems or Pieces of Painting, and other ſuch like; thoſe who are not Judges, are generally pleaſed with and praiſe thoſe things, which by no means deſerve any Praiſe or Commendation: Becauſe, I ſuppoſe, there may be ſomething that is Good in them, which ſerves well enough to take with thoſe that are ignorant, and who have not ſo much skill as to be able to diſcover their ſeveral Imperfections: And therefore, when they are inſtructed by thoſe who underſtand it better, they are brought without difficulty to forſake their Opinions.

Chap. IV.

The greateſt Men that have been in the World, were not perfectly Wiſe. Profit ought not to be compared with the Middle, any more than with the Perfect Honeſty. How Men come to compare them together, or to doubt upon this Subject. This illuſtrated by an Example. One certain Rule neceſſary for our Guidance in this caſe. The Doctrine of the Stoicks *preferable to that of the* Peripateticks.

THoſe Duties therefore, which make up the Subject of this Enquiry, by the *Stoicks* are counted a kind of *ſecond-rate Honeſty*, which is not confined to their Wiſe Men only, but is common and open to all Mankind: and therefore all thoſe, who have any kind of Senſe or Inclination for Virtue, are very ſenſibly touched and affected with *it*. For you are not to imagine, when we call the two Decii's or Scipio's *Magnanimous*, and give Fabricius and Aristides the Appellation of *Juſt*, that we ſet them for Patterns of ſuch Juſtice and Magnanimity, as we ſuppoſe to be in thoſe who are perfectly Wiſe. For they were none of them *Wiſe* in that exalted Senſe, which we would here be underſtood to mean by *that Word*. Nay thoſe who were counted and ſirnamed the *Wiſe*, ſuch as Cato, for Inſtance, and Lælius, and particularly the famous Seven; yet in Truth and Reality were not ſuch: but by frequently practiſing that *middle* ſort of Duties, had gotten a ſort of Shew and Reſemblance of *true Wiſdom*. As no Profit therefore ought ever to be put in oppoſition to that, which is *truly and perfectly* Virtuous and Honeſt;

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ſo neither ſhould any Intereſt, or Convenience of Life, be ſet up againſt that, which is *ordinarily* called ſo, and which is followed by thoſe, who deſire to be counted Men of Honeſty and Integrity: And *we* ſhould be as careful to live up to that Honeſty, *whereof we are capable*; as the *perfectly Wiſe* are of keeping cloſe to that, which is truly ſuch, and may in ſtrictneſs of Speech be called by that Name. For whatever Attainments we have made in Virtue, they will never ſtand us in any mighty ſtead, if we be not thus careful of holding conſtantly to our Duty——. What has hitherto been ſaid can be applied to thoſe only, who make Goodneſs conſiſt in living according to their Duty: But thoſe Men, who meaſure the Goodneſs of things by ſome *Profit* or *Advantage*, which they bring along with them, and who let *theſe* prevail with them above Virtue and Honeſty; frequently in deliberating, uſe to put that, which they take to be Profitable, into the Balance againſt Juſtice and Honeſty; but good and wiſe Men never offer to do it. I am therefore of opinion, when PANÆTIUS tells us, *That Men uſe to deliberate, in conſidering which of theſe two they ſhould chuſe*; that he meant no more than what his Words ſtrictly ſignifie, *viz.* That they *uſe* to do this, and not that really they *ought* to do it. For it is infinitely ſcandalous, not only to prefer a pretended Advantage before Duty and Conſcience; but ſo much as to bring them to the Conteſt and Competition, and to *doubt* whether the one of them ſhould be choſen before the other. If this be ſo, you will be ready to ask me, *How then comes there to be any Doubt at all? And what is it that requires Conſideration upon this Subject?* I ſuppoſe it is this, That it ſometimes happens Men are not ſo very certain, *Whether the*

Action

Action deliberated upon be Honeſt, or not Honeſt: For that which is uſually counted a piece of Villany, is frequently changed by the Times or Circumſtances, and is found to be the contrary. To lay down one Inſtance, which may ſerve to give ſome Light to a great many others: Pray what greater Wickedneſs can there be upon Earth (if we ſpeak in general) than for any one to Murder, not only a Man, but a familiar Friend? And ſhall we therefore affirm that he is chargeable with a Crime, who has murdered *a Tyrant*, though he were his Familiar? The People of *Rome* I am ſure will not ſay ſo, by whom this is counted among the greateſt and moſt glorious Actions in the World. You will ſay then, *Does not Intereſt here carry it againſt Honeſty?* No, but rather Honeſty voluntarily follows Intereſt. If therefore we would, upon all Emergencies, be ſure to determine our ſelves aright, when that which we call our Advantage or Intereſt, ſeems to be repugnant to that which is Honeſt; we muſt lay down ſome general Rule or Meaſure, which if we will make uſe of in judging about things, we ſhall never be miſtaken as to point of Duty. Now this *Meaſure* I would have to be conformable to the Doctrine and Principles of the *Stoicks*, which I principally follow throughout this Work. For though I confeſs that the ancient *Academicks*, and your *Peripateticks*, which were formerly the ſame, make Honeſty far preferable to that which ſeems one's Intereſt: yet thoſe who aſſert, *That whatever is Honeſt muſt be alſo Profitable*, and *Nothing is Profitable but what is Honeſt*, talk much more bravely and heroically upon this Subject, than thoſe who allow, *That there are ſome things Honeſt, which are not Profitable*; and *ſome things Profitable, which are*

not

not Honeſt. And we have very great Liberty given us by our *Academy*, ſo as never to be tied up to ſuch and ſuch Tenets, but are left free to defend what we think moſt probable.

CHAP. V.

The Rule or Meaſure mentioned in the former Chapter. The ill Effects of Mens Injuring others for their own Advantage. Every one allowed to take Care of himſelf in the firſt place; but not ſo as to Injure any other, though to ſave his own Life. Two Errors, that occaſion Mens Acting contrarywiſe, and the Abſurdity of them.

BUT to return to our General Rule or Meaſure: There is nothing upon Earth then ſo contrary to Nature, neither Death, nor Poverty, nor Pain, nor whatever other Evil can befal a Man either in his Body or Fortune, as to take away any thing wrongfully from another, and do one's ſelf a Kindneſs by injuring one's Neighbour. For, in the firſt place, it ruins all manner of Society and Entercourſe amongſt Men; ſince it is plain, that if once Men arrive at ſuch a paſs, as to Plunder and Injure the reſt of their Neighbours, out of hopes to procure ſome Advantage to themſelves, there muſt follow of courſe a Diſſolution of that Society, which of all things in the World is moſt agreeable to Nature. Should we ſuppoſe, for Example, that the bodily Members had, every one of them, gotten an Opinion, that to draw to its ſelf all the Vigour of its Neighbours, would very much ſerve to encreaſe its own; it is certain the whole Body muſt decay

decay and periſh: And juſt ſo, ſhould every one amongſt us deprive other People of their Profits and Advantages, and take away all he could get from them, with deſign of applying it only to his own Uſe; the general Society and Fellowſhip of Mankind muſt of neceſſity be broken. For though it is no more than what Nature will allow of, That each Man ſhould look after himſelf in the firſt place, and furniſh himſelf with the Neceſſaries of Life, before he takes care to provide for other People; yet the ſame Nature will by no means permit, that any one ſhould riſe by his thruſting down another, and encreaſe his own Fortune by the Spoils of his Neighbours. And not only Nature, that is the univerſal Law or Conſent of Nations, but particular Laws, by which ſeveral Countries and Commonwealths are governed, have commanded likewiſe, *That no one be ſuffered to do an Injury to another, for the ſake of procuring any Advantage to himſelf.* For the very Deſign and End of Laws, is to keep up Agreement and Union amongſt Citizens; which whoever deſtroys, is by them puniſhed, not with the loſs of his Goods alone, but with Priſons, Baniſhment, or even Death it ſelf. But Nature and Right Reaſon, as being at once both an Human and Divine Law too, command this Duty with much greater Authority; and whoever obeys them (as all Men muſt, who propoſe to live according to the Rules of Nature) will never be guilty of coveting what is anothers, or applying to his own Uſe what had firſt been injuriouſly taken from his Neighbour. For certainly Greatneſs and Elevation of Soul; as alſo the Virtues of Courteſie, Juſtice and Liberality, are much more agreeable to Nature and Right Reaſon, than Pleaſure, than Riches, than even Life it ſelf; to

deſpiſe

deſpiſe all which, and regard them as juſt nothing, when they come to be compared with the Publick Intereſt, is the Duty of a brave and exalted Spirit: whereas to rob another for one's own Advantage, is (as has been ſhewn) more contrary to Nature, than Death, than Pain, or any other Evil whatever of that kind. Again, Thoſe Men live much more according to Nature, who ſuffer perpetual Troubles and Labours, for the Good and Preſervation, were it poſſible, of all Men; (like HERCULES of old, whom Men, as a grateful Requital for his Benefits, report to be placed among the number of the Gods) than thoſe who conſume all their Lives in Retirement, where they are not only free from Diſturbances and Vexations, but are furniſhed with all the Pleaſures and Conveniencies of Life; and have moreover the advantages of Strength and Comlineſs ſuperadded to them. And accordingly we find it to be ſo in effect, that all the moſt great and extraordinary Geniuſes, have preferred all the Troubles and Difficulties of the *former*, before the Quiet and Eaſe of this *latter* way of Living. From all which laid together it unanſwerably follows, That whoever lives agreeably to the Dictates of Nature, can never be guilty of Injuring another. In fine, He that Injures another to do himſelf a Kindneſs, either thinks he does nothing that is contrary to Nature; or that the *doing an Injury* is a leſs degree of Evil, than Death, or Poverty, or Pain, or loſs of Children, Friends, or Relations. If he thinks that in Wronging and Abuſing of others, he doth not do any thing that is contrary to Nature; it is in vain to diſpute any longer with ſuch a one, who takes away from Man the diſtinguiſhing Part, and very Characteriſtick (as it were) of his Nature: But if

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he allows that it is indeed an Evil, only thinks that ſome others, ſuch as Poverty, Pain, or Death, may be worſe; he is groſly miſtaken in being of Opinion, That the Ills which touch nothing but the Body or Fortune, can be greater than thoſe which affect the Soul.

CHAP. VI.

The Intereſt of Particulars inſeparable from that of the whole Community. The Rule of not Wronging another for our own Advantage, extends not only to Relations, or Fellow-Citizens, but to all Mankind. The breaking of it, ruins all Juſtice, Liberality, &c. Several Caſes about it, put and reſolved. Tyrants no Members of Human Society.

WE ſhould all of us therefore propoſe the ſame End, and every one think his own Intereſt in particular, to be the ſame with that of the Community in general: which if each one endeavour to draw ſolely to himſelf, all Union and Agreement amongſt Men will be diſſolved. And if *Nature* enjoyn us, That *every* Man ſhould deſire and procure the Advantage of another, whoever he be, though for no other reaſon than becauſe he is a Man; it neceſſarily follows, That *all* Men are joined, by the ſelf ſame Nature, in one common Intereſt: which if it be true, then all Men are ſubject to, and live equally under the *ſame* Law of Nature: and if this be true too, then certainly they are forbid by that *ſame* Law of Nature, any Ways to Injure or Wrong one another:

nother: But the firſt of theſe is undoubtedly certain, therefore the laſt muſt needs be ſo likewiſe. For as to what is uſually ſaid by ſome Men, That they would not take any thing away from a Father, or Brother, for their own Advantage; but there is not the ſame reaſon for their *ordinary* Citizens; it is fooliſh and abſurd: For they thruſt themſelves out from partaking of any Privileges, and from joining in common with the reſt of their Citizens, for the Publick Good: An Opinion that ſtrikes at the very Root and Foundation of all Civil Societies. Others there are, who are ready to confeſs, That they ought to bear ſuch a Regard to Fellow-Citizens; but by no means allow of it in relation to Strangers: Now theſe Men deſtroy that univerſal Society of all Mankind; which if once taken away, *Kindneſs*, *Liberality*, *Juſtice* and *Humanity* muſt utterly periſh; which excellent Virtues whoever makes void, is chargeable with Impiety towards the immortal Gods: For he breaks that Society, which they have eſtabliſhed and ſettled amongſt Men; the cloſeſt Cement or Bond of which, is the being of Opinion, That for Men to Injure and Wrong one another for their private Intereſts, is an Evil that Nature *is* much more averſe from, than all thoſe which happen either to the *Body* or *Fortune*; nay, and I might add to the *Mind* alſo, provided only they be not contrary to Juſtice; for that one Virtue is as it were, a kind Miſtreſs and Queen of all the reſt. But what? (perhaps ſome Men will be apt to ſay) if a Wiſe Man be ready to periſh for Hunger, muſt not he take away Victuals from another; though a perfectly uſeleſs and inſignificant Fellow? Not at all, for Life it ſelf is not ſo dear to me, as a ſettled Reſolution of doing no Wrong for my private

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Advantage. But ſuppoſe this good Man, almoſt dead with Cold, ſhould have it in his power to take PHALARIS's Cloaths away, one of the moſt ſavage and inhuman of Tyrants; would not you have him to do it? There is no great difficulty in determining ſuch Caſes: For it is certain if you take away any thing from another, though never ſo uſeleſs and inſignificant a Creature, *for no other End but to Benefit your ſelf by it*; it is an inhuman Action, and plainly contrary to the Laws of Nature: But if you are one, who by Living will do very great Service to the Republick, or perhaps to the Society of Mankind in general, and *for that only reaſon take ſomething from another*; it is an Action that is not to be found much fault with. But in all other Caſes, every Man is bound to bear his own Misfortunes, rather than to get quit of them by Wronging his Neighbour. You will ſay then, Is it not more contrary to Nature, *To Covet or Seize what belongs to another, than to be in Sickneſs, or Want, or any ſuch Evil? Yes; but withal it is as contrary to Nature, to abandon all Care of the publick Intereſt*; for it is a piece of Injuſtice: From whence it follows, That an *honeſt, prudent*, and *valiant* Perſon, whoſe Death would bring a great Diſadvantage to the Publick, may take from an idle and uſeleſs Citizen, ſuch things as are *neceſſary* for the Maintenance of Life, without any Offence againſt the Laws of Nature; which aim at the Preſervation and Intereſt of the Publick; *provided that* he do not make the Love of himſelf, and Conceit of his own more than ordinary Merits, an occaſion of Injuring and Oppreſſing others. For he will perform but the Duties which Juſtice requires of him, by thus taking care to be ſerviceable to the Publick, and upholding

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that (which I am often forced to mention) univerſal Society between all Mankind. As for the Queſtion propoſed about PHALARIS, it is eaſily anſwered: For Tyrants are not Members of Human Society, but rather its greateſt and moſt peſtilent Enemies; nor is it unnatural, if it lie in one's power, to *Rob* that Man, whom it is even a Virtue and a Glory to Murder. And it were heartily to be wiſhed, That this whole deſtructive and impious Race, were utterly baniſhed and excluded from amongſt Men. Juſt as we cut off thoſe Members of the Body, which have got no longer either Blood or Spirits in them, and ſerve but to infect and corrupt the reſt; ſo ſhould thoſe Monſters, which under the Shape and Outſide of Men, conceal all the Savageneſs and Cruelty of Beaſts, be cut off, as it were, and ſeparated from the Body and Society of Mankind. Of much the ſame Nature are all thoſe Queſtions, in which the Knowledge and Underſtanding of our Duty, depends upon the Knowledge of Times and Circumſtances.

CHAP. VII.

CICERO *will finiſh what* PANÆTIUS *left imperfect. All his Deciſions taken from this Principle,* That Honeſty alone, *or at leaſt* chiefly, is deſireable for its own ſake. *The true Meaning of* PANÆTIUS, *in making Profit and Honeſty be compared with one another.*

I Believe then PANÆTIUS would have diſcourſed upon ſuch things as theſe, but that ſome Accident, or perhaps other Buſineſs, put a ſtop to his De-

Deſigns. However there are Precepts enough laid down in his former Books, to reſolve all Scruples and Doubts concerning them; from which we may learn, *What that is which is Wicked, and therefore to be avoided*; and what *that*, which therefore is not to be avoided, becauſe not at ſuch Times, and in ſuch Caſes wicked. But ſince I am going (as it were) to *crown* a Work, which was left imperfect by the Author of it, though wanting but little of being brought to Perfection; I ſhall follow the Method of the *Geometricians*: And as they do not uſe to demonſtrate every thing, but demand to have ſome things allowed them beforehand, by the help of which they more eaſily explain and demonſtrate their Deſigns, ſo I demand of you, Son MARK, if you can, to grant me this following *Poſtulatum, That nothing is deſirable for it ſelf alone, but that which is Honeſt*: Or however, if CRATIPPUS will not permit you to do that; yet at leaſt, I am ſure, you muſt grant me this which follows, *That Honeſty is deſirable for its own ſake, above all things in the World*: Either of the two is ſufficient for my Purpoſe, and the one is *probable* as well as the other, and nothing elſe beſide them is ſo upon this Subject. And here in the firſt place we muſt do Right to PANÆTIUS: who does *not* ſay, (as indeed he ought not) That *that*, which *is* Profitable, could ever be contrary to that, which is Honeſt; but only *that*, which has the *appearance* of ſuch. And he often avows, That nothing is Profitable, but that which is Honeſt; and, That whatever is Honeſt is at the ſame time Profitable: and declares their Opinion, who firſt made a difference between thoſe two, to be the greateſt Evil that ever yet ſpread it ſelf abroad amongſt Men. Therefore when he ſpeaks of a

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Contrariety between them, he means an *appearing*, and not a *real* one; which he therefore laid down for one of the Heads of his Diſcourſe: not as though it were lawful for Men ever to give *Profit* the Preference before *Honeſty*; but only that they might be able to determin themſelves aright, if theſe two at any time ſhould ſeem to interfere and be inconſiſtent with one another. This Part therefore, which he has omitted, I ſhall now ſupply; not with any borrowed Aſſiſtance from others, but purely (as we ſay) by my own Strength. For I never had any thing come to my Hands upon this Subject, that I could any ways approve of, ſince the time of PANÆTIUS.

CHAP. VIII.

What we ought to do, when any thing preſents it ſelf under the appearance of Profit. Proof that whatever is Profitable muſt alſo be Honeſt, and whatever is Honeſt muſt alſo be Profitable. The contrary Opinion the great Source of all Wickedneſs. Infamy a certain Puniſhment of Villany. It is a Wickedneſs even to deliberate whether Profit ſhould be preferred before Honeſty, or not. Nothing is to be done out of hopes of being concealed.

WHenever therefore any thing comes in our View, which carries the appearance of *Profit* along with it, we cannot but immediately be ſomewhat affected with it: But if, upon taking a nearer View, we find there is any thing Baſe and Diſhoneſt, in that which appeared to be Profitable

fitable at first, it is our Duty to reject it: Which is not to deprive us of what is *really* Profitable, but only to let us understand, That nothing Dishoneſt can possibly be such. Now if nothing be so *contrary* to Nature as Baseneſs, and nothing so *agreeable* to Nature as true Profit, (which is certainly so; for she always desires what is Right, and Becoming, and Consistent with it self, and abhors the contrary) then it necessarily follows, *That whatever is Profitable can never have any Baseneſs, or Dishoneſty annexed to it.* Again, If we were born for Virtue or Honesty, and this be the *only* desirable Good; (as ZENO would have it, or at least *so much more* so, than every thing else, as to outweigh all that can be put in the Scale against it; (which was ARISTOTLE's Opinion) it must certainly follow, *That Honeſty is the only*, or however *the greateſt Good:* Now whatever is Good must certainly be Profitable; from whence it follows, *That whatever is Honeſt muſt alſo certainly be Profitable.* It is a villanous Error of some naughty Men therefore, when any thing strikes them with *an appearance* of Profit, to seize it immediately and enjoy it as such, without ever considering its Relation to Honesty. Hence come Assassinations, Poysonings, and making of false Wills: Hence Stealing, Embezling the Publick Monies, Plundring and Oppressing both Citizens and Confederates: Hence the unsufferable Power and Insolence, which some Men exercise, who are grown too great for the rest of their Citizens: In fine, Hence Ambition, and the Desire of Rule, have produced their most cursed and deplorable Effects, even in free Commonwealths; than which nothing can be thought of more odious and detestable. For Men look upon the fancied *Advantages* of things through a false Per-

Perſpective; but as for the *Puniſhment* appendant to them, (I do not mean of the Laws, which they frequently break through; but of Baſeneſs and Diſhoneſty, which is much the more grievous) *that*, I ſay, they never ſo much as think upon at all. Such People therefore are impious and abominable, and deſerve to be excluded from all Society, who deliberate with themſelves, and make it Matter of Doubt, Whether they ſhould chooſe what they ſee to be Honeſt, or wilfully commit what they know to be a Villany. For the very making a Queſtion of ſuch a thing is Criminal, though one ſhould not proceed ſo far as to Execution. Thoſe things therefore ought not to be deliberated at all upon, where the very Deliberation is Scandalous and Diſhoneſt. And whenever we do deliberate upon any kind of Subject, we ſhould never do any thing out of Hope, and Expectation, that our Actions will be concealed: For we ought to take this as a conſtant Maxim, if we pretend to have made any progreſs in Philoſophy, *That though we could hide from the Eyes of all Men, and even of the Gods themſelves, whatever we go about; yet we ſhould be careful to abſtain from the Vices of Covetouſneſs and Injuſtice, of Laſciviouſneſs and Incontinency.*

Chap. IX.

He illuſtrates his Rule laid down in the former Chapter with the Story of Gyges, *taken out of* Plato. *He ſhews himſelf a Villain, who acknowledges he would do wickedly, if he could with Secrecy.*

TO this purpoſe Plato brings in that remarkable Story of Gyges. A Gaping in the Earth being made by reaſon of ſome violent Showers, as the Story tells us, Gyges went down into the hollow of it, and found there lying a brazen Horſe, with a Door in his Side. This he opened, and looking in, diſcovered a dead Man's Body, of an unuſual Bulk, with a Ring of Gold upon one of its Fingers. This he pulls off, and puts upon his own Finger; and then coming up, goes and joyns himſelf to the reſt of the Shepherds; (for he was Shepherd to the King at that time.) Here he obſerved, That upon turning the Stone toward the Palm of his Hand, he became inviſible to every body elſe, though others did not become ſo to him; and that upon turning it to its proper place, he immediately became viſible again, as before. Making uſe therefore of this lucky Opportunity, he found out a way to enjoy the Queen, and by her Aſſiſtance to Murder the King, his Lord and Maſter, and to make away thoſe, who might prove any hindrance or ſtop to his Deſigns; nor could any one poſſibly ſee or diſcover him in any of theſe Villanies; ſo that he quickly, by the help of this Ring, from a ſimple Shepherd became King of *Lydia*. Now had a truly Wiſe Man had the keeping of this Ring, he would not have thought himſelf

himſelf ever the more priviledged to be guilty of any Action that is wicked or deteſtable: For good Men deſire to be virtuous and honeſt, and not to be ſecret, that ſo they may ſin without Danger. And here ſome Philoſophers, Men of more Honeſty than Acuteneſs or Subtilty, cry out, *That this Story of* PLATO's *is a meer Fiction:* As though he had ſaid either that it *really* was, or indeed *could be* done. No; the Meaning and Deſign of this Example of *Gyges* and the Ring, is this: Suppoſe you could do any diſhoneſt Action, for the gratifying a luſtful, covetous, or ambitious Deſire, ſo as that no one living could either know or ſuſpect it, but both Gods and Men muſt be kept perfectly in Ignorance; whether, in ſuch Caſe, would you do it or no? *Ay, but,* ſay they, *this is an impoſſible Caſe:* Though it is not ſo impoſſible neither: But that which I ask them is, *What they would do, ſuppoſing that poſſible, which they deny now to be ſo?* The Manner of their Arguing is ſomewhat odd and illiterate; for they ſtill deny the Poſſibility of it, and that they will ſtand to; not, it ſeems, underſtanding what the Force and true Import of this Suppoſition is. For when we put the Queſtion to them, Whether they would do ſuch an Action or not, *ſuppoſing they could conceal it:* We do not ask them, Whether they *can conceal it or not?* But put them, as it were, to the Rack or Inquiſition; that ſo, if they ſay *they would* gratify ſuch Deſires upon Aſſurance of Impunity, we may know them to be Villains by their own Confeſſion: But if they deny it, they may be forced to grant, that every baſe and diſhoneſt Action is, barely as ſuch, to be ſhunned and deteſted. But to return to our Purpoſe from which we have digreſſed.

Chap. X.

Several Caſes, wherein Men doubt whether that which appears to be profitable be not honeſt. The Caſe of Brutus *baniſhing* Collatinus; *of* Romulus *murdering his Brother* Remus. *Men may do what is for their own Advantage, provided they do no Injury to another. An excellent Saying of* Chryſippus *to that Purpoſe. How far a Man may honeſtly, and ought to go, upon a Friend's Account: Illuſtrated by the Example of* Damon *and* Pinthias, *two loving Friends.*

THERE frequently happen a great many Caſes, which diſturb Mens Minds, and put them into Suſpence, by the Shew of ſome Profit which they ſeem to contain in them. *Not* when Men deliberate, Whether they ſhould leave and abandon their Honeſty for the ſake of any Profit, be it never ſo great; (for that is a Piece of Wickedneſs, as was before obſerved) *but*, Whether that Action which appears to be profitable, may not ſafely be done without tranſgreſſing againſt Honeſty. It might not ſeem honeſt in Brutus, for Example, to depoſe Collatinus his Brother-Conſul from his Office, whoſe Wiſdom and Conduct he himſelf had made uſe of in expelling the Kings. But ſince the chief Men in the Government had ſo ordered, That the Kindred of Superbus, and very Name of the Tarquins, ſhould be baniſhed the City, and no Marks or Footſteps be ſuffered to remain of Monarchical Government; it was not only profitable thus to conſult for the Safety of his Country, but ſo honeſt too, as that Collatinus himſelf ought joyfully to have acquieſced in it. That which was profitable therefore

fore prevailed, becauſe it was honeſt withal; which had it not been, it could never have been profitable. I cannot ſay the ſame in relation to that King, by whom this City was firſt founded: For a bare Shew of Profit got the better over him, when he imbrewed his Hands in the Blood of his own Brother, becauſe it ſeemed more profitable to reign by himſelf, than in Conjunction with another: He broke all the Ties both of brotherly Affection and common Humanity, for the obtaining of an End, which appeared to be profitable, and yet really was not ſo. He pretended however, for a Shew of Honeſty, that it was done to revenge an Affront of his Brother's, who leapt with Contempt over his new-raiſed Wall; a frivolous Excuſe, and, if true, not ſufficient to ſerve his Turn: By his Favour therefore, whether QUIRINUS or ROMULUS, I cannot but think he did a very ill Action. Not that Men are bound to be careleſs of their own Intereſts, or to part with that to others which themſelves ſtand in need of; but every one may do what he thinks for his own Advantage, provided it be no Injury or Prejudice to another Perſon. CHRYSIPPUS, amongſt a great many very good Sayings, has this one in particular: "He that is "running a Race ought to ſtrive and endeavour, "*ſays he*, as much as he is able to get before his "Antagoniſt; but muſt not trip his Heels up, or "thruſt him aſide with his Hands: So in Life it "is *allowable*, that every one ſhould get what "is uſeful and convenient for his comfortable "Subſiſtence, but it is not *ſo* to take it away from "other People." But it is no where more difficult to keep to one's Duty, than in the Affair of Friendſhip: For as not to do every thing that one handſomely can for the ſake of a Friend; ſo to do

any thing that is baſe or diſhoneſt, are both of them equally contrary to one's Duty. But there is one very ſhort and yet eaſy Rule, which may ſerve to direct us in all Caſes of this Nature; and it is this, Never to prefer that which *only ſeems* profitable, ſuch as Honours, Riches, Pleaſure, and the like, before a Kindneſs to a Friend: but never to do any thing for the ſake of a Friend that is an Injury to the Publick, or a Breach of one's Oath, or other ſolemn Engagement: For whoever does this, it is impoſſible he ſhould ever be *a good Man.* Should ſuch a one therefore be Judge in his Friend's Caſe, he would not by any means be biaſſed in his Favour, but would wholly lay aſide the Perſon of a Friend, as ſoon as he took upon him that of a Judge. Perhaps he might do ſo much for Friendſhip ſake, as to wiſh that his Friend may have the juſter Cauſe; and allow him as long time to ſpeak for himſelf as the Laws will permit of: But when he is to give in his Sentence upon Oath, he will then remember that he calls God to Witneſs, that is (I conceive) his own Soul and Conſcience, the divineſt Thing that God has granted to Man. It is a good Cuſtom therefore we have received from our Anceſtors, if we did but obſerve it, of *deſiring the Judge to be as favourable to us, as his Oath will permit him.* The Meaning of which Requeſt is no more than this, That he would do ſo much for us, as I juſt now ſaid might very honeſtly be done by a Judge for his Friend. For if Men were obliged to do every thing preſently that their Friends ſhould deſire of them; ſuch Agreements as theſe ought to be counted not Friendſhips, but dangerous Conſpiracies. I ſpeak here only of the ordinary ſort of Friendſhips; for in thoſe which are found between perfectly wiſe Men, there can be no

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Danger of any ſuch thing. DAMON and PINTHIAS, two of PYTHAGORAS's Followers, were ſo cloſely united to one another in their Affections, that when DIONYSIUS the *Sicilian* Tyrant had appointed a Time wherein one of them ſhould die, and the Party condemned had begged a few Days Reſpite, wherein he might provide for his Children and Family, and recommend them to ſome body who would take care of them after his Death; the other delivered up himſelf in his ſtead, voluntarily to die in the Room of his Friend, if he did not accordingly make his Appearance. The Priſoner came back at the Day appointed, in order to his Execution; which the Tyrant perceiving, was ſo greatly amazed at their extraordinary Faithfulneſs, as to deſire he might be admitted a third Man in their Friendſhip. In Friendſhip therefore, when that which ſeems *profitable* comes into Competition with that which is *honeſt*, the latter ſhould always be preferred before the former: But Faith and Religion ſhould be preferred before Friendſhip, whenever it demands any thing that is not reconcileable with Virtue and Honeſty. Which one Rule, if but carefully attended to, is ſufficient for the Purpoſe we are now upon; which is to diſcover, upon every Occaſion, what are thoſe Duties which Friendſhip requires of us.

Chap. XI.

In the Management of the publick Affairs, the Appearance of Profit makes Men relinquish Honesty. Several Examples of it. Examples of the contrary, when the Appearance of Profit is rejected for the sake of Honesty.

THE Appearance of Profit is also an Occasion, in publick Affairs, of making false Steps, and doing several Things that are contrary to Duty. Thus our Fathers, for Instance, did ill in destroying and razing of *Corinth*. The *Athenians* yet worse in making an Order, That the People of *Ægina* should all have their Thumbs cut off, because they were powerful at Sea. This, no question, was thought a profitable Decree; for *Ægina* seem'd to threaten their Port *Piræum*, by reason of its Nearness: But nothing can truly be profitable that is cruel; for the Nature of Man, which we ought to follow as the Guide of our Actions, of all things in the World is most opposite to Cruelty. Those do ill likewise, who banish all Strangers, and forbid them the City; as Pennus did in the preceeding Age, and Papius but lately. For though it is but fair, that he who is no Citizen should not have the Privileges of those who are; (which was made into a Law by two very wise Consuls, *viz.* Crassus and Scævola) yet wholly to exclude them from having any thing to do there, is plainly against the Dictates and Laws of Humanity. And as these things are bad in the Government of a State, so nothing is more splendid and glorious on the other hand, than for that, which appears to be the Interest of the Publick, to be

be rejected in the Compariſon with Juſtice and Honeſty. Our own Commonwealth can abundantly ſupply us with Examples of this Nature, as on other Occaſions, ſo more eſpecially in the ſecond *Punick* War; when, after the Loſs of that fatal Day at *Cannæ*, it ſhewed more Courage and Bravery of Reſolution, than ever it had done upon the greateſt Succeſſes. There was not any Sign of Faint-heartedneſs ſeen, nor ever any Mention of Peace once heard of: So great is the Glory and Brightneſs of Honeſty, as that it utterly overwhelms the Appearance of Intereſt. The *Athenians* knowing they ſhould never be able to reſiſt the *Perſians*, reſolved by Conſent to abandon their City, and carrying their Wives and their Children to *Troezene*, to defend by Sea the Liberties of *Greece*: And when one CYRSILUS tried to perſwade them not to leave their City, but receive XERXES into it, they took him and ſtoned him. Not but that the Man would have drawn them to a Thing which was *ſeemingly* profitable: But that ſeeming Profit was *really* none at all, being contrary to Honeſty. THEMISTOCLES, after that notable Victory in the *Perſian* War, told all the People in a general Aſſembly, That he had thought upon a Thing *which* might prove of great Uſe and Advantage to the Publick, but *which* it was not convenient that every body ſhould know of: Whereupon he deſired they would appoint him ſome Perſon to whom he might ſafely communicate it in ſecret. ARISTIDES was immediately appointed accordingly: THEMISTOCLES told him, *It would be no hard Matter to fire in private the* Spartan *Fleet, which was laid up at* Gytheum; *whereby the whole Power of that Republick muſt neceſſarily be ruined.* ARISTIDES, as ſoon as he knew the Buſineſs, went back into

the Assembly, (which was big with Expectation of what he had to say) and let them all know, *That* THEMISTOCLES's *Counsel indeed was advantagious, but by no means honest or creditable for the City.* The *Athenians* therefore, thinking what was dishonest not to be truly profitable, rejected immediately the whole Proposal, without having heard so much as what it was, upon nothing else but this Report of ARISTIDES. How much better and more honestly did they do than we, who can suffer even Pirates to live free from Molestation, and yet demand Tribute of our Confederates and Allies?

CHAP. XII.

The Opinion, that a Thing may be profitable, though it is not honest, very pernicious. A Case put, wherein it is doubted, Whether that which seems to be Profitable, be Honest or no? *The Arguments on either Side, of two Philosophers differing in their Opinions. The Difference between* to Conceal, *and* not to Tell. *The Society of Mankind, how far it obliges.*

LET us lay down this therefore as a standing Maxim, *That whatever is dishonest can never be profitable; no, not though we should arrive at the full Possession of all those Advantages which we proposed to obtain by it.* Nay, this very Perswasion, *That a Thing may be profitable, though it is base and dishonest,* is one of the greatest Misfortunes and Calamities that could ever have happened to the Life of Man. But there often fall

out (as was before obſerved) ſome peculiar Caſes, wherein that which is honeſt has *a ſeeming* Repugnance with that which is profitable; ſo that it requires ſome farther Conſideration to know whether this Repugnance be certain and real, or whether they may not be brought to a fair Agreement. To this Head belong ſuch Examples as theſe: Suppoſe we, for Inſtance, an honeſt Merchant, when Corn was ſcarce and extreamly dear at *Rhodes*, to bring a large Quantity thither from *Alexandria*; and withal to know, That a great many Ships, well laden with Corn, were in their Way thither from the ſame City: Should he tell this now to the People of *Rhodes*, or ſay nothing of it, but ſell his own Corn at the beſt Rates he could? We ſuppoſe him a virtuous and honeſt Man, and do not here diſcourſe of the Deliberation of one, that would hold his Peace if he thought it were diſhoneſt; but of one that doubts whether it be diſhoneſt or not. In ſuch ſort of Caſes DIOGENES the *Babylonian*, a Man of great Credit and Note among the *Stoicks*, is of one Opinion; and ANTIPATER his Scholar, an extraoadinary ſmart and ingenious Man, of juſt the contrary. ANTIPATER would have every thing be plainly told, that ſo the Buyer might be ignorant of nothing in what he buys, that the Seller himſelf knows of: DIOGENES thinks it enough in the Seller to tell the Faults of his Goods as far as the Laws require it; and, as for the reſt, though to uſe no Cozening, yet ſince he is come with Deſign to ſell them, to get as much Money for them as ever he can. *Here*, may the Merchant ſay, *I have brought my Corn; I have expoſed it to Sale; and ſell it no dearer than other People do*; (nay perhaps he will ſay *cheaper*, there being now a greater Quantity than there was before) *and pray where is now the*

Wrong I have done to any Body? ANTIPATER argues upon a different Principle: *What ſay you,* (quoth he) *are not you obliged to do Good to Mankind; and be ſerviceable to the Society of all Men in general? Were not you born under ſuch an Obligation? And had not you ſuch Principles ingrafted into you by Nature, which it is always your Duty to follow and obey, that your ſingle Intereſt ſhould be the ſame with that of all Men; and again that of all Men ſhould be the ſame with yours? And will you, this notwithſtanding, conceal from the People what Plenty there is a-coming, the Knowledge of which might of be of ſo great Uſe and Advantage to them?* DIOGENES perhaps will reply upon him thus: *It is one thing to* conceal, *and another* not to tell; *nor can I be ſaid to* conceal *from you now, though I do not tell you, what the Nature and Eſſence of the Gods is, and what the Happineſs or chief Good of Men; Things which it would do one much more Kindneſs to know, than that Quantities of Corn are like to be here ſhortly. But if any thing be profitable for you to hear, it is none of my Duty to come and tell it you immediately. Nay, but you will find that it is your Duty,* (may the other reply) *if you will pleaſe but to remember, That there is ſuch a kind of Thing as a mutual Relation and Society amongſt all Men. Well, I do remember it;* (may the other reply again) *but, I pray you, is that Society of ſuch a Nature, as that no Man who lives in it muſt have any thing that is his own? If this be ſo, then there is no more* ſelling, *but we muſt even* give every thing away that we have.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Another Caſe put, Whether he that ſells a bad Houſe, be obliged to tell the Purchaſer it is ſo? *The Arguments* pro *and* con *of* ANTIPATER *and* DIOGENES. CICERO's *Determination of it, as alſo of that in the foregoing Chapter. What it is properly to Conceal.*

YOU plainly perceive, that it is never once ſaid in all this Diſpute, *Though ſuch a thing is not Honeſt, yet I will do it becauſe it is Profitable:* but the one ſide defends the Expediency of it, *no farther than it is Honeſt*; and the other denies that it ought to be done, *becauſe it is not Honeſt.* Again, Suppoſe an honeſt Man were to ſell an Houſe, becauſe of ſome Defects which he himſelf knows of, though others do not: Suppoſe it to be unhealthful, for Example, but eſteemed quite the contrary; Serpents to annoy all the Chambers of it, but no body to know this; made of bad Materials, and ready to fall, but no one to diſcern this except the Owner only: I demand, if he ſells this for more than he expected, and do not tell the Buyer of theſe ſeveral Faults, whether he do not act like a Knave and a Villain? *Yes undoubtedly,* anſwers ANTIPATER: *For what is this better, than* not to ſet a Man right when he is out of his Way, (*which at* Athens *was puniſhed with publick Execrations*) *thus to ſuffer the Buyer, as it were, to fall headlong, and run through a Miſtake into very great Miſchiefs. Nay, it is ſomething worſe yet, than* not to ſhew a Man his Way; *for it is wilfully and deſignedly to draw him into Miſchief.* DIOGENES on the contrary vindicates the

the Seller: *Pray did he force you* (says he) *to buy his Houſe, when he did not ſo much as adviſe you to it? He ſet a thing to ſale, which he did not like; and here you have bought a thing, which you* did *like. For if thoſe Men, who make it be publiſhed to the World,* Here is a very good Houſe, and very well built, to be ſold; *are not counted Deceivers, though the Houſe be not* good, *nor at all* well built; *how much leſs ſhould thoſe be counted ſo, who do not commend their Houſe at all? For wherever the Buyer has the free uſe of his Judgment, what Fraud can there be upon the Seller's part? And if a Man is not bound to make good all he ſaid, would you have him make good what he did not ſay? Beſide, What, I beſeech you, could be more odd and fooliſh, than for the Seller to tell the Faults of his own Wares? Or what more ridiculous, than for the Cryer to proclaim by the Proprietor's Order,* An infectious, peſtilential Houſe to be ſold? And thus you ſee there are ſome doubtful Caſes, in which on the one hand Men argue for Honeſty, and on the other are Advocates for Profit; ſo far as to ſhew, that it is not only *Honeſt* to do that which is Profitable, but even *Diſhoneſt* to neglect and omit it: And this is that *ſeeming* Oppoſition we ſpoke of, which often falls out between Profit and Honeſty. But let us now proceed to determin theſe Caſes; for we did not propoſe them for meer Queſtion ſake, but that we might give them a fair Deciſion. I am then of Opinion, That the Corn-Merchant ought not to have concealed from the *Rhodians*, nor this Seller of his Houſe from the Purchaſers of it, the ſeveral things that are mentioned in their Caſes. It is true *not to tell* a thing, *is not* properly *to conceal* it; but not to tell that, which People are concerned

to

to know, meerly for the ſake of ſome Advantage to your ſelf, I think *is:* And there is no body but knows what *concealing* this is, and who they are that make a Cuſtom of it: I am ſure not your plain, ſincere, ingenuous, honeſt and good ſort of People; but rather your ſhifting, ſly, cunning, deceitful, roguiſh, crafty, foxiſh, jugling kind of Fellows. And muſt it not neceſſarily be Unprofitable for any Man to lye under this, and a much longer Catalogue, of ſuch black and moſt odious Names of Vices?

CHAP. XIV.

Of thoſe, who are ſo far from telling the Faults of their Wares, as that they invent Lies to make them appear the better. An Example of this kind. AQUILIUS's *Definition of Knavery*, or Dolus malus.

AND if thoſe Men are thus blameable, who keep the Faults of their things ſecret; what ſhall we think of thoſe, who add down-right Lying to it? C. CANIUS, a *Roman* Knight, one that loved to be pleaſant, and a pretty good Scholar, removing to *Siracuſe* for the ſake of *Retirement* and not of *Employment*, (as he was uſed to ſay) gave out he had a great mind to buy ſome Gardens, whither he might invite his Friends and Acquaintance, and enjoy their Converſation without being interrupted. This coming abroad, there was one PYTHIUS, a Goldſmith or Banker at *Siracuſe*, who told him, Indeed he had no Gardens to ſell, but ſuch as he had were at CANIUS's Service, if he pleaſed

pleaſed to make uſe of them, as much as though they were his own: And withal he deſired him to come next Day, and take a Dinner with him there. When CANIUS had promiſed him to come accordingly, what does he do but ſend immediately for ſome Fiſhermen, (having Intereſt enough, by reaſon of his Calling, with all ſorts of People) and deſires them the next Day to fiſh before his Gardens; giving them their Inſtructions about what he would have them do. CANIUS came at the time appointed, and PYTHIUS had provided a very ſplendid Entertainment for him: Juſt before the Garden, where he could not but take notice of it, was a company of Fiſher-boats; and every one of the Men in particular brought the Fiſh he had caught, and laid them down before PYTHIUS. *How now* PYTHIUS! (ſays CANIUS to him) *what! all theſe Fiſh here? All theſe Boats? O lack, Sir,* (ſays the other) *that is no great Wonder; all the Fiſh that ſupply the City muſt be taken here: this is their common Water; none of theſe People could ever live, if it were not for my Houſe.* CANIUS immediately was all on fire, and begged of PYTHIUS that he would ſell him the Place. He pretended abundance of Unwillingneſs at firſt; but at length (to make ſhort of it) was brought to a Compliance. CANIUS buys it, together with all that belonged to it; and being very Rich, and deſirous of the Purchaſe, gives as much for it as PYTHIUS demanded. Security is given and taken for the Money, and the whole Bargain finally brought to a Concluſion. The next Day CANIUS invites ſome Acquaintance thither, and he comes himſelf ſomewhat earlier than ordinary; but ſees not one of the Fiſhermens Boats there. Hereupon he enquires of one of the next Neighbours, whether or no that were any Holiday

liday with the Fiſhermen; becauſe he ſaw none of them thereabouts. Not that I know of, replies the other; but they none of them ever uſe to fiſh here, and therefore I wondered what the matter was Yeſterday. This put CANIUS into a lamentable Fret; but how could he help himſelf? For AQUILIUS, my Colleague and familiar Friend, had not then publiſhed his Court-forms about Knavery; upon which when he was asked what he meant by the word *Knavery*, he anſwered, *The making ſhew of one thing, while one is doing another*: a very perſpicuous and plain Definition, as indeed he was a Man very happy at Defining. PYTHIUS then, and all others whatever, that make ſhew of one thing, and yet do the contrary, are perfidious, wicked, and knaviſh Raſcals. It is impoſſible therefore that any of their Actions ſhould ever be Profitable, when they are under the ſcandal of ſuch a number of filthy and deteſtable Vices.

CHAP. XV.

All Hypocriſie and Diſſimulation to be taken away. Knavery, or Dolus malus, *puniſhed by the* Roman *Laws and Judgments of Equity. A remarkable Action of* SCÆVOLA's. *He is not a* Wiſe Man, *who is not* Wiſe *for his own Advantage; in what Senſe true. A truly Good Man is not content with being as Juſt as the Laws require. A Definition of ſuch a one. He is very hard to be found.*

IF then this Definition of AQUILIUS be good, all Hypocriſie and Diſſimulation muſt be baniſhed from

from amongſt Men; ſo that no honeſt Man will be guilty of either of them, for the ſake of buying or ſelling to his greater Advantage. Nay this *Knavery* or *Cozenage* has always been puniſhed by the Laws of the City: Witneſs the XII Tables about the Caſe of Guardianſhip; and LÆTORIUS's Law about the Over-reaching of *Minors*. Nay, where there was nothing of a Law againſt it, it was nevertheleſs puniſhable in thoſe Judgments of Equity, the Form of which was, *Ex fide bona agitur, That all things be done faithfully and honeſtly.* And the ſame ſort of words are in all other Judgments; as when a Wife, for Example, enters an Action for her Dowry, upon a Divorce from her Husband, *Melius Æquius, That things be ſettled better and more equitably:* When any thing had been mortgaged and pawned to another, *Ut inter bonos bene agier, That among honeſt Men there be nothing done, but only that which is Honeſt.* And could there poſſibly be any Knavery allowed of in that, where the very Court-form was, *Melius Æquius, for the better and more equitable ſettling of things?* Or any thing done through Deceit and Roguery, where theſe words are publickly read in Court, *Inter bonos bene agier, That among honeſt Men there may be nothing done, except that which is Honeſt?* Now there is ſomething of this Knavery, as AQUILIUS ſays, in all falſe Shews and hypocritical Pretences: Lying therefore ſhould wholly be baniſhed from all ſorts of Buſineſs, and Commerce in the World: Nor ſhould Sellers bring People to bid high for their Goods, and enhance their Prizes; nor Purchaſers others to bid under-value, and ſo beat them down lower: but each of them, if they come to ſpeak about a Bargain, ſhould ſay at a word what he will give and take. QUINTUS SCÆVOLA, the

Son

Son of Publius, going to buy an Eſtate, deſired the Owner to tell him at one word, what it was he muſt have for it: The Seller did ſo, and Scævola told him, He thought it was worth more than what he had demanded for it, and accordingly gave him a thouſand Crowns over. Now there is no one but will grant this was done like an *Honeſt*, but they will not allow it was like a *Prudent* Man; any more, than if he had ſold a thing for leſs, than he might have had for it. Here now, you may ſee, is that pernicious Opinion, thus to make a Diſtinction between *Prudence* and *Honeſty*. Ennius has a Saying to this purpoſe, *That he would not give a Farthing for a Prudent Man, that could not be prudent for his own Advantage*; to which I am ready to ſet my Hand, if he and I can agree upon one and the ſame Meaning of the word *Advantage*. I find that Hecaton, a *Rhodian* Philoſopher, and Scholar of Panætius, in his Book about *Offices*, which he wrote to Q. Tubero, hath laid this down as a Wiſe Man's Duty, Firſt to conform to the Laws, and Cuſtoms, and Practices of his Country; and, when he hath done that, to make the beſt Improvement he can of his Eſtate: ſince we ought to ſeek Riches not only for our ſelves, but our Children, Friends, Relations, and eſpecially the Commonwealth; whoſe publick Riches muſt principally conſiſt in the Wealth and Stock of its particular Members. This Man can by no means approve of that Action, which I juſt now mentioned of Quintus Scævola; and there is nothing, he tells us, that he would ſcruple to do for his own Advantage, if it be but permitted and allowed of by the Law; for which I think he does not much deſerve to be thanked or commended. If then to make pretence of that which never was,

and

and cunningly to diſſemble the real Truth, be pieces of Knavery, there are but very few Actions that are altogether free from it: And if he alone be an honeſt Man, *Who does all the Good he can, and does no Injury to any body*, it will be no eaſie Matter to find one in the World. The Reſult of what has been ſaid is this, To be Knaviſh and Wicked can never be Profitable, becauſe it is attended with Baſeneſs and Diſhonour; and it *always* muſt be Profitable to be Virtuous and Good, becauſe it *always* is Honeſt and Creditable.

Chap. XVI.

The Care taken by the Romans, *to make the Seller tell the Faults of the thing to be ſold. An Example or two of Caſes of this Nature.*

IN the Matter of buying and ſelling Eſtates, it is provided amongſt us by the Civil Conſtitutions, That he who is the Seller ſhould tell all the Faults, that he knows of, to the Purchaſer. For the XII Tables ordering no more than this, That the Seller ſhould be bound to make good thoſe Faults, which were expreſly mentioned by word of Mouth in the Bargain; and which whoever denied, was to pay double Damages; The Lawyers have appointed a Puniſhment for thoſe, who themſelves do not diſcover the Defects of what they ſell. For they have ſo decreed, *That if the Seller of an Eſtate, when he made the Bargain, did not tell all the Faults in particular, that he knew of it; he ſhould afterwards be bound to make them good to the Purchaſer.* Titus Claudius Centumalus (to give an Example) had a

Houſe

Houſe that ſtood upon the *Cælian* Hill, and hindred the Augurs as they made their Obſervations from the *Capitoline* Mount: who therefore gave him Orders to pull that down, which was ſuch an hindrance to their Buſineſs. Inſtead of this CLAUDIUS puts a Bill over the Door, *That the Houſe was to be ſold*; and quickly put it off, P. CALPURNIUS LANARIUS being the Man that bought it. The Augurs in a ſhort time ſent him the ſame Orders, and he accordingly took care to perform them. But afterwards coming to underſtand, That CLAUDIUS had not ſet the Houſe to ſale, till after he had been ordered by the Augurs to demoliſh it; he brought in againſt him an Action at Law, *To receive ſuch Satisfaction, as in Conſcience and Equity he was bound to make him.* MARCUS CATO, the Father of him that is lately dead (for as others are diſtinguiſhed by the Names of their Fathers, ſo he that begot this incomparable Perſon ſhould be named from his Son) ſat as Judge in the Caſe, and gave this Sentence upon the whole matter; That ſince CLAUDIUS knew this Inconvenience before-hand, and did not diſcover it when he ſold the Eſtate, he was obliged in Equity to make it good to the Purchaſer. He judged it therefore to be a part of Honeſty, That the Seller ſhould fairly declare to the Buyer, all the Faults which he knows in the thing to be ſold. If then this Judgment were juſt and equitable, neither the Merchant that brought the Corn, nor the ſuppoſed Seller of the infectious Houſe, did well in concealing what either of them knew. But all the particular ſorts of Concealing could never be taken notice of by the Laws of the City; however ſuch as could were very carefully provided againſt. M. MARIUS GRATIDIANUS, a Kinſman of mine, had ſold an Houſe

to SERGIUS ORATA, which he had bought of the ſame Perſon not many Years before. The Houſe, it ſeems, paid a Duty to SERGIUS, which MARIUS never once mentioned in the Bargain. The Buſineſs came at laſt to a Suit in Law, wherein LUCIUS CRASSUS was Counſel for ORATA, and ANTHONY for GRATIDIANUS. CRASSUS inſiſted very much upon the Law, which ſays, that the Seller ſhall make good thoſe Faults, which he himſelf knew of, and yet concealed them from the Buyer: ANTHONY on the other ſide argued for Equity, That SERGIUS could not but know that Incumbrance, who had ſold the Houſe himſelf but a little while before; and therefore what need was there of telling him of it? That he could not complain of being any ways impoſed upon, ſince he knew very well the condition of what he bought. I have brought you theſe Inſtances only to let you ſee, That theſe cunning ſort of Men were never approved of by our Anceſtors.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

The different Methods uſed by Law and Philoſophy, for the rooting out of Knavery. Treachery to ſet up Traps, though one do not drive the Beaſts into them. How the Law of Nature differs from the Civil. The Excellence of the Roman *Civil Laws. The Extent of that Expreſſion,* Ex fide bona. *Knaviſh Cunning very different from true Prudence. How the Laws provide againſt Fraud in Selling of Slaves. Nature forbids one Man to make his Gain of another's Ignorance. The ill Effects of falſe Prudence.*

BUT the Laws take one way to root theſe Frauds out, and Philoſophers another; the *former* medling no further with them, than as they break out into open Acts, and may (as it were) be laid hold on by the hands of Juſtice: the latter endeavouring to hinder their breaking out, and to prevent them by Precepts of Wiſdom and Reaſon. Reaſon therefore requires of us, That we do nothing Treacherouſly, nothing Deceitfully, nothing meerly by outward Shews and falſe Pretences. Now is it not Treachery to ſet up a Trap, though one does not fright and purſue the Beaſts into it; for the ſimple Creatures of themſelves will run into it, without being driven? Juſt ſo you offer an Houſe to be ſold, becauſe of ſome Faults which you know to be in it; and put up your Bill, as it were like a Trap, in which ſome unwary ſort of Body will be taken. I know *that*, at preſent, the depravation of Manners, and prevalence of evil Cuſtom, have made this be counted neither Baſe nor Diſhonourable; and *that* it is tolerated by the Laws and Con-

Conſtitutions of the *Publick*: but I am ſure it is not tolerated by the Laws of Nature. For it is to be conſidered (I muſt repeat it again, though I have already mentioned it a great many times) that there is ſuch a thing as Natural Society, which comprehends all Men, and ties and unites them to one another: There is a nearer between thoſe of the ſame Nation; and a nearer yet, between thoſe of the ſame City. Therefore our Fore-fathers made a diſtinction, between that Law which is common to Nations, and that which belongs to each City in particular. Whatever we are bound, *by the Civil Conſtitutions*, to do to our Citizens; we are not obliged, *by the Law of Nations*, to do the ſame to Strangers: but whatever we are bound by this *latter* to do to others, the ſame we ought to do to our Citizens alſo: But the Law, which at preſent we uſe amongſt us, is far from being an original Piece, immediately taken from genuine Right and true perfect Juſtice; it is only a Copy and faint Repreſentation of it. However, I could wiſh we lived up even to this: for it is copied at leaſt from ſome of the beſt Originals, which were drawn from the Truth and Nature of the thing. For how excellent is that Form in judicial Proceedings, *Uti ne*, &c. *That I may not be Defrauded or brought to an Inconvenience, by truſting to you, and your Honeſty!* And how incomparable that other, *That Honeſt Men do nothing, but that which is Honeſt and without Deſign.* But the great Queſtion is, Who they are *that are Honeſt Men*; and what it is *to do nothing, but that which is Honeſt*? Q. SCÆVOLA, I remember, the High-Prieſt, was uſed to ſay, *That* all thoſe Judgments which had *Ex fide bona, Faithfully and honeſtly*, put into their Forms, were of marvellous Force; and *that*

Faith-

Faithfully and Honeſtly were of very large Extent, and belonged not only to *Wardſhips*, *Societies*, *Truſts* and *Commiſſions*, but to *Buyings*, *Sellings*, *Lettings* and *Hirings*, which relate to the Society and Entercourſe of Mankind; and *that* it was the part of an extraordinary Judge, to determine exactly in all theſe Caſes, what one Man ought to make good to another, upon only the bare Principles of *Conſcience and Honeſty*; eſpecially ſeeing Men differ in their Judgments about the greateſt part of them. All Craft therefore ſhould utterly be baniſhed, and that *knaviſh* ſort of *Cunning*, which would fain indeed be *counted*, but is the fartheſt *from Prudence*, of any thing in the World: For Prudence conſiſts in the making a right Diſtinction between Good and Evil, but this kind of Cunning gives the preference to Evil; if, at leaſt, it be true (as moſt certainly it is) that every thing is Evil, which is contrary to Honeſty. Neither is it only in *Farms* and *Houſes* that the Laws of the City, which are copied from Nature, take care to have Cheating and Knavery puniſhed; but in Slaves they exclude all Fraud in the Seller: For he that is preſumed to know what the Slave was, if he does not declare whether he be Healthy, a Runagate, or apt to Steal, is anſweable to the Buyer, by an Order of the Ædiles: But this does not hold in the Caſe of an Heir. From what has been ſaid, it apparently follows, ſince Nature is the Fountain from whence Law is derived, that it is agreeable to the Dictates and Rules of Nature, that no one ſhould endeavour to make his own Advantage from the Ignorance of another. And indeed there is no greater Miſchief in the World, than this Wiſdom, *falſly* ſo named, joined with Baſeneſs and Knavery. From this have ariſen innumerable Caſes, wherein Profit is ſet up in oppoſition to Honeſty: For where almoſt is there

there a Man to be found, that would ſcruple to Injure and Wrong any other, if he could do it with ſecreſie, and without fear of being puniſhed?

Chap. XVIII.

An Example of a Wickedneſs committed, when there was no Fear of Puniſhment. It is a Wickedneſs to be a Receiver of ill-gotten Goods, though you have no hand in the getting them. It is Diſhoneſt to get Eſtates by ſervile Flattery. Separating Profit from Honeſty, the Cauſe of all Miſchiefs.

LET us try, if you pleaſe, by ſome Examples of that nature, wherein the common ſort of People, perhaps, think there is no Crime: For we do not ſpeak here of ſuch as cut Throats, Poyſon, *make* falſe Wills, Rob, or Embezzle the publick Treaſures; who are not to be repreſſed with nothing but Words and philoſophical Diſcourſes, but muſt be vexed and wearied out with Chains and Impriſonment: But let us conſider here what is done by thoſe, who paſs in the World for Men of Honeſty and Integrity. A Will that was forged of one Minutius Basilus, a wealthy Perſon, was brought by ſome People out of *Greece* into *Italy*; who, to make it the more eaſily paſs for good, made Marcus Crassus and Lucius Hortensius, the two greateſt Men at that time in the City, Joint-Heirs with themſelves: who, though they ſuſpected the whole to be a Forgery, yet having nothing of hand in it themſelves, made very little ſcruple of getting an Advantage by other Peo-

ples

ples Villany. And what then? was that ſufficient to excuſe them from Fault, *That they themſelves had no hand in it?* Truly I am fully perſuaded not; though I always loved one of them while he was alive, and do not hate the other ſince he is dead and gone. But when BASILUS had deſired that MARCUS SATRIUS, his Siſter's Son, ſhould bear his Name, and had appointed him his Heir; (*I nominate him*, ſays he, *Lord of my Sabine and Picenian Mannors*) was it any ways a juſt and reaſonable Thing, and not rather an eternal Blot upon thoſe Times, that ſome principal Citizens ſhould have a Man's Eſtate, and SATRIUS the Heir be put off barely with his Name? For if he be unjuſt, that does not keep off Injuries from any of his Neighbours, and defend and protect them as far as he is able, (as I have ſhewn already in the firſt Book) what ſort of Man ſhall we take him to be, who not only does not keep off an Injury, but rather on the contrary helps to promote it? Nay I, for my part, am wholly of Opinion, That Eſtates which are left Men by *true* Wills, if gotten by knaviſh and ſervile Flatteries, not by a *real*, but pretended Friendſhip, are Scandalous and Diſhoneſt. But in ſuch kind of Caſes it often comes to paſs, that one thing ſeems *Profitable*, and another *Honeſt*: undoubtedly by a Miſtake; for the ſame thing is the Meaſure both of the one and the other; which whoever perceives not, will eaſily be led into all ſorts of Roguery. For he that begins thus to argue with himſelf, *That* indeed is Honeſt, but *this* is Advantagious; impudently divides, by this groſs Miſtake, thoſe things which by Nature are coupled and united: which is the deadly Root, from which all Frauds, Wickedneſſes and Villanies ſpring.

Chap. XIX.

The Carriage of a truly Honeſt Man, when it is in his Power to be Diſhoneſt ſo as not to be diſcovered. The true Notion of a Good Man. A Saying of Fimbria's *in the Caſe of* Lutatius Pinthia, *to this purpoſe. A Proverb borrowed from the Country, ſhewing, That nothing Diſhoneſt how ſecret ſoever can be Profitable.*

IF a Good Man therefore ſhould have ſuch a power, as that by ſnapping of his Fingers he could ſlip his Name cunningly into rich Peoples Wills, he could never make uſe of it: no, not although he were fully aſſured, that no one living could either *know* or *ſuſpect* it: But give ſuch a power to Marcus Crassus, that by doing the ſame thing he ſhould make himſelf Heir, where he *really* was not ſo, and he would Dance, I dare warrant you, publickly in the Market-place. But he that is *Honeſt*, and anſwers to our Notion of a *Good Man*, will never take any thing away from another for the enriching himſelf, and filling his own Coffers; which whoever admires at, let him even confeſs at the ſame time, that he does not underſtand what a *Good Man* is. For if any one will throughly examine his own Thoughts, and clear up a little his obſcure Conceptions, he will quickly be able to tell himſelf, that a Good Man is one, *Who does all the Good that he can to others, but never any Harm; unleſs by way of reaſonable and juſt Retribution for ſome Injury received.* I deſire to know then; is not that Man guilty of *Harming* another, that outs the rightful Heirs, as it were, by a Spell, and procures himſelf to be put into their Rooms?

Rooms? How then! (will ſome Men ſay) what would not you have People conſult their own Intereſt? Yes; but withal I would have them underſtand, That nothing can be ſo, that is Baſe or Diſhoneſt: which is a neceſſary Maxim for all thoſe to learn, who ever deſign to be Good Men. I remember I heard my own Father tell, as long ago as when I was a Boy, That FIMBRIA, one who had formerly been Conſul, was Judge in a caſe of LUTATIUS PINTHIA's, a *Roman* Knight, and a very Honeſt Man; who, upon pain of loſing a certain Sum of Money, was to prove himſelf to be a Good Man. Hereupon FIMBRIA plainly told him, that he would never paſs Judgment upon ſuch a matter; leaſt either by giving the Cauſe againſt him, he ſhould ſpoil the Credit of a well-approved Citizen; or elſe ſhould be forced, by giving it for him, to pronounce that any one was *a Good Man:* which he could not do, conſidering the infinite Virtues and Duties, that are requiſite to the completing any Perſon of that Character. This *Good Man* then, of whom FIMBRIA had a Notion, as well as SOCRATES, will never judge any thing Profitable, that is Diſhoneſt: From whence it follows, That ſuch a one will always be *ſo* far from *doing*, as *that* he will *never* ſo much as *think* of any thing, which he is afraid ſhould be laid open to the reſt of the World. And is it not a ſhame that Philoſophers ſhould doubt of this, when there is not a Peaſant in the Country but aſſents to it? For from *them* we have gotten that common Saying, which is now by long Uſage become a Proverb among us, which they bring in to ſignifie the faithful Dealing and Honeſty of a Man, *He is one* (ſay they) *that you may venture to play with at Even and Odd in the dark.* The meaning of

which, what can it be but this, That nothing can be Profitable, but that which is Honeſt and Becoming, though a Man could be certain of being never found out in it? You ſee then according to this Proverb, that neither that GYGES, whom we mentioned above, nor that other, whom we juſt now ſuppoſed to have a power by the ſnapping of his Fingers to become all Peoples Heir, can by any means be excuſed. For as that which is Scandalous and Diſhoneſt in it ſelf, however it may be hid from the Eye of the World, can never be brought to be Honeſt and Creditable; ſo alſo *that*, which is not Honeſt and Creditable, can never be brought to be Profitable and Advantagious; the very Nature of the things reſiſting and oppoſing it.

CHAP. XX.

Great Rewards are very apt to make Men forgetful of Honeſty. Examples concerning this. An excellent Rule for our Direction in this caſe. A Man loſes more by doing an unjuſt Action, than ever he can gain by it, be the Reward what it will.

BUT when People expect great Advantages from their Roguery, it is a mighty Temptation for them to be guilty of it. Thus, for Inſtance, when MARIUS was far from any hopes of obtaining the Conſulſhip, and had lain ſeven Years from the time of his being Prætor, ſo that no one ſuſpected his ſtanding for thar Honour; being diſpatched to *Rome* by Q. METELLUS, whoſe Lieutenant

nant he was, an extraordinary Man, and a brave Member of the Republick; he accuſed his General to the People of *Rome* of protracting the War; and told them, *That if they would but chooſe him Conſul, they ſhould ſoon have* JUGURTHA, *either dead or alive, delivered into their power.* It is true by this Artifice he got to be choſen Conſul, but he payed for it the price of his Honeſty and Fidelity; who could thus bring an uſeful and excellent Citizen, whoſe Lieutenant he was, and by whom he was ſent, into Hatred and Ill-will by falſe Accuſations. Nor did my Kinſman GRATIDIANUS act the part of an Honeſt and Fair-dealing Man, in the time of his Prætorſhip: The Tribunes of the People held a common Conſultation with the Company of Prætors, about ſettling the Value and Rate of Money; which at thoſe times was grown to be ſo very Unconſtant, as that no body could be certain how much he was Worth. They made an Edict by common Conſent, allowing an Action againſt thoſe who tranſgreſſed it, and appointing a Penalty for thoſe who were convicted. This being ordered, they agreed to meet again in the Aſſembly after Noon, and all of them together tell the People what they had done. The Meeting broke up, and the reſt all departed, ſome one way, and ſome another: MARIUS only directly from the Court went down to the Aſſembly, and by himſelf alone declared that to the People, which all of them had agreed upon by general Conſent. If you ask now what was the Event of this; nothing in the World could have got him greater Honour, Statues erected for him about the Streets, Frankinſence and Tapers burnt at every one of them; and, in ſhort, never was any Man more adored by the Multitude. Theſe are the things,

which do ſometimes miſlead Men in deliberating about their Duty; when the Offence againſt Honeſty ſeems very trivial, but the Advantage that is gained by it very conſiderable. Thus MARIUS thought it but a little piece of Knavery, to ſteal the People's Love from the Tribunes and his Collegues; but a mighty Advantage to be made Conſul by it, which was what he at that time propoſed to himſelf. But in all theſe Caſes there is only one Rule, which I deſire you would conſtantly take along with you: *Be ſure in the firſt place, that what you count Profitable be no way Diſhoneſt; and if it be Diſhoneſt, then aſſure your ſelf that it is not truly Profitable.* And can we then eſteem either the one or the other of theſe MARIUSES Good Men? Conſider a little and examine your own Thoughts, that you may ſee what Idea, what Notion or Conception, you have of a Good Man. Is it reconcileable then with the Character of ſuch a one, to Lie for the ſake of his own Advantage; to Deceive, to raiſe falſe Reports and Miſrepreſentations of others; to Seize that before-hand, which others have a Right to as well as himſelf? Certainly nothing leſs. And is there any thing then of ſuch excellent Worth? any Profit or Intereſt ſo very deſirable, for the gaining of which one would forfeit the Glory and Reputation of a *Good Man?* Can that, which we call by the name of Profitable, bring us any thing ſo good as what it takes away from us, if it ſpoil our being counted Men of Honeſty and Integrity? if it occaſion the Loſs of our Juſtice and Faithfulneſs; that is, in plain truth, if it change us into Brutes? For where is the great difference between altering our Shapes and becoming real Beaſts; and carrying the Nature and Fierceneſs of Beaſts, though under the Outſides and Figures of Men?

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

To do any thing Diſhoneſt for the ſake of Power and Authority, *not Profitable. A moſt deteſtable Maxim of* CÆSAR's. *Not Profitable to make himſelf King in a Free City. The Unhappineſs of a Tyrant's Life.*

AGain, Thoſe who contemn all Juſtice and Honeſty for the ſake of Power, do not they do the ſame thing that a certain Man did, when he choſe to be Son-in-law to none but one, by whoſe daring Boldneſs he might encreaſe his own Authority? He thought it a very great Advantage no queſtion, to enlarge his own Greatneſs, by drawing Hatred upon another; but he never conſidered how great a Diſſervice he did to his Country, and how much Scandal and Diſcredit he brought upon himſelf. As for the Father, he had always a couple of *Greek* Verſes in his Mouth, taken out of EURIPIDES's Tragedy of *Phæniſſæ*; which I will endeavour to tranſlate as well as I am able, perhaps it may be aukwardly, but however ſo as to make their Senſe appear,

If ever we may break the Ties of Right,
'Tis when a Kingdom is the glorious Prize:
In other things be ſtrictly Juſt ——

It was a villanous thing in ETEOCLES, or rather in EURIPIDES indeed, to exempt that one Breach of Right from being criminal, which is certainly of all others the moſt wicked and deteſtable. Why do we inſiſt then upon Examples of leſſer Rogueries, ſuch as making one's ſelf Heir by Cunning

and Spells, Cheats about Buying, Selling, *&c.*? Here is a Man for you, that has made no ſcruple of deſiring to make himſelf King of the *Roman* People, and Lord and Governour of the whole Earth; nay, and which is worſe, hath accompliſhed his Deſire. If any Man call this an honeſt Ambition, he muſt be out of his Wits; for he juſtifies the Subverſion of our Laws and Liberties, and eſteems the moſt baſe and deteſtable Oppreſſion of them, a virtuous, laudable, and glorious Action: But if any Man, confeſſing that it is not Honeſt, to get the Dominion in that Republick, which *has been* and *ought to be* always free, will yet ſay, It is Profitable for him that can do it; what Reproofs ſhall I uſe, or what Reproaches rather, to recal ſuch a one from ſo dangerous an Error? Good Gods! Can it ever be ſuppoſed then to be any Man's Intereſt, by the heinouſeſt and moſt unnatural Wickedneſs upon Earth, to ruin and deſtroy his own Native Country; though perhaps the Man, who is guilty of it, may afterwards be ſtiled by his poor oppreſſed Citizens, *The Father of it? Intereſt* therefore ſhould always be meaſured by *Juſtice* and *Honeſty*; ſo that theſe two Words, though of different Sounds, ſhould yet be underſtood to mean one and the ſame Thing. I know the common People are apt to imagine, that nothing in the World can be better than to Govern; but when I conſider the real Truth and Reaſon of the thing it ſelf, I find on the contrary that nothing can be worſe, when People arrive at it by unlawful Means. Can it poſſibly be Profitable for any Man then, to live in perpetual Cares and Anxieties? to be Day and Night racked and tormented with Fears, in a Life full of nothing but Treacheries and Dangers? *Many are Treacherous and Unfaithful to Kings*, ſays

ſays ACCIUS, *and but few are Faithful.* But of what ſort of Kings did he ſpeak this? Was it not of thoſe, who by lawful Succeſſion had received the Royal Scepter from TANTALUS and PELOPS? How many more then muſt we ſuppoſe to be unfaithful to that King, who with an Army of *Romans* had oppreſſed and enſlaved the *Roman* People it ſelf? and had forced that City, which was not only Free, but even Empreſs of the whole World, to ſubmit her Neck to his Tyrannical Yoke? What Uneaſineſs of Mind muſt ſuch a one, think you, be continually under? What Wounds and Twitches of Conſcience muſt he needs feel? How, in ſhort, can that Life be an Advantage to any Man, which has this Inconvenience inſeparably annexed to it, that whoever is ſo happy as to take it away, will obtain the greateſt Glory and Good-will from all the World? And if theſe things, which ſeem *moſt of all* to be Profitable, yet are found to be the contrary when Unworthy and Diſhoneſt; this certainly ought to convince us all, *That nothing can be Profitable, which is not Honeſt.*

Chap. XXII.

A brave Example of the Romans *preferring Juſtice before a ſeeming Profit. Glory can never be gotten by Wickedneſs. Riches Unprofitable, if accompanied with Infamy. Example of Injuſtice in the* Romans. *How an Empire ought to be ſupported.* Cato *too ſevere in exacting the Tributes. An unjuſt Saying of* Curio's.

BUT this has been determined, as at many other times by our wiſe Fore-fathers, ſo particularly by Fabricius, then a ſecond time Conſul, and the whole *Roman* Senate, in the War with Pyrrhus. For when Pyrrhus had voluntarily made War upon the *Romans*, and the Contention was held about Empire and Maſtery, with a no leſs powerful than generous Adverſary; a Deſerter came ſecretly into Fabricius's Camp, and offered, upon condition he might be well Rewarded, to return back again with the ſame ſecreſie that he came, and to Poyſon Pyrrhus. But inſtead of Encouragement, Fabricius ordered him to be ſent back to Pyrrhus, and was afterwards commended by the Senate for ſo doing. If we look no further now than the outward appearance of what ſeems to be Profitable, here is a dangerous War, and a powerful Adverſary of the growing Empire might ſoon have been removed by the ſingle Aſſiſtance of this one Deſerter: But then it would have been an eternal Scandal, not to mention the Villany and Wickedneſs of it, in an honourable War, which was managed with a fair and generous Enemy, not to get the Victory by Virtue and Courage, but only by baſe and treacherous Practices,

ces. Whether was more Profitable then for FABRICIUS, who was ſuch in this City as ARISTIDES was at *Athens*; or for the *Roman* Senate, which never thought any thing diſhonourable their Intereſt; to contend with an Enemy by Valour or by Poyſon? If Empire be deſirable for the ſake of Glory, why is not Wickedneſs altogether baniſhed, in which it is impoſſible there ſhould ever be any Glory? But if we are for Power at any rate, we ſhould do well to conſider, that it can never be Profitable when accompanied with Infamy. That Counſel therefore of Lucius PHILIPPUS, the Son of QUINTUS, was far from being Profitable, *That thoſe very Cities, which* SYLLA *had freed for a ſet Sum of Money, by the Senate's Order, ſhould again be brought under their former Contributions; and yet not the Money, which they had payed, be returned them.* This Advice of his was followed by the Senate, to the great Diſparagement and Shame of the Empire; for even Pirates at this rate will ſooner be truſted than the *Roman* Senate. Well, but the publick Revenues were encreaſed by it, and *therefore* it was Profitable: Heavens! How long will Men dare to call any thing Profitable, which is not Honeſt! Can Hatred then and Infamy be Profitable to a State, which ought to be ſupported by Glory, and Credit, and the Love of its Confederates! In this Particular I often diſagreed from my old Friend CATO; whom I always thought to be ſomewhat too headſtrong, in ſtanding up for the Intereſt of the Publick Treaſury; and exacting the Tributes with ſo much rigour, as not to make any Allowances to the Farmers, and very ſeldom or never grant any thing to the Confederates: whereas we ought always to be kind to the latter, and to deal with the former,

as

as we would do with our own Bayliffs; and that ſo much the more, becauſe all the Safety and Welfare of the Republick depends upon the Agreement of the ſeveral Orders in it. Nor leſs Ill than PHILIP's, was the Counſel of CURIO; who, in the Caſe of the People inhabiting beyond the *Po*, though he confeſſed their Demands were but juſt and reaſonable, yet always added, *Vincat utilitas*; *Every thing muſt give way to the Intereſt of the Publick.* He ſhould rather have ſaid that they were not juſt, becauſe not comporting with the Publick Intereſt; than thus have declared they did not comport with it, and at the ſame time confeſs them to be juſt and reaſonable.

CHAP. XXIII.

Several Caſes put by Hecaton *the* Rhodian. Diogenes *and* Antipater *oppoſe one another. Whether Bad Money received for Good ſhould be put off.*

HECATON propoſeth, in his ſixth Book of Offices, ſeveral Queſtions ſuch as theſe which follow: Whether a good Man, in time of great Scarcity, may refuſe to give Victuals to the Servants of his own Family? He diſcourſes indeed upon either ſide of the Queſtion, but at laſt concludes, That he ſhould rather be guided by his Intereſt, than Humanity. He demands again, If a Merchant in a Storm be forced to throw his Goods over-board, whether of the two he ſhould chooſe to caſt away, a very valuable Horſe, or a Servant that is good for nothing? Here Intereſt, and the

ſaving of his Goods draws one way, and Compaſſion of Human Nature another. Should a *Fool* in a Shipwreck have gotten a Plank, may a *Wiſe* Man take it away from him if he can? He anſwers, No; becauſe it would be plainly a piece of Injuſtice: But what if the Owner of the Ship ſhould come? may not he take it away when it properly belongs to him? No, not at all; no more than he may throw a Man out of the Ship, under the Pretence that the Ship belongs to him. For till they are arrived whither the Ship was hired for, it does not more properly belong to the Owner, than it does to the Paſſengers by whom it was hired. Suppoſe two Men, that are equally Wiſe, ſhould both of them in a Shipwreck lay hold of the ſame Plank; may either of them ſeize upon it forcibly to himſelf, or ſhould one of them voluntarily yield it to the other? Let one yield to the other, provided *that* other will be more ſerviceable to the Publick, or there is more depending upon his Life and Preſervation. But what if *theſe* are equal in either of them? Why then there is no more to be ſaid about it, but it muſt even be let alone for Chance to determine, as though they ſhould caſt Lots, or play at Even and Odd for it. What if a Father ſhould rifle Temples, and dig Paſſages under ground into the Treaſury? Should the Son diſcover him to the Publick Magiſtrate? No; that were an horrid unnatural Impiety: he ſhould rather on the contrary defend his Father, if any one elſe ſhould pretend to accuſe him. But what! ought not the Intereſt of my Country to be conſulted, before that of any one elſe whatſoever? Yes undeniably; but then it is very much the Intereſt of your Country, to have Citizens that are dutiful and obedient to their Parents. But if a Father ſhould attempt to make himſelf

ſelf King, or any ways endeavour to betray his Country; ſhould a Son in ſuch a caſe hold his Tongue and conceal it? In the firſt place, let him *beg* of his Father to deſiſt: if that does no good, let him proceed to rebuke and even to threaten him about it: but if at laſt he perceive that it *directly* tends to the Ruin of his Country, he ſhould prefer *its* Safety before that of his Father. Another of the Queſtions he propoſes is this, Suppoſe a Good Man to receive, by an overſight, bad Money for good, and afterwards come to underſtand that it is bad, may he pay it for good, if he owes another any thing? DIOGENES thinks he may, but ANTIPATER not; whom I rather aſſent to. Suppoſe a Man be ſelling a Veſſel of Wine, which he knows will not keep; is he bound to tell of this? DIOGENES thinks he is under no ſuch Obligation; ANTIPATER will have it to be every honeſt Man's Duty. Theſe are the things, which whether they are Right and one's Duty or not, is often controverted among the *Stoicks*. In ſelling a Slave is one bound to declare what his Faults are or not? I do not mean thoſe, which unleſs they are told, the Law it ſelf commands he ſhall be returned upon our Hands; but his being a Liar, a Filcher, a Player at Dice, or a Drunkard. One is of Opinion we ought to declare them, and the other not. Should an ignorant Body ſell a quantity of Gold, and ſuppoſe it to be Copper; is a good Man obliged now to tell him that it is Gold; or may he buy for a Penny what is worth a thouſand Pence? It is plain enough by this time what my Thoughts are, and wherein conſiſts the Controverſie between the forementioned Philoſophers.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIV.

Whether a Man is obliged to perform all his Promiſes or not; though at the Expence of his Life or Reputation. Some Examples upon it.

ARE we bound to perform all thoſe Promiſes and Bargains, which (in the Prætor's Language) have neither Force nor Fraud in them? Here is a Man, for Example, that has gotten the Dropſy, and another preſcribes him an infallible Cure for it, upon Condition that he will never make uſe of it again. The Man recovers by its Help at preſent, but falls again ſome time after into the ſame Diſtemper. Suppoſe now that he, to whom he made ſuch Promiſe, will by no means allow him to uſe the Cure again; what would be his Duty in ſuch a Caſe! Why, ſince he, who denies him the Requeſt, is inhuman, and it is a Thing will do him no manner of Prejudice, it is the beſt way to take care of his Life and Safety. A good and wiſe Man is deſired by one, who appoints him his Heir, and leaves him by Will a conſiderable Eſtate, that before he enters upon the Poſſeſſion of it, he ſhould dance at Noon-day in the open Streets; and this he accordingly promiſes to do, becauſe otherwiſe the Teſtator would not make him his Heir? Would you have him perform now what he promiſed, or not? I could wiſh that he never had promiſed it at all, which I think would much better have ſuited with his Character: But ſince he *has* done it, if he think it diſhonourable to dance ſo in publick, the beſt way will be not to ſtand to ſuch a Promiſe, provided he takes none of the Money that was left him: Unleſs the Money may be

be turned to ſome very great Benefit and Advantage of the Publick; ſo that it would be no Diſgrace for a Man even to dance, when it brings ſo much Good to his Country along with it.

Chap. XXV.

Several other Caſes, wherein a Man is not obliged to perform his Promiſes and Vows; nor to give up a Truſt. The Method he deſigns to take in the following Part of the Work.

NEither is one bound to perform thoſe Promiſes, which are hurtful and prejudicial to the Perſons they were made to. Thus Father Phoebus (that we may return to our Fables) promiſed to grant Phaeton whatſoever he ſhould deſire; and the mad young Fellow deſired to get up into his Father's Chariot. It was accordingly granted him; but before he could get to be well ſettled in it, he was ſtruck down with Lightning. How abundantly better had it been, in ſuch a Caſe, if the Father had refuſed to perform ſuch a Promiſe? The ſame may be ſaid of another, which Theseus obtained of Neptune: This God had promiſed to do any three Things for him, whatever he ſhould requeſt: And he requeſted the Death of his own Son Hyppolitus, upon a falſe Suſpicion that he had been naught with his Mother-in-Law. He obtained what he asked, which occaſioned him very much Sorrow and Affliction. Again, Agamemnon had vowed, for a Sacrifice to Diana, the moſt beautiful Thing that was born that Year in his whole Dominions. To be as good as his Word, he

he was forced to offer his Daughter IPHIGENIA, than whom nothing that Year had been born more beautiful. Had not it been better to have broke his Promiſe, than have done ſuch an horrid and unnatural Action? In ſome Caſes then a Man is not obliged to perform his Promiſes: No more is he to reſtore what was given him in Truſt. Suppoſe, for the Purpoſe, a Man in his Wits had entruſted you with his Sword, and ſhould demand it of you again when he is beſide himſelf; your Duty would be not to give it him again, and if you did, you would be guilty of a very great Errour. Again, ſhould a Man put a large Sum of Money in your Hands, and afterwards raiſe a Rebellion againſt his Country, would you deliver up your Truſt, if demanded it by him? Certainly no; for this would be to act againſt the publick Intereſt, which ought to be preferred before every thing elſe. Thus a great many Things, which are honeſt of themſelves, we may ſee ceaſe to be ſo when the Circumſtances alter: To perform a Promiſe, for Inſtance, to ſtand to an Agreement, or deliver up a Truſt, ought not to be done when they become unprofitable. This may ſuffice to have been ſaid of thoſe things, which a pretended Wiſdom would fain count profitable, though contrary to Juſtice. But having laid down four general Heads *in the Firſt Book*, from which all Offices or Duties are derived; I ſhall diſcourſe upon each of the ſame *in this*; and make out, that what is contrary to any of thoſe Virtues, is only in Shew, and not really profitable. Of *Prudence* then, which a knaviſh Sort of Cunning endeavours to imitate; as alſo of *Juſtice*, which is never but profitable; we have diſcourſed already. It remains that we ſpeak of the other two general Heads of Duty; the one of which

which consists in the Greatness and Excellency of a couragious Soul; and the other in such a Regularity of our Actions, as is conformable to the Precepts of Temperance and Moderation.

Chap. XXVI.

That nothing can be profitable, which is contrary to the Virtue of Fortitude, shewn from the Examples of Ulysses *and* Regulus.

Ulysses thought it would be profitable for him, (if what the Tragedians tell us be true; for Homer, a Writer of the greatest Authority, never once insinuates any such thing) but the Writers of Tragedy accuse Ulysses for feigning himself mad, that he might avoid the War; a Design that was by no means honest and creditable: *Well, but it was profitable* (will some one say) *to stay and govern at his own Home, and enjoy himself quietly in his Island* Ithaca, *together with his Parents, his Wife and Son. Is there any such Credit in the daily Dangers and Fatigues of War, that you can ever think comparable with living such a Life of Tranquility and Security?* Yes, I wholly despise and contemn your *Security*, being fully perswaded that it can never be profitable so long as it is dishonest. Pray what would they have said, do you think, of Ulysses, suppose he had continued in his pretended Madness? When after his glorious Atchievements in the War, he had yet these Reproaches thrown upon him by Ajax,

Though

Though, you all know, he *firſt propoſed this* Oath,
Yet he's *the only Man that would have broke it.*
He firſt endeavour'd not to join i'th'War,
Faint-hearted Coward! feigning to be mad.
And had not prudent PALAMEDE *found out,*
By Cunning, this his impudent Deceit;
The Villain, notwithſtanding all the Ties
Of ſacred Oaths, *had certainly gone off.*

It was much better for him to bear all the Hazards, not of the War only, but of the Sea too, (as at laſt he did) than not to make one among the reſt of the *Grecians*, then reſolving, by Conſent, upon a War with the *Barbarians*. But to remove the Scene from Foreign Countries, and fabulous Relations, that we may come nearer home, and to a thing that really happened: M. ATILIUS REGULUS, then a ſecond time Conſul, was ſurprized in *Africk* by XANTHIPPUS the *Lacedæmonian*, and made a Priſoner, (AMILCAR, Father of HANNIBAL, being the General of the *Carthaginians*) and was ſent by the *Carthaginians* to the *Roman* Senate, upon ſolemn Oath given, that, unleſs ſome remarkable Priſoners were reſtored them, he ſhould himſelf return back again to *Carthage*. Now as ſoon as this Man arrived at *Rome*, he could not but perceive what *appeared to* be his Intereſt, but withal was perſwaded (as the Event declared) that it *only appeared ſo*. The Caſe was thus: Here he might have ſtaid in his Native Country, and have lived at home quietly with his Wife and Children; might have judged his Misfortune, received in the War, no more than what all Men in that State are liable to; and might ſtill have continued in his old Degree of Honour among thoſe of conſular Dignity.

nity. *And who can deny now,* (will any one ſay) *that all theſe things are expedient and profitable?* Who do you think? Why *Greatneſs of Soul* and true *Courage* deny it. Can you deſire any greater and more illuſtrious Authorities?

Chap. XXVII.

What Courage and Greatneſs of Soul teach us. A Continuation of the Story of Regulus.

THESE are the Virtues, by which we are taught to be afraid of nothing, to deſpiſe all the outward Concerns of Life, and count nothing intolerable that can poſſibly befal a Man. *Well, but pray what did this* Regulus *do then?* He came into the Senate, and told them what it was he was ſent about, and refuſed to give his own Vote in the Caſe, foraſmuch as he was not to be counted a Senator, as being by Oath under the Enemy's Power. And in his Speech, which he ſpoke to the Senate upon that Subject, (*Fool that he was,* ſome will be ready to ſay, *and an Enemy to his own Intereſt!*) he told them, *It was beſt not to give up their Priſoners, that they were young Men, and might make able Leaders; but that he, for his part, was grown almoſt uſeleſs, and worn away with old Age.* The Senate were ſo far perſwaded by his Speech, that they reſolved the Priſoners ſhould be detained in Cuſtody, and he himſelf returned back again to *Carthage*; not all the Love which he had for his Country, his Friends and Relations, being able to detain him. And though he knew well enough what a barbarous Ene-

my,

my, and what exquiſite Torments he was going to return to; yet he thought it his Duty, whatever came of it, not to violate his Oath. I think he was in a better Condition therefore, even whilſt he was murdered by being kept from ſleeping, than ever he could have been had he ſtayed at home, and lived under the Scandal of being an old Captive, and a perjured Nobleman. *But was not it very great* Folly *and* Madneſs, *if he would not perſwade the Releaſing of the Priſoners, yet to go and diſſwade it as much as he could?* Pray how *Folly* and *Madneſs?* What though it were conducive to the Good of the Republick? Or can any thing be profitable to a private Citizen, which brings a Diſadvantage to the Commonwealth in general?

CHAP. XXVIII.

To ſeparate Profit from Honeſty, is to pervert the firſt Principles of Nature. All Men naturally deſirous of Profit. The Reaſons given by thoſe, who think Regulus *did ill in returning.*

THOSE Men who ſeparate Profit from Honeſty, wholly pervert the firſt Principles of Nature: For we all of us naturally deſire our Intereſt, toward which we are carried with ſo ſtrong a Biaſs, as that it is not in our Power to turn the other Way? For who is averſe from, or rather, who does not moſt eagerly follow his own Advantage? But ſince we can find out no real Advantage, except in what is honeſt, becoming and commendable, therefore we count theſe the principal Things;

Things; and take the Word Profit to ſignify ſomething which only relates to our outward Neceſſities, and the ſupplying of them, without all that glorious and ſhining Excellence which appears in the Actions of Virtue and Honeſty. *But after all is done*, perhaps ſome Men will ſay, *pray what is there in an Oath, that he ſhould be afraid thus to break it?* What! was it JUPITER's Anger that he dreaded? But this is agreed on by all Philoſophers; not only thoſe who maintain that the Gods lead an idle Life, neither buſying themſelves, nor diſturbing others; but thoſe who affirm they are always buſy, and always doing ſomething that relates to the World: In this thing, *I ſay*, they are all agreed, That the Deity neither hurts nor is angry with any one. But ſuppoſing the worſt, Pray what Hurt could JUPITER's Vengeance have done REGULUS, greater than what REGULUS did to himſelf? It could not be any thing of Religion therefore that hindered him from following what appeared to be his Intereſt. Again, Was he afraid of the Baſeneſs and Diſhoneſty of the Action? *As to that*, in the firſt place, Always of two Evils chuſe the leaſt; and where was any Evil in the Baſeneſs of the Thing, ſo great as was that of the Torments which he endured? Beſide, pray remember that Sentence of ACCIUS, which, however it might be ſaid by an impious King, is yet generally acknowledged to be very well ſaid, who when one told him, *You have broken your Oath to me*; anſwered, *I neither am, nor have been tied by Oath to any treacherous Deceiver.* Again they tell us, That as we affirm ſome Things *ſeem* profitable which *are not ſo*; ſo *they* affirm ſome Things *ſeem* honeſt which *are not ſo*: As this for Example, of returning to be tormented, rather than

than break one's Oath; which *is not* honeſt, though it may *ſeem to be* ſo; becauſe no Man is obliged to perform that Oath, which was extorted from him by the Force of his Enemies. And *laſtly* they argue, That whatever makes very much for one's Profit and Advantage, thereby becomes honeſt, though before it did not ſeem ſo. This is what is generally brought againſt REGULUS; but let us ſee and examine all the Parts of it in Order.

CHAP. XXIX.

He anſwers the firſt part of the Arguments brought againſt Regulus. *The Sacredneſs of an Oath. The Divinity of* Faith. *Pain none, or at leaſt not the greateſt Evil. Diſhoneſty the greateſt, if not only Evil. Faith to be kept even with thoſe who are Treacherous. Oaths made to Enemies ſhould be kept. Not ſo thoſe made to Pirates, and why. What 'tis to Forſwear one's ſelf. The Form of Oaths among the* Romans. *Laws of War to be kept inviolable.*

FIrſt then they ſay, *He could fear no Harm from the Anger of* JUPITER, *who neither can be angry, nor do Harm to any body.* This proves as ſtrongly againſt all Oaths in general, as it does in particular againſt this of REGULUS. But the Thing to be conſidered in Peoples taking of Oaths, is not what Danger they are in, ſhould they break them; but what a ſacred and powerful Obligation is laid upon them. For every Oath is a religious Affirmation; and whatever is promiſed after ſuch a manner, as it were calling God for a Witneſs to your

your Words, ought certainly to be performed. For now *Faith* and *Juſtice* require it of us, and not any Fear of that Anger of the Gods, which is not incident to their Divine Natures. The *Faith* I mean, of which ENNIUS has got theſe incomparable Words:

O FAITH All-glorious and Divine!
In lofty Temples fit to ſhine;
Ev'n JOVE *himſelf by thee doth ſwear!*

Whoſoever therefore doth not perform his Oath, affronts the Deity of that Divine FAITH, which was (as CATO in his Speech informs us) ſet up by our Fathers in the Capitol it ſelf, even next to the Statue of the Great God JUPITER. But, Secondly, they tell us, *Suppoſing* JUPITER *had been angry with* REGULUS, *he could not have brought any Evil upon him greater than what* REGULUS *brought upon himſelf.* This, I confeſs, would be very true, if there was no other Evil but only Pain: But *that* is ſo far from being the greateſt Evil, as that it is not ſo much as any Evil at all, if we may credit ſome of the chief Philoſophers; among whom, I pray you, let REGULUS be counted of *no ſmall* Authority; if I may not rather ſay of the *greateſt and moſt weighty:* For what greater Teſtimony can any one deſire, than that of a principal Man among the *Romans*, who rather than be wanting in any Point of his Duty, choſe to undergo the moſt exquiſite Torment? *But of two Evils*, ſay they, *always chuſe the leaſt:* That is in plain Words, *Rather be a Rogue than undergo any Calamity.* Can any Calamity then be greater, than that of Baſeneſs and Injuſtice? For if even the Filth and Deformity of the *Body* be loathſome and offenſive;

ſive; how much more ſo muſt *that* of the *Mind* needs be, when it is covered and polluted with Shame and Diſhoneſty? Thoſe Philoſophers therefore who diſcourſe of theſe Things with moſt Cloſeneſs and Severity, venture boldly to affirm, *That nothing is evil but only what is diſhoneſt*: And even thoſe themſelves who do it more looſly, yet always acknowledge, *That it is the greateſt however of all Evils.* That Saying of the Poet's indeed is good, *I neither am, nor have been tied by Oath to a treacherous Deceiver*; but it is therefore ſo, becauſe when ATREUS was brought upon the Stage, he was to make him ſpeak that which was ſuitable to his Character. But if once they begin to lay down this for a Maxim, *That Faith, when given to thoſe who are treacherous, is not to be kept*; they had beſt have a care that this be not made a Refuge and Cover for Perjury. *As for his Oaths being made to an Enemy*; even War it ſelf has Laws that belong to it; and Faith, except in ſome very few Caſes, is always to be kept even with our greateſt Adverſaries. For whatever you ſwear, for Example, in ſuch a Manner, as that your Conſcience tells you it ought to be done, you are bound moſt inviolably to perform it: But where it is otherwiſe, you do not lie under any ſuch Obligation; and are not perjured, though you ſhould not perform it. Suppoſe, for the purpoſe, you had ſworn to a Pirate, That you would pay him ſuch a Sum, if he would ſpare your Life; it would not be Perjury, though you ſhould not pay it him. For a Pirate is by no means a lawful Adverſary, but rather a common Peſt and Enemy of Mankind; ſo that no one is obliged to keep his Faith or Oath with him. For to ſwear to a Thing, and yet not perform it, is is not immediately to *forſwear* one's ſelf: But then a Man is properly ſaid

to be *perjured*, when he ſwears upon his Conſcience (as our Form runs) to do ſuch and ſuch Things, and yet does not do them. For that of EURIPIDES may be ſaid in ſome Caſes to be very good, *My Tongue indeed ſwore, but my Conſcience did not aſſent.* But had REGULUS in his Caſe done any thing contrary to the Laws and Conditions that are kept between Enemies, it had been downright Perjury. For the *Carthaginians*, with whom he had then to do, were a lawful Adverſary, between whom and us there is all the Fecial, and ſeveral other Laws that are common to Nations. For had it been otherwiſe, it is certain the Senate would never have delivered up ſome eminent Perſons in Chains to their Enemies.

CHAP. XXX.

Examples of ſeveral eminent Romans *given up to the Enemy. Anſwer to the reſt of the Arguments brought againſt* Regulus.

BUT they *did* deliver both LUCIUS VETURIUS and SP. POSTHUMIUS in their ſecond Conſulſhips to their Enemies, the *Samnites*; becauſe being beaten at the Paſſage of *Caudium*, and the Legions being diſarmed and ſent away with Diſgrace, they had concluded a Peace of their own Heads, without any Orders from the Senate or People. T. NUMICIUS and Q. MÆLIUS, who were Tribunes of the People at the ſame time, becauſe by their Authority the Peace was concluded, were likewiſe delivered; that ſo we might be freed from any Obligation of keeping it. And all this was done upon the Propoſal and Advice of POSTHUMIUS

MIUS himſelf, who was the Perſon delivered. The Caſe of MANCINUS, a great many Yeas after, was exactly the ſame, who having, without any Orders from the Senate, ſtruck up an Alliance with thoſe of *Numantia*, was the firſt Man that ſpoke for that Bill in the Senate-houſe, which by L. FURIUS and SEXT. ATILIUS was carried to the People; and which they agreeing to, he was delivered to the Enemy. He did more honeſtly than SEXT. POMPEIUS, who being concerned in the ſame ſort of Crime, made Intereſt to be excuſed from undergoing the ſame Puniſhment, and by that means eſcaped it. This Man now let the Appearance of Profit prevail over Honeſty; but in all the others mentioned, the Authority of Honeſty eaſily carried it from the pretended Profit. But to go on with REGULUS: Another Thing urged by his Adverſaries is this, *That he ſhould not have performed what was forcibly put upon him.* As though a Man of Courage could be wrought upon by Force. *But why*, ſay they, *did he go at all to the Senate, being reſolved to diſſwade the Delivery of the Captives?* This is to blame him for that, which particularly deſerves Commendation: He would not depend upon his own Judgment, but pleading for that which he thought moſt profitable, left it to be determined by the Judgment of the Senate: And had it not been for his Counſel in the Caſe, the Priſoners had ſurely been ſent again to *Carthage*, and he remained ſafe in his native Country: But this he concluded would be a Prejudice to the Publick, and therefore eſteemed it to be no more than his Duty to ſpeak what he thought, and endure what might come of it. Laſtly, They add, *That whatever makes highly for one's Profit and Advantage, thereby becomes Honeſt.* I anſwer, That it may indeed antecedently *be* ſuch, but can never *thereby become* ſuch: For nothing is

Profitable but what is Honeſt; and things do not *become* Honeſt by their firſt being Profitable, but *become* Profitable by their firſt being Honeſt. I conclude therefore, That of all thoſe great and wonderful Examples, which might eaſily be brought upon this Subject, it will be hard to find any more illuſtrious and commendable than this of REGULUS.

CHAP. XXXI.

Regulus's *Returning to* Carthage *a Commendation of thoſe Times. The Sacredneſs of an Oath, though extorted by Force, among the ancient* Romans. *This illuſtrated by the Example of* Pomponius *and* Manlius.

BUT the only thing that deſerves our Admiration, in all this glorious Conduct of REGULUS, is his perſwading the Senate not to reſtore the Captives. As for his returning again to *Carthage*, it is true we admire it in our Days, but at thoſe Times he could not have poſſibly avoided it. The Age, I think, therefore ſhould rather be commended for *that*, than the Man. For there is nothing our Anceſtors took greater Care of, than that the Tye of an Oath ſhould be always held as moſt ſacred and inviolable. This appears plainly from the XII Tables; it appears from thoſe Laws which are called *Sacratæ*; it appears from the ſtrict Obſervation of Leagues, by which we are obliged to keep Faith even with Enemies; and, laſtly, it appears from the Puniſhments and Penalties which have been inflicted by the Cenſors; who in no one Thing have been more ſevere, than in puniſhing thoſe who had tranſgreſſed their Oaths. M. POMPONIUS, a Tribune of the People, once entered an Action

Action againſt L. MANLIUS, the Son of AULUS, who had been Dictatator, for holding that Office ſomewhat longer than he ſhould have done. And amongſt other things brought in this too againſt him, That he kept his Son TITUS, who was afterwards TORQUATUS, from Converſation with the World, and had ſtrictly charged him to live ſolitary in the Country. As ſoon as the Son heard his Father was in Trouble about this Buſineſs, he is reported immediately to have ſet out for *Rome*, and come early in the Morning to POMPONIUS's Houſe. POMPONIUS was no ſooner told of his Coming, but he got up immediately; and thinking the Youth, out of Anger, had brought ſome Complaint againſt his Father, commanded all others to depart the Room, and him alone to be brought in to him. As ſoon as the young Man was got into the Room, he drew his Sword, and ſwore he would immediately kill POMPONIUS, unleſs he would promiſe him upon Oath to meddle with his Father no further. POMPONIUS, out of ſudden Apprehenſion of the Danger, did ſwear to him accordingly, and diſcharged his Father from any more Trouble; having firſt reported the Matter to the People, and told them why he was forced to let fall his Action. Thus ſtrict and conſcientious were People at thoſe Times in obſerving their Oaths. And this TITUS MANLIUS is that very Perſon, who being afterwards challenged by a mighty *Frenchman*, killed him in a Duel by the River *Anien*, and was ſirnamed TORQUATUS from wearing a Chain, (in Latin *Torquis*) which he took from his Neck. The ſame Man again, in his third Conſulſhip, put to flight and defeated the *Latins* near *Veſeris*. He was indeed a very great and extraordinary Perſon; who as he ſhewed his Love, in this Caſe, to his Father, ſo he was unnaturally Cruel to his Son.

Chap. XXXII.

The Severity of the Romans *againſt the Breakers of Oaths. The Example of ten ſent by* Hannibal *to the Senate, upon Oath of returning. Fraud not ſufficient to excuſe a Perjury. A reſolute Action of the Senate in not redeeming eight Thouſand Priſoners. The Concluſion of this Head.*

BUT as Regulus did well in performing his Oath; ſo thoſe ten, who, after the Battel at *Cannæ*, were by Hannibal ſent to the *Roman* Senate, upon Oath of returning to the *Carthaginian* Camp, if they could not obtain an Exchange of Priſoners, did ill if they did not return accordingly: Concerning whom Writers have differed in their Relations. Polybius, an Author of very good Credit, informs us, Ten Perſons of conſiderable Quality were ſent to the Senate; and that nine of them honeſtly returned to the Camp, not having been able to obtain what they went about; but the tenth ſtaid behind and remained at *Rome*. This Man, as ſoon as he was out of the Camp, pretending he had forgot to take ſomething along with him, went back thither again; as thinking his returning under ſuch a colour, was a very ſufficient Performance of his Oath. But certainly he was miſtaken; for Cunning is ſo far from excuſing a Perjury, that it aggravates it rather, and makes it the more criminal. This therefore was no more than a fooliſh piece of Craftineſs, impudently pretending to paſs for Prudence: Whereupon the Senate took care to order, that my crafty Gentleman ſhould be ſent back in Fetters again to Hannibal.

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But the glorioufeſt Action of the Senate was this: HANNIBAL had eight Thouſand of our Soldiers his Priſoners; not ſuch as had either been taken in Battel, or had fled from any imminent Danger of their Lives; but were left in the Camp by PAULLUS and VARRO, the then two Conſuls. The Senate decreed that theſe ſhould not be Ranſomed, though it might have been done with a ſmall Sum of Money; for no other end but to let our Soldiers ſee, that either they muſt reſolve to Conquer, or Die. Upon the News of which, as the ſame Author tells us, HANNIBAL preſently began to be diſheartned, when he ſaw that the Senate, and People of *Rome*, had ſo great Reſolution even in the midſt of their Misfortunes. Thus, we ſee, Honeſty gets the better in the compariſon, againſt that which has only the Appearance of Profit. But ACILIUS, who has written an Hiſtory in Greek, ſays, More of them returned under this Pretence to the Camp, hoping by ſuch a Trick to get quit of their Oaths; and *that* they were all of them branded with Shame and Diſhonour by the Cenſors. But let us now put an end to this third Head; ſince from what has been ſaid it is apparently maniſeſt, That whatever is contrary to the Virtue of *Fortitude*; that is to ſay, whatever is done with a timorous, mean, diſheartned, abject Spirit, can never be really and truly Profitable, becauſe it is wicked, diſgraceful and odious. And ſuch would this Action of REGULUS have been, had he either, in delivering his Senſe about the Captives, ſpoke what was for his *own*, not the *Publick* Security; or afterwards choſen to remain at home, inſtead of returning to fulfil his Oath.

Chap. XXXIII.

Nothing contrary to Temperance, &c. can be truly Profitable. Who thoſe Philoſophers were, that made Happineſs and Miſery conſiſt in Pleaſure and Pain. This Opinion ruins all Virtue, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance and Juſtice: However theſe Philoſophers endeavour to clear themſelves of this Imputation; but cannot get well off. Pleaſure oppoſite to Honeſty. The Abſurdity of thoſe, who would have made Happineſs to conſiſt in both theſe. A ſhort Recapitulation of this laſt Book. How far Pleaſure may be allowed. A Concluſion, by way of Exhortation to his Son.

WE have now finiſhed our third Head, the fourth and laſt remains only to be ſpoke to, which contains in it Decency, Modeſty, Moderation, Continence, and Temperance. And can any thing be Profitable, that is oppoſite to a Train of ſuch excellent Virtues? There hath been however a Sect of Philoſophers, Scholars of Aristippus, who were called *Cyrenaicks*; and others, who had the Name of *Annicerians* given them, that affirm all Good to conſiſt in Pleaſure, and count Virtue it ſelf *therefore* only deſirable, becauſe of ſome Pleaſure which it brings along with it. But theſe being now almoſt worn out of Date, Epicurus is mightily come into Vogue, the great Supporter, and, as it were, ſecond Founder of the ſame Opinions. With theſe we muſt fight (as they ſay) with might and main, if ever we think of ſupporting the Cauſe, and maintaining the Intereſt of Virtue and Honeſty. For if what Metrodorus has written paſs for Truth, *That whatever can truly*

truly be called our Profit, nay, and all the Welfare and Happineſs of Life, conſiſts in a firm Conſtitution of Body, and a well-grounded Hope of its laſting Continuance; it is certain *this Profit*, nay, *this ſovereign Profit* (for ſuch they account it) muſt ſometimes be ſet in oppoſition to Honeſty. For what, in the firſt place, will be the Office of *Prudence?* only to cater and look about for Pleaſures? How miſerable a Caſe is that Virtue in, which is thus made a Servant and Pander to Pleaſure? But what ſhall be her Buſineſs in this Office? to taſte and diſtinguiſh ingeniouſly betwixt Pleaſures? Suppoſing this to be a pleaſant Buſineſs, it is certainly the moſt ſcandalous one that could ever have been thought on. Again, Can he that makes Pain be the greateſt Evil, have ever ſuch a Virtue as *Fortitude* in him, the very Nature of which conſiſts wholly in deſpiſing of Pains and Difficulties? I know EPICURUS upon ſeveral Occaſions, and this in particular, ſpeaks very couragiouſly as to the matter of Pain; but we muſt not conſider ſo much what *is* ſaid, as what *ought to be ſaid* by a Man of his Principles, who makes Pleaſure and Pain to be the ultimate Bounds of Man's Happineſs and Miſery. So again, if you would hear him about *Continence* and *Temperance*, he tells you abundance of extraordinary things in a great many places; but he is gravelled (as we ſpeak) and can never be able to acquit himſelf handſomly. For with what Face of Reaſon can he commend *Temperance*, who places his Happineſs in the Enjoyment of Pleaſures? when the ſenſual Appetite follows after Pleaſures, and it is the Buſineſs of *Temperance* to correct that Appetite. But ſtill they endeavour, in each of theſe Virtues, to bring themſelves off by one little Shift or other: Thus *Prudence* is admitted, and defined to be *The Skill of ſupplying us*

with Pleaſures, and defending us from Pains: And they make out *Fortitude* as well as they can, by ſaying it conſiſts in deſpiſing Death, and enduring Torments. They do bring in a ſort of *Temperance* too, though not without a great deal of Straining and Difficulty; but however they make a ſhift, after ſome faſhion, by ſaying, they count it the greateſt Pleaſure, if they can but be exempt from Pain and Uneaſineſs. Thus theſe three Virtues ſtand up pretty well; but *Juſtice*, the fourth, totters mightily with them, or rather indeed is quite fallen to the Ground; with all thoſe Duties, which relate to the maintenance of Human Society: For what Kindneſs, Liberality, Affability, or Friendſhip can there be amongſt thoſe, who deſire theſe Virtues not purely for themſelves, but only in relation to their Pleaſure or Advantage? To make ſhort then, I ſhall only ſay, that as I have ſhewn before, That nothing can be Profitable which is contrary to Honeſty, ſo now I do affirm, That Pleaſure in general is contrary to Honeſty. I the more blame therefore DINOMACHUS and CALLIPHO, who thought this Diſpute might be brought to an Iſſue, if they joined both Pleaſure and Virtue together, like a Man and a Beaſt as it were in the ſame Yoke. For Virtue can never admit of this Conjunction, but abhors and diſdains it; nor can ever the ſovereign Good and Evil, which muſt be one ſingle and ſimple thing, be made up and compounded of ſuch different Principles. But of this, which is a thing of the greateſt Moment, I have written at large in another Work: Let us now return to our preſent Subject: What has been ſaid in this laſt Book, I hope, is enough to let any one ſee, how it is his Duty to determine his Choice, if that which ſeems uſeful and expedient for him, ſhould come into competition with that which is

Ho-

Honeſt. But if it ſhould be ſaid, that even Pleaſure carries with it the appearance of Profit; let it alſo be conſidered, That it never can be brought to an Agreement with Honeſty: For the moſt that can poſſibly be ſaid for Pleaſure, (that we may not ſeem wholly to exclude it) is, That it ſerves by way of Sauce, to give a Reliſh to things, but has no true Profit or Advantage in it ſelf.

This is the Preſent, dear Son MARK, that your Father ſends you, and in my Opinion it is a very good one; but that will depend upon the uſe you ſhall make of it. However entertain, among CRATIPPUS's Lectures, theſe three Books, and ſhew them at leaſt the Civility due to Strangers Had it been my fortune to have come to *Athens* (which had ſurely been done, if I had not been recalled by the Cries of my Country) you might then perhaps ſometimes have heard my Lectures: However ſince now, in peruſing theſe Sheets, you will have my Voice, as it were, by Proxy; Pray beſtow upon them as much time as you can, and I am ſure *you can* as much as you pleaſe. When I hear you take a pleaſure in this ſort of Studies, it will delight me to talk to you (which I hope may be ſpeedily) face to face, or however to write to you, though at never ſo great a diſtance. In the mean time Adieu, my dear CICERO, and aſſure your ſelf, that *though* no one in the World is more dear to me than you are, *yet* you will hereafter be much more ſo, if I find you take Delight in ſuch Writings and Inſtructions.

THE END.

INDEX.

☞ *The first Figure refers to one of the Three Books; the second, &c. to the Chapter of that Book.*

A.

Academicks, little differing from the *Peripateticks* 1, 1. 3, 4. have a right to treat about Duties 1, 2. how differing from the *Scepticks*, and why they dispute against every thing 2, 2. formerly the same with the *Peripateticks* 3, 4. are not tied to a Set of Opinions 3, 4.

Accusing, how far allowable 2, 14.

Acilius the Historian 3, 32.

Acknowledgment, a sufficient return of a Kindness 2, 20.

Action gives a true Value to Virtue 1, 6. to take place of Speculation 1, 6, 43, 44, 45. not to be ventured on, if we doubt of its Honesty 1, 9. should be free from Rashness, *&c.* 1, 29. three Rules to be observed for keeping *Decorum* in our Actions 1, 39. Order and Regularity to be observed in our Actions 1, 40. these depend upon Time and Place 1, 40. good Actions ill applied become bad ones 2, 18.

Actors choose the Parts fittest for their Humours 1, 31. respect Modesty 1, 35.

Admiration, how moved in Men 2, 10, 11.

Advantages tempt Men to be Rogues 3, 10.

Advice of Friends to be asked in Prosperity 1, 26. of experienced Men in doubt 1, 41. Rules about taking this Advice 1, 41.

Advocates may plead for what is not really true 2, 14.

Ædiles

Ædiles who, and their Magnificence 2, 16.
Affability wins Peoples Love 2, 14.
Affectation odious 1, 36.
Africanus his saying, That Men grown proud, *&c.* 1, 26. his Retirement and saying That he was never less Idle, *&c.* 3, 1. *Afric.* the Younger razes *Carthage* and *Numantia* 1, 22. Son of *Paullus* 1, 33. not to be corrupted by Money 2, 22.
Agamemnon sacrificed his Daughter 3, 25.
Agreement between the several Orders, the Support of a State 3, 22.
Agriculture commended 1, 42.
Ajax, his Character 1, 31.
Alexander Phereus the Tyrant 2, 7.
Alex. the Great, often guilty of great Vices 1, 26. chidden by his Father for giving Money 2, 15.
Ambition a great Cause of Injustice 1, 8, 19. is generally in Men of the greatest Souls, *ibid.* is contrary to true Courage 1, 19, 20. robs a Man of his Liberty 1, 20. is destructive to a State 2, 25. 3, 21.
Anger against Adversaries to be avoided 1, 25. especially in Punishing 1, 25. also in common Discourse, in Chiding, and in Quarrels 1, 38.
Annicerian Philosophers 3, 33.
Another's Right, *see* take.
Antipater the *Stoick* 2, 24. 3, 14.
Apelles's Venus 3, 2.
Applause, the desire of it to be avoided 1, 19, 20.
Aquillius's Formulæ 3, 14, 15.
Aratus the *Sicyonian* 2, 23.
Aristippus 1, 41. 3, 33.
Ariston 1, 2.
Aristotle neglected Eloquence 1, 1. his Opinion about Shows to the People, *&c.* 2. 16. makes Honesty far outweigh all other Goods 3, 8.

Armies of little use abroad, without Prudence at home, *&c.* 1, 22.
Assent not to be given hastily 1, 6.
Athens a famous University 1, 1. 3, 2.
Athenians make a cruel Edict 3, 11. forsake their City for fear of the *Persians*, ibid. reject a dishonest Proposal, *&c.* ibid.
Avarice one great cause of Injustice 1, 7, 8. a sign of a narrow and sordid Spirit 1, 20. Magistrates should be free from Suspicion of it 2, 21. is destructive to a State 2, 22.

B.

Bardylis the *Illyrian* 2, 11.
Bargains should be made at a word 3, 15.
Beauty of two sorts 1, 36. how to be gotten *ibid.*
Becoming, *see* Decency.
Benefits; how we should judge of their value 1, 15. done either by our Money or Industry 2, 15. relate either to the Republick, or to Particulars 2, 19, *&c.* upon whom best bestowed 2, 18, 20.
Body should be enured to Labour 1, 23. the care Nature has taken in its Fabrick 1, 35.
Bounty, 12. *see* Liberality.
Boys not allowed all sorts of Plays 1, 29.
Bragging very unbecoming 1, 38.
Bribery in Magistrates the Ruin of a Republick 2, 21, 22. Laws made against it by the *Romans* 2, 21.
Brutes, how differing from Men 1, 4, *&c.* we often talk of their Courage, but not Justice, *&c.* 1, 16.
Brutus deposed *Collatinus* 3, 10.
Building; its Measures and End 1, 39.
Buyers should not use Arts to beat down the Prices 3, 15. *see* Seller.

C.

Cæsar, Brother of *Catulus*, a facetious Man 1, 37.

Cæsar, broke through the most sacred Ties for the sake of Empire 1, 8. Robbed some that he might be Generous to others 1, 14. rent and mangled his Country 1, 17. was killed for his Tyranny 2, 7. triumphs over *Marseilles*, &c. 2, 8. his Party was Wicked and Detestable 2, 13. loved Villany, though he got nothing by it 2, 24. makes himself King of the *Romans*, &c. 3, 21.
Callicratidas too careful of his own Honour 1, 24. a Lover of Simplicity 1, 30.
Calling, *see* Life.
Calliphe and *Dinomachus* join Pleasure and Virtue 3, 33.
Cannius's Bargain 3, 14.
Carriage toward all Men to be taken care of 1, 28, 35.
Carthaginians Treacherous 1, 12.
Cato Censorius, his Letter to *Poppilius* 1, 11. caused the third *Carthaginian* War 1, 23. his Apothegms 1, 29. his Answer about managing an Estate 2, 25.
Cato, Father to *Uticensis*, his Determination of a Case 3, 16.
Cato Uticensis's Genius 1, 31. too headstrong in standing up for the Interest of the Publick 3, 22
Catulus not inferiour to *Pompey* 1, 22. *Catuli* counted the best Speakers 1, 37.
Chiding sometimes necessary 1, 38. Rules to be observed in it, *ibid.*
Children naturally loved 1, 4.
Chrysippus's excellent Saying 3, 10.
Cicero's Service to his Country-men by Writing 1, 1. assumes to himself the Virtues of an Orator, *&c.* ibid. his prudent Management of the Republick 1, 22. 2, 24. got his Preferments by all the

the Votes 2, 17. betakes himſelf to Retirement 3, 1. deſigned to have gone to *Athens* 3, 33.
Cimbers and *Celtibers* 1, 12.
Cimon of *Athens*'s Hoſpitality 2, 18.
Circumſtances of Men to be regarded in Giving 1, 8. 2, 18. make that not to be a Crime, which uſually is one 3, 4.
Cities, in taking them nothing to be done cruelly, *&c.* 1, 24. the great uſe of them 2, 4. why at firſt built 2, 21, 22.
Citizens Duties 1, 34.
Claudius Centumalus 3, 16.
Clemency, how far laudable 1, 25.
Cleombrotus beat by *Epaminondas* 1, 24.
Cloaths; only Health to be regarded in them 1, 30. Moderation to be obſerved in the fineneſs of them 1, 36.
Clowniſhneſs to be avoided 1, 35, 36.
Common: all things at firſt were ſo 1, 7. what things are common to all 1, 16.
Company; a Man would be weary of his Life without it 1, 43. to keep Company with Good and Wiſe Men recommends young People 2, 13.
Conceal, how differing from *not to tell* 3, 12. what it is 3, 13.
Concord a Pillar of any State 2, 22.
Confidence, *ſee* Truſt.
Conſtantia, what it is 1, 20.
Contemplation ſhould give place to Action 1, 4, 6, 43, 44, 45.
Copulation, the Deſire of it natural to all Animals 1, 4.
Corinth razed by the *Romans* 1, 11. 3, 11.
Correction, *ſee* Chiding, Puniſhment.
Covetouſneſs; *ſee* Avarice.
Countenance to be kept always the ſame, without Dejection 1, 26.

Counterfeit: nothing can be lasting that is such 2, 12.
Country claims a share in us 1, 8. the Love we have for it swallows up all other Loves 1, 17. their Wickedness who injure it 1, 17. every one that is able ought to serve it 1, 20. should be preferred even before Parents 1, 17, 45. 3, 23.
Courage is a Virtue contending for Honesty 1, 19. an Enemy to Treachery, *&c. ibid.* to desire of Applause 1, 20. consists in two things *ibid.* is obtained by the Mind, not the Body 1, 23. in War recommends young Men 2, 13. teaches us to fear nothing, *&c.* 3, 27. nothing Profitable that is contrary to it 3, 26, *&c.*
Craft, *see* Cunning.
Crassus Marc. his Saying about Riches 1, 8. made Heir by a false Will 3, 18. an ill Man 3, 19.
Crassus Luc. an Orator 1, 37. got Honour by an Accusation 2, 13.
Crassus the Wealthy, Ædile 2, 16.
Cratippus, who he was 1, 1. 2, 2.
Cruelty most contrary to Nature 2, 11.
Cunning far from true Wisdom 1, 19. 2, 3. 3, 17. the great Mischief of it 3, 17. doth not excuse from Perjury, but rather aggravates it 3, 32.
Custom and Civil Constitutions to be followed 1, 41. some may act against them, and others not *ibid.*
Cynicks argue against Modesty 1, 35. to be wholly rejected 1, 41.
Cyrenaick Philosophers 3, 33.

D.

DAncing in the Streets scandalous 3, 19, 25.
Danger how far to be undertaken 1, 24. we should endanger our selves rather than the Publick *ibid.*
Debts forgiven, *&c.* 2, 22, 23. Governours should hin-

hinder People from running into Debt 2, 24.
Deceit frees a Man from being bound by his Promiſe 1, 10.
Decency obſerved by Man only 1, 4. inſeparable from Honeſty 1, 27. is ſeen in all the parts of Honeſty *ibid.* draws the Approbation of all 1, 28. relates both to Body and Mind *ibid.* nothing Decent that is contrary to a Man's Genius 1, 31. Decency of Living according to Univerſal Nature 1, 28, 29, 30. according to each Man's particular one 1, 30, 31. according to one's Place or Station in the World 1, 32. is ſeen in our Words, Actions, *&c.* 1, 35. in our Hands, Eyes, *&c. ibid.* conſiſts in three things *ibid.*
Decorum of the Poets 1, 28.
Defending, more laudable than to Accuſe 2, 14. to defend a guilty Perſon lawful *ibid.*
Define; the Subject of a Diſcourſe ought to be defined at the beginning 1, 2.
Deliberation, five Heads of it 1, 3. in ſome Caſes ſinful 3, 4, 8, *&c.*
Demetrius Phalerius who he was 1, 1. blames *Pericles* 2, 17.
Demetrius forſaken by the *Macedonians* 2, 7.
Demoſthenes a Hearer of *Plato* 1, 1. at what age he began his Study 2, 13.
Deſire of Riches, *&c. ſee* Avarice, Ambition.
Deſpiſing different from having an ill Opinion of 2, 10.
Dicæarchus's Book about the Deſtruction of Men 2, 5.
Difficult Subject, *ſee* Study. Difficulty makes a thing more honourable 1, 19.
Diogenes and *Antipater* diſpute 3, 12, 13.
Dion taught by *Plato* 1, 44.
Dionyſius the *Sicilian* Tyrant 2, 7.
Direct a wandering Traveller 1, 16.

Diſcourſe; variety in Mens Ways of it 1, 30. not to be dreſſed up with Greek Expreſſions 1, 31. of two ſorts 1, 37. 2, 14. common Diſcourſe ſhould be eaſie, *&c. ibid.* free from Paſſion, *&c.* 1, 38. ſhould be agreeble to the Subject we diſcourſe upon 1, 37, 40.
Diſputing of two ſorts, by Reaſon and by Force 1, 11.
Diſſimulation ſhould be excluded 3, 15.
Diviſion ſhould take in the whole Matter divided 1, 3.
Dolus malus what 3, 14. puniſhed by the Civil Laws 3, 15.
Donations to the People, when allowable 2, 16, 17.
Doubt: We ſhould do nothing, of which we doubt whether it is Honeſt or not 1, 9. in Caſes of doubt ask experienced Men's Advice 41.
Duties: the whole Subject of them conſiſts of two parts 1, 3. middle and perfect ones. *ibid.* 3, 3, 4. incumbent on us in every part of our Lives 1, 2. greater ones to take place before leſs 1, 10. Duty to Parents adorns a young Man 2, 13.

E.

EDucation of Youth a laudable Employment 1, 42. makes many uſeful Men, *&c.* 1, 44.
Effeminacy to be avoided 1, 4. *ſee* Niceneſs.
Eloquence preferable to acute Thinking 1, 44. its great force, *&c.* 2, 14. its downfal in *Rome* 2, 19. gives one opportunities of Obliging many, *ibid.*
Enemies by the old *Romans* called Strangers 1, 12. Juſtice to be kept towards them 1, 11, 12. 3, 29. difference of Carriage to be obſerved toward them 1, 12. none to be reckoned Enemies, but who take up Arms againſt the State 1, 25.
Ennius 1, 8, 16.

Epi-

Epicurus ruins all Virtue 1, 2. 3, 33, makes Happineſs conſiſt in Pleaſure 3, 33. endeavours to bring himſelf off, but in vain, *ibid.*
Eſtate, how to be gotten, bettered, *&c*, 1, 26. 2, 24, 25. it is a ſcandal to ruin it by neglect 2, 18. that the beſt, that can be left to a Son 1, 33.
Evenneſs of Temper, a part of Courage 1, 26.
Evils; the leaſt to be choſen 3, 1, 28, 29. thoſe of Body and Fortune leſs than thoſe of the Soul 3, 5.
Euripides's *Phœniſſæ* 3, 21.
Exacting to be avoided in Dealing with others 2, 18.
Exerciſe requiſite to make Men perfect 1, 18.
Extraordinary things move admiration 2, 10.

F.

Q. Fabius Labeo's Trick 1, 10. *Fab. Maximus* his Wiſe Delaying 1, 24. his Subtilty and Cunning 1, 30.
Fabricius's Juſtice 1. 13. 3, 4, 22.
Faith, the Foundation of Juſtice 1, 7. ſet up in the Capitol next to *Jupiter* 3, 29. to be kept with Enemies, *ibid.* *See* Oaths.
Fathers often followed in courſe of Life by their Sons 1, 32. Rules to be obſerved in imitating them 1, 33. whether to be accuſed by their Sons, ſhould they Plot againſt the State 3, 23.
Fear, one cauſe of Injuſtice 1, 7. Promiſes made through fear not binding 1. 10. an improper way of getting Men to be of our ſide; and the ill Conſequences of it 2, 7, 8.
Fecial Law of the *Romans* 1, 11. 3, 29.
Fides derived by the *Stoicks* 1, 7. *Ex fide bona*, a Form in Law 3, 17.
Fighting, when laudable 1, 23.
Fimbria, Judge in a Caſe 3, 19.
Flatterers to be avoided 1, 26. Eſtates got by Flattery, ſcandalous 3, 18.

Force

Force and Fraud, the two ways of injuring Men; the latter more odious 1, 13. a couragious Man cannot be forced 3, 31.
Forms in Judgment 3, 15. the general Form or Rule 3, 5.
Fortune muſt yield to Nature 1, 33. her influence upon the good or ill Succeſs of Actions 2, 6. Seditions will never be wanting, while Men hope to make Fortunes by them 2, 8. to be tranſported with good or ill Fortune, ſhews a mean Spirit 1, 26.
Freedom; wherein it conſiſts 1, 20.
Fretfulneſs upon unſeaſonable Viſits, *&c.* to be avoided 1, 25.
Friends neceſſary for all 2, 8. all common among Friends 1, 16. the Counſel of Friends ſhould be asked 1, 26. Men are born for their Friends, as well as themſelves 1, 8. Corrections, Counſel, *&c.* due among Friends 1, 17, How much may be done for the ſake of a Friend 3, 10. *Damon* and *Pythas* two Friends, *ibid.* cloſeneſs of Union between Friends 1, 17.
Friendſhip makes many become one 1, 17. is cemented by likeneſs of Manners, *ibid.* to be broken off by little and little 1, 33.

G.

GAte, ſhould not to be too ſlow, *&c.* 1, 36. Generals of the *Romans* delivered to their Enemies 3, 30.
Genius, *ſee* Nature.
Geometricians Method 3, 7.
Gentile Jeſts 1, 29. Carriage 1, 35.
Glory made up of three Ingredients 2, 9. *Cicero* wrote two Books about it, *ibid.* muſt be uſed with Diſcretion; and what the ſhorteſt cut to it 2, 12, 13. not to be gotten by Counterfeiting 2, 12. but by Juſtice 2, 13. cannot be durable unleſs

unleſs founded upon Virtue 2, 20. inconſiſtent with Wickedneſs 3, 22.

Gods; Duties to them to be be performed firſt 1, 45. how their Favour may be procured 2, 3. they never hurt, *ibid.* are never angry 3, 28, 29.

Good Fortune, it is a ſign of a low Spirit to be tranſported with it 1, 26.

Good Men ſo called from Juſtice 1, 7. 2, 11. who 3, 15, 19. very hard to be found, *ibid.* it is always profitable to be one, *ibid.* Good Men deſire Honeſty, not Secrecy 3, 9.

Good-will, *ſee* Love.

Government of a State like the Office of a Guardian 1, 25. the ſeveral Duties of thoſe that govern 2, 21, *&c.*

Gownmen as uſeful as Soldiers 1, 22, 23.

Gracchus Father of the two *Gracchi* 2, 12. his Sons juſtly ſlain, *ibid.* ruined by their levelling Principles 2, 23.

Gratidianus 3, 16, 20.

Gratitude a moſt neceſſary Duty, in which we ſhould imitate fruitful Fields 1, 15. all People hate one that is not Grateful 2, 18.

Greatneſs of Soul, natural to Man 1, 4. what it appears in 1, 5. enclines Men to Ambition 1, 8, 19. is often too hot 1, 15. uſually made moſt Account of in the World 1, 18. neceſſary for Stateſmen more than Philoſophers 1, 20. its Deſcription, and how it differs from Greatneſs of Underſtanding 1, 23. ſeen even in a retired Life 1, 26. is Savageneſs, if not accompanied with Juſtice 1, 44. *ſee* Courage.

Greek and Latin to be joined 1, 1. to bring Greek into Diſcourſe, ridiculous 1. 31.

Guilty Perſons may ſometimes be defended 2, 14.

Gyges's Ring 3, 9, 19.

H.

Hannibal Cruel 1, 12. ſends ten to *Rome* after the Fight at *Cannæ* 1, 13. 3, 32.
Haſtineſs in giving aſſent, a Fault in the ſearch of Truth 1, 7. the Paſſions ſhould not through haſte out-run Reaſon 1, 29.
Hate, able to ruine the greateſt Power 2, 7, 8.
Haughtineſs in Proſperity to be avoided 1, 26.
Health how to be preſerved 2, 24.
Hecaton the *Rhodian* 3, 15, 23.
Help: not to help the Injured if we can, is Injuſtice 1, 7.
Hercules ſees two ways 1, 32. is placed among the Gods 3, 5.
Herillus exploded 1, 2.
Herodotus the Hiſtorian 2, 12.
Heſiod's Rule 1, 15.
Hire; the worſt means of winning Men to our ſide 2, 6.
Honeſtum, whence it reſults 1, 4, 5. laudable in it ſelf, *ibid.* would make the World in Love with it, could it be ſeen 1, 5. ſhews it ſelf by its own Brightneſs, 1, 9. entitles a Man to our Liberality, 1, 14, 15. 2, 20. more-eſpecially deſerves our Study, 2, 3. naturally pleaſeth Men, 2, 9. is the ſame with Profit, 3, 3, 7, 8, *&c.* honeſt Man, who, 3, 19.
Honour; the Deſire of it tempts Men to Injuſtice, 3, 20.
Hortenſius Ædile, 2, 15. uſes a falſe Will, 3, 18.
Hoſpitality to be kept by great Men, 1, 39. praiſed deſervedly by *Theophraſtus*, 2, 18.
Hoſtis, its Signification among the old *Romans*, 1, 12.
Hot Counſels and Deſigns preferred by ſome, 1, 24.
Houſe, of what Sort becomes a great Man, 1, 39. the Maſter ſhould be an Honour to his Houſe, *ibid.*
Humility requiſite in Proſperity, 1, 26.
Humours, *ſee* Nature.

Hunt-

Hunting, a Manly Recreation, 1, 29.
Hypocriſy ſhould be baniſhed out of the World, 3, 14.

I.

JEſting in what Kind and Degree allowable, 1, 29.
Inheritance; the beſt a Father can leave to his Son, is the Fame of his Vertues, 1, 33,
Injuries, two Ways of doing them, 1, 13, injuring others moſt contrary to Nature, 3, 5,
Injuſtice of two Sorts, and the Cauſes of each, 1, 7, 8, 9. the greateſt, which is done under the Maſk of Honeſty, 1, 13.
Innocent Perſons never to be accuſed, 2, 14.
Intereſt draws one way, and Honeſty another, 1, 3. no baſe Thing can be any one's Intereſt, 3. 19. ſhould be meaſured by Juſtice, 3, 21.
Iſocrates contrary to *Ariſtotle*, 1, 1.
Judges Duty, 2, 14.
Juſtice the moſt ſplendid Virtue, 1, 7. makes Men be called Good, *ibid.* 2, 11. the Duties of it 1, 7. is alter'd upon an alteration of the Circumſtances, 1, 10. to be kept toward thoſe that have injur'd us, and Enemies, 1, 11. toward the meaneſt, ſuch as Slaves, 1, 13. is the only way of obtaining our Ends, 2, 3. makes Men truſt us more than Prudence, 2, 9. no Man juſt, who is afraid of Death, *&c.* 2, 11. Juſtice gets us all the three Ingredients of Glory, *ibid.* is neceſſary for all Men, even Pirates, 2. 11. Kings were at firſt choſe, and Laws made, for the ſake of it, 2, 12. no Credit can be laſting, that is not built upon it, 2, 20. is the Queen of all Virtues, 3, 6. nothing profitable that's contrary to it, 3, 22, *&c.*

K.

KIndneſſes ſhould be done to Honeſt rather than Great Men, 2, 20. not to be done to one, by injuring another, *ibid.* *See* Benefits.
Kings formerly choſe for their Juſtice, 2, 12. no Faith in caſe of a Kingdom, 1. 8. Juſtice violated for a Kingdom,

Kingdom 3, 21. many treacherous, and but few faithful to Kings *ibid.*
Knowledge how desired, *&c.* by Men 1, 4, 6. must give place to Action 1, 43. is a barren Accomplishment without Justice 1, 44. that of Honesty best 2, 2, 3, 3, 2.
Knavery to be avoided 2, 3. few Actions wholly free from it 3, 15. *See* Dolus malus.

L.

Lacedæmonians: Plato's Observation of them 1, 19. ruined by *Epaminondas* 1, 24. forsaken by their Allies 2, 7. murther their King *Agis*, &c. 2, 23.
Lætorius's Law 3, 15.
Language, *see* Discourse.
Largi, of two sorts 2, 16.
Latin to be joyned with Greek 1, 1.
Laws; a malicious Interpretation of them a means of Roguery 1, 10. punish Offenders according to Justice 1, 25. why first invented 2, 12. use the same Language to all Conditions *ibid.* the knowledge of them creditable at *Rome* 2, 19. gives a Man opportunities of obliging *ibid.* the End and Design of them 3, 5. how they root out Frauds 3, 17. the Law of Nations different from that of particular Cities *ibid.* *Roman* Law taken from Nature, and its Excellence *ibid.* Law of Nature takes in all Men 3, 6. Law-suits to be avoided 2, 18.
Learners how best corrected 1, 41.
Learning; who may be allowed to give themselves up to the Study of it 1, 20. is a Pleasure, not a a Labour 3, 2.
Letters, how to be expressed 1, 37.
Levelling Estates destructive, *&c.* 2, 21, *&c.*
Liberality: Three Cautions to be observed in it 1, 14. 2, 25. must be governed by Justice *ibid.* to give to one what is taken from another, not Liberality *ibid.* to whom it should be most shewn 1, 15, 18. 2, 18, 20. moves the Peoples Love

2, 9, 18. consists in doing Kindnesses either by *Money* or *Labour*; the latter preferable 2, 15. has got no bottom *ibid.* how the Liberal dispose of their Money 2, 16.
Liberty ought to be most of all contended for 1, 20. wherein it consists *ibid.* bites deeper after she has been chained 2, 7.
Life of Retirement, and that of Publick Business compared 1, 21. several Men take several ways of Life 1, 32. the difficulty of choosing a way of Life; and what chiefly to be regarded in it 1, 32, 33. should not easily be changed 1, 33. how such Change should be made *ibid.*
Little Indecencies especially to be avoided 1, 40. in the least things we observe what is becoming 1, 41.
Love of themselves and Offspring in all Animals 1, 4. Love a stronger Motive to Obedience than Fear 2, 7, 8. how to be gained of the People 2, 9. by what we are to judge of Mens Love to us 1, 15. we should do most for those, by whom we are loved most *ibid.* general Love, and that of Friendship, how far necessary 2, 8.
Lucullus magnificent in Building 1, 39.
Lycurgus the Law-giver of *Sparta* 1, 22.
Lying abominable 1, 42. 3, 14. should be banished from all Commerce 3, 15. is inconsistent with the Character of a good Man 3, 20.
Lysander enlarged the *Spartan* Empire 1, 22. Crafty 1, 30. the Ephore banished 2, 23.
Lysis Master of *Epaminondas* 1, 44.

M.

Macedonians desert *Demetrius* 2, 7. *Paullus* took the Treasure of *Macedon* 2, 22.
Magistrates Duties 1, 24, 25, 34. 2, 21, *&c.*
Mamercus put by the Consulship 2, 17.
Man; how different from Brutes 1, 4, 30. not born for himself alone 1, 7. all things on Earth made for him, say the *Stoicks ibid.* we should shew a

reſpect for all Men 1, 28, 36. and deſire to be thought well of by them *ibid.* ſome are Men in Name only 1, 30. Men may be allowed ſome Ornaments; but muſt avoid Niceneſs 1, 36. naturally love Society 1, 43, 44. do the moſt Good and Harm to one another 2, 3, 4, 5. to procure their Love the chief of Virtue 2, 5. by what means they are drawn to be for us 2, 6. every Man ſhould help any other becauſe he is a Man 3, 36.

Manlius Luc. and *Titus* 3, 31.

Marius made Conſul, *&c.* 3, 20. *Marius Gratidianus* 3, 16, 20.

Marriage the cloſeſt Bond of Society 1, 17.

Medes choſe the juſteſt Men Kings 2, 12.

Merchandice, how far creditable 1, 42.

Merchant of Corn's Caſe 3, 12, 23.

Merits of the Receiver to be conſidered in giving; of four ſorts 1, 14.

Metellus accuſed by *Marius* 3, 20. and *Africanus*'s Diſſent 1, 25.

Metrodorus's Opinion about Happineſs 3, 33.

Milo got great Honour 2, 17.

Mind of Man always in Motion 1, 6. conſiſts in Reaſon and Appetite 1, 28, 36. decency to be kept in its Motions 1, 36. filthineſs of the Mind more loathſome than of the Body 3, 29.

Moderation what 1, 40. is beſt in moſt things 1, 36.

Modeſty, Baſhfulneſs, *&c.* 1, 27. the Duties of them different from thoſe of Juſtice 1, 28. forbids to do or name ſome things 1, 35. the *Cynicks* argue againſt it *ibid.* nothing virtuous or becoming without it 1, 41. ſets off Eloquence, eſpecially in young Men 2, 14.

Money: *See* Hire, Riches, *&c.* thoſe tryed with Fire, who have withſtood its Temptations 2, 11. how beſt laid out 2, 16, 17, 18. bad Money ſhould not be put away 3, 23.

Motives drawing Men to favour us, *&c.* 2, 6.

Mummius took *Corinth*, &c. 2, 22.
Muſicians diſcover the leaſt Faults in Muſick 1, 40, 41.

N.

Naſica killed *T. Gracchus* 1, 22.
Nature ſhould be taken for Guide, and then we cannot err 1, 28. Pleaſures, *&c.* unworthy Man's Nature 1, 30. variety of Mens particular Natures *ibid.* every one ſhould follow his own Nature; and how far 1, 31. nothing becoming that is contrary to it *ibid.* its great influence on our Actions *ibid.* has greater ſway than Fortune 1, 23. directs to Modeſty 1, 35. is both an Human and Divine Law 3, 5. enjoyns each Man to help another 3, 6. always deſires what is becoming 3, 8. to live according to Nature, the Stoical chief Good 3, 3.
Neceſſity, not the Motive to Society among Men 1, 44.
Niceneſs in Carriage 1, 35. Dreſs, *&c.* 1, 36.
Nola and *Naples* quarrel about their Bounds 1, 10.
Non putaram, a Fool's ſhift 1, 23.

O.

Oaths given to Soldiers 1, 11. what is to be conſidered in Oaths 1, 13. 3, 29. I am not tied by Oath to a Deceiver 3, 28, 29. Oath is a religious Affirmation, *&c.* 3, 29. the Sacredneſs of them amongſt the old *Romans* 3, 31. not eluded by ſhifts 1, 13. 3, 32.
Obſcene Jeſting 1, 29. Talking diſcovers ill Inclinations, *&c.* 1, 35.
Obſcure Subjects to be neglected 1, 6.
Offence: a fear of giving Offence, a cauſe of Injuſtice 1, 9. a cauſe of Miſmanagement in Civil and Military Affairs 1, 24. it is the Duty of Modeſty not to give Offence 1, 28. nothing to be done, that may offend the Eyes and Ears 1, 35.
Offices a moſt uſeful and comprehenſive Subject 1, 2. 3, 2. who have a Right to diſcourſe about 'em 1, 2.
Old Age to be reverenced 1, 34, 41. the Duties of it 1, 34.

Opinion of the World concerning us not to be neglected 1, 28.
Oratory and Philoſophy to be joined 1, 1.
Order in our Words and Actions 1, 40.
Oreſtes gives a Dinner to the People 2, 17.
Other Mens Affairs appear ſmall to us, as things at a diſtance 1, 9. we ſhould mind by others what is becoming 1, 42. we can ſooneſt ſee Faults in others *ibid.*
Own: every one to be kept in the Enjoyment of his own 2, 22. own's Intereſt how far to be regarded 3, 5, 10.

P.

PAin racks and torments us 2, 10. not the greateſt Evil 3, 29.
Pains ſhould be proportioned to what we are about 1, 39.
Painters ſet their Works out to be viewed 1, 41.
Panætius, who he was 1, 2. left his Work about Duties unfiniſhed 3, 2, 7.
Particulars; nothing to be done for them, that is a Damage to the Publick 2, 21. ſhould not have Intereſt ſeparate from the Publick 3, 6.
Parts; Men have ſeveral Parts to be acted 1, 30, 32. parts of the Body well fitted by Nature 1, 35.
Paſſion: Injuries done in a Paſſion leſs heinous than in cold Blood 1, 8. ſhould be governed by Reaſon 1, 29, 36, 39. 2, 5. diſturb both Body and Mind 1, 29. to be ſhunned in Diſcourſe 1, 38. nothing can be liked that is done in a Paſſion *ibid.*
Pauſanias, Spartan General 1, 22.
Paullus had all the Riches of *Macedon* 2, 22.
Pericles's Anſwer to *Sophocles* 1, 40. is blamed by *Phalereus* 2, 17.
People careſſed, *&c.* 2, 16.
Peripateticks differ little from the *Academicks* 1, 1. 3, 4. have a Right to treat about Duties 1, 2. require a Mediocrity, and ſay Anger was given us to good Purpoſes 1, 25. their's a moſt noble and ancient Philoſophy 2, 2.

Perjury; when a Man is guilty of it 3, 29.
Phaeton 3, 25.
Phalaris 2, 7. 3, 6.
Philip of *Macedon*, above his Son in good Nature 1, 26. adviſes his Son to ſpeak kindly to the People 2, 14. rebukes him for giving them Money 2, 15.
Philip's Harangues in his Tribuneſhip 2, 21. his ill Council 3, 22.
Philoſophers unjuſt in minding only their Studies 1, 9. relinquiſh the Publick *ibid.* their Method of rooting out Frauds 3, 17. none may aſſume that Name, without giving Rules about Duty 1, 2. their Study commended 2, 2. Philoſophy a Comfort in Affliction 2, 1, 2. a rich and plentiful Soil 3, 2. the meaning of the word 2, 2.
Pirates ought to have no Faith kept with them 3, 29. cannot be without Juſtice 2, 11.
Place, its Influence on our Actions 1, 40.
Plato might have made an excellent Orator 1, 1. his ſaying, That Men are not born for themſelves only 1, 7. his Miſtake about the Philoſophers 1, 9. his two Rules about Government 1, 25. his Saying about Ambition *ibid.* his excellent Saying about Prudence 1, 10. his Fable about *Gyges* 3, 9.
Plays and Recreations how far allowable 1, 29. Play at Even and Odd, *&c.* 3, 19.
Players chooſe the parts fitteſt for them 1, 31. their reſpect to Modeſty 1, 35.
Pleaſures of Body beneath a Man 1, 30.
Pleaſures are alluring Miſtreſſes 2, 10. are contrary to Honeſty 3, 33. may ſerve to give a reliſh to Actions *ibid.* ſhould not be regarded in Eating, *&c.* 1, 30.
Poetical Decorum 1, 28. Poets ſet their Works out to be viewed 1, 41.
Polybius the Hiſtorian 3, 32.
Pompey Sext. a Geometrician 1, 6.

Pompey the Great, his Saying to *Cicero* 1, 20. his Party unſucceſsful 2, 13. his magnificent Shows to the People 2, 16.
Pomponius the Tribune 3, 31.
Pontius C. the *Samnite* 2, 21.
Poppilius a *Roman* Commander 1, 11.
Popular Expreſſions to be us'd 2, 10.
Power, the Deſire of it draws Men to Injuſtice 3, 21.
Practice neceſſary to perfect a Man in Virtue 1, 18.
Precepts inſufficient without Exerciſe *ibid.*
Preſent things more acceptable for a time 2, 17.
Pride in Proſperity to be avoided 1, 26.
Private Men ſhould be kept in their Eſtates 2, 21.
Prodigal who 2, 16.
Profit the ſame with Honeſty 2, 3. 3, 3, 7, 12. *&c.* Moves all Men 3, 8, 28. The Appearance of it makes Men act contrary to Duty 3, 11. ought to be rejected *ibid.* every thing honeſt profitable, and every thing profitable honeſt 3, 8.
Promiſes not always obliging 1, 10. 3, 24, 25.
Property, its Original 1, 7.
Prudence, the Duties reſulting from it 1, 5. Conſiſts in the Knowledge of Truth, and is moſt natural to Man 1, 6. of but little Worth without Juſtice 1, 43. different from Craft 1, 19. 2, 3. 3, 17. a Definition of it 1, 43. makes Men confide in us, if joyn'd, *&c.* 2, 9.
Publick Officers ſhould be free from Paſſion, *&c.* 1, 20, 25. ſhould ſee that what they undertake be honeſt *ibid.* remember *Plato*'s two Rules 1, 25. a Deſcription of a good one *ibid.* ſhould be courteous, affable, *&c. ibid.* do the braveſt Actions 1, 26. ſhould guard their Eyes as well as Hands 1, 40. not to be reſiſted 1, 41. publick and private Life compared 1, 21.
Puniſhments, Rules to be obſerved about them 1, 15, if ſome eſcape them, others grow more inſolent 2, 8.

Pyrrho can give no Rules about Duty 1, 2. 2, 2.
Pyrrhus his Speech upon giving up the Priſoners 1, 12. a Deſerter offers to poyſon him 1, 12. 3, 22.
Pythagoras 1, 17, 30.
Pythius, a Banker, *&c.* 3, 14.

R.

RAſhneſs in giving up our Aſſent to be avoided 1, 6. 2, 2. in our Actions 1, 29.
Reaſon ought to be the governing Faculty in Man 1, 28.
Rebukes in Friendſhip 1, 17. *See* Chiding.
Regularity, *ſee* Uniformity.
Regulus taken by the *Carthaginians*, *&c.* 1, 3. 3, 26, *&c.*
Relations ſhould be conſidered before other People 1, 14, 16.
Republick, *Cicero* wrote ſix Books about it 2, 17.
Reſpect ſhould be had for all Men 1, 28. eſpecially thoſe we converſe with 1, 35, 36, 38.
Retired People do very noble things 1, 26. *See* Life.
Revenge muſt be kept within Bounds 1, 11.
Rhetorick-Maſters over-run all 1, 36.
Riches why deſired 1, 8. it is not enough to get, unleſs one know how to uſe them 2, 12. neither to be kept too cloſe nor too open 2, 15. the beſt Fruit of them 2, 16. are too much reſpected 2, 20. to be got not for our ſelves alone, *&c.* 3, 15. are not profitable if accompanied with Infamy 3, 22. *See* Avarice, Liberality.
Romans famous for Courage 1, 18. their ancient Juſtice and Kindneſſes to Allies when changed 2, 8. ruined by Tyranny and Oppreſſion, *ibid.*
Romulus did ill in killing *Remus* 3, 10.
Roſcius Amerinus defended by *Cicero* 2, 14.
Rule, the Deſire of it natural to Men 1, 4. general Rule or Meaſure 3, 5.
Rutilius had the Name of an honeſt Man, *&c.* 2, 13. Scholar of *Panætius* 3, 2.

S.

S.

Salamis famous for a Victory 1, 22.
Salinacis 1, 18.
Scævola gives more than was asked for an Eſtate 3, 15. *Pontifex max.* 3, 17.
Scepticks, their Opinion 2, 2.
Secrecy, nothing to be committed out of Hopes of it 3, 8, 9, *&c.*
Self-love keeps Men from ſeeing their Duty 1, 9. Nature allows a Man to love himſelf firſt 3, 5, 10. but not to injure others for the ſake of ſelf *ibid.* 3, 6.
Seller bound to tell the Faults of his Goods 3, 12, 13, *&c.* ſhould uſe no Arts to enhance their Price 3, 15.
Serious things to be handled ſeriouſly 1, 37, 40.
Shows to the People, how far allowable 2, 16, 17.
Sincerity agreeable to Man's Nature 1, 4.
Singing openly a great Rudeneſs 1, 40.
Slaves how to be dealt with 1, 13. 2, 7. Tricks in ſelling them puniſhed 3, 17.
Society; the Principles, Sorts, and Degrees of it 1, 16, 17. nothing that Men ſhould be more concerned for 1, 43. Man by Nature ſociable 1, 44. Neceſſity not the Motive to Society *ibid.* Duties of it of ſeveral Degrees, in what Order to be performed 1, 43. Univerſal Society of what Nature 3, 12.
Socrates facetious and drolling 1, 30. of extraordinary Virtues 1, 41. his ſhorteſt Cut to Glory 2, 12, 13. uſed to curſe thoſe that ſeparate Profit and Honeſty 3, 3.
Solon, Athenian Law-giver 1, 22. his Craft 1, 30.
Sons ſhould live as becomes the Name of their Anceſtors 1, 22, 23. do not bath with their Fathers 1, 35.
Sophocles the Tragedian 1, 40.
Soul's Functions more noble than the Bodies 2, 13.
Speech, *ſee* Diſcourſe.

State, how to be ſupported 2, 7. 8, 3, 22.
Stiles of Eloquence and Philoſophy to be both cultivated 1, 1.
Stoicks; *Cicero* follows them in this Book 1, 2. great Admirers of Derivations 1, 8. their chief Good, *&c.* 3, 3.
Strangers Duties in a place 1, 34. a difference to be made between them 1, 41. ſhould not be forbid a City 3, 11.
Study not to be ſpent upon obſcure and difficult Subjects 1, 7. the end of it *ibid.* ſhould give place to Action 1, 4, 6, 43, 44, 45.
Subject of a Diſcourſe muſt be firſt explained 1, 2. different Subjects require different ways of Expreſſion 2, 10.
Subjects of common Diſcourſe 1, 37.
Sulpitius an Aſtronomer 1, 6. an Orator accuſes *Norbanus* 2, 14.
Summum jus, ſumma injuria 1, 10.
Swearing upon one's Conſcience 3, 16. my Tongue ſwore, but, *&c.* 3, 29.
Sylla [*Lucius's*] inhuman Victory 2, 8.
Sylla [*Pub.*] Kinſman to the former *ibid.*

T.

TAking away what is another's, a breach of Juſtice 1, 7. moſt contrary to Nature 3, 5, 6. taking away from one and giving to another, no Liberality 1, 14. no good Man will take from another to enrich himſelf 3, 19.
Talk, *See* Diſcourſe.
Taxes, the People not to be burthened with them 2, 21. Tax-gatherers hated 1, 42.
Ten Men ſent by *Hannibal* to *Rome*, &c. 1, 13. 3, 32.
Temperance 1, 5. the Duties of it muſt not always give place to thoſe of Juſtice 1, 45. and Sobriety adorn a young Man 2, 13. nothing Profitable that is contrary to it 3, 33.
Tenths paid to the Gods 2, 17. *Terence's*

Terence's *Chremes* 1, 9.
Thebe Wife of Tyrant *Alexander* 2, 7.
Themiſtocles 1, 22. his Opinion about Marrying a Daughter 2, 20. his Propoſal to the *Athenians* 3, 11.
Theophraſtus 1, 1. his Book about Riches 2, 16. praiſes Hoſpitality 2, 18.
Theſeus's Wiſh granted by *Neptune* 1, 10. 3, 25.
Thieves cannot ſubſiſt without Juſtice 2, 11.
Thinking; the end of it 1, 6. a good Man will not think what he is aſhamed ſhould be known 3, 19.
Thracians branded 2, 7.
Time and Place make Actions good or bad 1, 40.
Trades which creditable, *&c.* 1, 42. Tradeſmen ſhould avoid Lying 1, 42. be Juſt 2, 11.
Treachery, *&c.* contrary to Reaſon 3, 17.
Truce for thirty Days 1, 10.
Truſt: how Men are induced to truſt us 2, 9. Truſts not always to be reſtored 3, 25.
Truth; the Love of it natural to Man 1, 4, 30. two Faults in ſearch of it to be avoided 1, 6.
Tyrants generally come to ill Ends 2, 7. to kill them counted glorious among the *Romans* 3, 4. are Enemies of Human Society 3, 6. lead miſerable Lives 3, 31.

V.

Victuals: Pleaſure ſhould not be regarded in them 1, 30.
Viriathus, the *Luſitanian* Robber 2, 11.
Virtue alone, or at leaſt chiefly deſirable 1, 2. 3, 7. Virtues all connected 1, 5. 2, 10. forces us to love the Perſons that poſſeſs it 1, 17. 2, 9. its principal Office to procure the Love of Men 2, 5. conſiſts in three things *ibid.* moves Men's Admiration 2, 10. when it appears with greateſt Splendor *ibid.* ſcorns Affinity with Pleaſure 3, 33. *See* Honeſty.

Ulysses of a Temper to undergo any thing 1, 31. would have avoided the War 3, 26.
Unable: those who are unable to exercise some Virtues, should take the more care to get others 1, 33.
Ungrateful Men hated by all 2, 18.
Uniformity of Life, whence it arises 1, 31, 40. is most becoming *ibid.*
Unjust: those who spend their Lives in Contemplation are so 1, 9. and those who mind no body's Business but their own *ibid.*
Voice should be clear and harmonious, &c. 1, 37.
Voluntary: no true Virtue, that is not so 1, 9.
Usurers hated 1, 42. *Cato*'s Opinion of Usury 2, 25.

W.

WAnt: we should be most liberal to those that want most, &c. 1, 15. 2, 18.
War: Laws of it to be observed 1, 11. 3, 29. may be undertaken; but it must be for the sake of Peace 1, 11, 23. the Management of it less glorious than Civil Prudence 1, 22. Courage in it recommends a young Man 2, 13.
Ways two, of Pleasure and Virtue 1, 32.
Wicked: to be so, never Profitable 3, 15.
Will forged of *Minut. Basilius*, &c, 3, 18.
Wisdom, which the chief 1, 43. the Definition and Commendation of it 2, 2. to be often with Wise Men, recommends a young Man 2, 13. a Wise Man not wise for himself, good for nothing 3, 15.
Work-house can have nothing gentile in it 1, 42.
World: we should endeavour to be well thought of by all the World 1, 28.

X.

X*Anthippus* the *Lacedæmonian* 3, 26.
Xenocrates the severest Philosopher 1, 30.
Xenophon's *OEconomicks* translated by *Cicero* 2, 24.

Y.

YOung Men: the Duties of them 1, 34. how they should make themselves taken notice of in the World 2, 13. are not envied, but rather encouraged, *ibid.*

Z.

Z*Eno* holds Virtue to be the only Good 3, 8.

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